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China has made great progress in poverty reduction since the late 1970s when the rural economic 
reform was initiated (LGPR, WB and UNDP 2000).  From 1978 to 2000, more than 200 million 
people in rural areas have escaped from poverty.  Based on the government’s poverty line, the 
incidence of poverty declined from 30.7 percent to 3.4 percent (table 1.1).
1  China’s poverty 
reduction has been attributed to the adoption of a broad program of rural economic reforms 
(Zhang  et  al.  2002).    These  reforms,  including  the  adoption  of  the  production  responsibility 
system, the dismantling of the commune system, agricultural product price increase and market 
liberalization, have been associated with dramatic rural economic growth. 
Irrigation, the most important form of investment in the agricultural sector in both the 
rich and poor areas of the rural economy, is also believed to have played an important role in 
increasing agricultural productivity and in reducing poverty.  China has invested more than 10 
times as much in irrigation (35 billion yuan in 2000), as it did in agricultural research (3.4 billion 
yuan).  Investment in water control, more generally, also dominates all other forms of investment.  
For example, spending in 2000 on water control (83 billion yuan--Ministry of Water Resources 
2001), far exceeded the annual budget that was targeted specifically at poverty reduction (22.4 
billion yuan--National Statistical Bureau of China 2001). 
However, low and declining marginal returns to irrigation investment at the aggregate 
level are not unexpected, since China has exploited nearly all of the opportunities to irrigate 
cultivated areas.  The proportion of cultivated area under irrigation increased from 18 percent in 
1952 to more than 50 percent by the late 1990s (National Statistical Bureau of China 2001).  
Given the high level of irrigation, the increasing costs of bringing additional land under irrigation, 
and the severe financial constraints of government budgets, the potential advantage in expanding 
irrigation areas to increase  agricultural productivity and reduce poverty may be fairly limited. 
Furthermore,  water  shortages  are  threatening  China’s  resource  base  and  agricultural 
production. Despite ranking fifth in total water resources among the countries in the world, on a 
per capita basis, China has only 25 percent of the world average. Between 1949 and 1998 total 
water use increased by 430 percent.  China’s water utilization rates are already among the highest 
in the world, and there is little scope for tapping additional sources (Ministry of Water Resources 
2002; Rosegrant and Cai 2002).  Water demands in industries and urban sectors have risen so 
fast that the water available to the agricultural sector has declined.   
Not just a limited resource base and rising demand, but also a deterioration of the surface 
water irrigation system and resultant inefficient water use have also contributed to the water crisis 
in  China.    Constructed in  the  1950s-1970s,  the  surface  water irrigation  system  has  been  the 
                                                 
1 However, based on the World Bank poverty line (US$1/day), China still had a 124 million rural poor population in 
1997, though the poverty decline trend is also very obvious.   5 
backbone of the effort to increase agricultural productivity.  However, due to lagged investment 
(which  has  favored  new  projects  rather  than  maintenance  of  old  projects)  and  poor  water 
management, the surface water delivery infrastructure has been deteriorating and water cannot be 
used efficiently (Lohmar et al 2002).  Delivery of surface water efficiency in China is only about 
25 - 40 percent.  
China’s government has identified the nation’s rising water scarcity as one of the key 
problems that must be solved if the nation is to meet its national development plan in the coming 
years  (Zhang  2001).    Shortages  of  water  are  attenuating  efforts  to  alleviate  poverty  and  are 
causing  environmental  problems  (World  Bank  1998;  Zhang  2000).    In  many  regions  of  the 
country, a rapidly growing industry and an expanding, increasingly wealthy urban population 
regularly vie with each other for the limited water resources, thus threatening to curtail growth in 
food production.   
China has made remarkable progress in increasing the standard of living in its rural areas 
since the onset of economic reforms.  Research has documented a rapid rise in rural incomes and 
reduction in poverty (Lardy 1983; Putterman 1992; World Bank 2001).  A number of studies have 
analysed the impact of institutional changes and the increased use of inputs in production growth 
during  the  reform  period,  as  well  as  attempted  to  explain  the  success  of  China’s  poverty 
alleviation efforts (McMillan, Whalley and Zhu 1989; Lin 1992; Fan 1991; Huang and Rozelle 
1996).   
While several studies have established the links between rural growth and institutional 
change  and  input  growth,  few  studies  have  established  the  link  between  policy  effort  and 
investments on one hand and poverty reduction on the other.  For example, a study on the effect 
of agricultural research on productivity of farmers in poor areas, has shown that new technology 
did not benefit poor area farmers (Jin et al. 2002).  Rozelle et al. (1998), show how billions of 
yuan that have been invested in poverty alleviation do not explain income per capita gains in poor 
areas.  Most observers believe China’s efforts to invest in micro-credit schemes have generally 
failed to produce any sustained, positive effect on poverty reduction (World Bank 2001). 
Perhaps,  more  curiously,  despite  the  large  investment  that  China  has  made  in  water 
control, the most important form of investment in the agricultural sector in both the rich and poor 
areas of the rural economy, previous studies have not been able to identify any strong impact of 
irrigation on the performance of any part of the rural economy.
2  For example, Hu et al. (2000), 
find that irrigation did not contribute to the total factor productivity (TFP) growth of rice in China 
between 1981 and 1995.  Jin et al. (2002), extend the work to other crops and cannot find a link 
between irrigation and TFP growth of any major grain crop (rice, wheat or maize).  Fan et al. 
(2000), illustrate that government expenditure on irrigation has the smallest returns to agriculture 
output compared to other investments, such as roads, agricultural research and development and 
education. 
While such a finding may be surprising, a survey of the broader development literature 
shows that this finding is not unique to China.  Studies in other countries, frequently, are unable 
to find a significant effect of irrigation on the performance of the rural economy.  For example, 
                                                 
2Information on investments are from a number of sources.  Water control investment numbers are from the Ministry of 
Water Resources (2001).  Agricultural research figures are from Huang and Hu (2001).  Data on the investments for 
poverty alleviation are from the China National Statistics Bureau (2001).   6 
Fan and Hazell (2000), show that despite levels of investment in water control that exceed those 
of seven other investment categories, irrigation ranks only sixth in terms of marginal impact on 
poverty alleviation in India behind investments such as rural roads, agricultural research, and 
education.  Rosegrant and Evenson (1992), also find that irrigation does not have a significant 
impact on TFP in India.  
In facing the emerging water crisis, leaders typically debate about which of the several 
approaches they should use to address water scarcity problems, although none has been very 
successful  (Lohmar  et  al.  2002).    As  discussed  above,  developing  more  water  resources  to 
increase  water  supply,  historically,  has  been  given  the  highest  priority  in  resolving  water 
shortages.  Recently, the State Council announced plans to allocate more than 50 billion US 
dollars for the construction of a project to move water from the Yangtse River Valley to North 
China.  Despite such ambitious goals, the high cost of developing new sources of water will make 
it so that the volume of water that can be added to north China’s water equation will still be 
marginal.  Leaders have also promoted water-saving technology and considered whether or not 
they should use water-pricing policy (Chen 2002; Rosegrant and Cai 2002).  Unfortunately, most 
of their efforts to encourage the use of sophisticated water-saving technologies such as drip and 
sprinkler irrigation have failed, and in the past several years the Ministry of Water Resources has 
distanced itself  from  a  water  policy  based  on  water-saving  technology  (Zai  2002).   Political 
considerations will also, most likely, keep leaders from moving too aggressively on raising prices, 
at least in the agricultural sector (Rosegrant and Cai 2002). 
With the failure and infeasibility of traditional methods, in recent years, leaders have 
begun to consider water management reform as a key part of their strategy to combat China’s 
water problems, since they believe water in agriculture is being used inefficiently.  Despite water 
shortages, users in all sectors of the economy--especially those in agriculture, by far the nation’s 
largest consumer of water--do not efficiently use the water that they are allocated. One study, for 
example, estimated that due to the poor management of the nation’s canal network, only 50 
percent of water from the primary canals is actually delivered to the fields (Xu 2001).  Farmers 
also do not efficiently use the water that reaches their fields, wasting roughly 20-30 percent of 
their water.  Hence, overall, only about 40 percent of water in China’s Surface Water System, that 
is allocated to production agriculture, is actually used by farmers on their crops.  Others have 
estimated even greater inefficiencies (Fang 2000).  In response, it has been proposed that local 
leaders reform the institutions that manage water in China’s communities (Nian 2001; Reidinger 
2002). 
Despite the resolve of the current leadership in China to push water management reforms, 
there is a considerable debate about its appropriateness.  International evidence shows that water 
management and its institutional arrangements are important measures for dealing with water 
shortage problems (World Bank 1993; IWMI and FAO 1995).  Since the 1980s, many developing 
countries have begun to transfer irrigation management responsibilities from the government to 
farmer organizations or other private entities, in order to mitigate the financial burden of water 
projects  and  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  water  use  and  supply  (Vermillion 1997).    Despite 
decentralizing water resource management a proper structure can provide the incentive needed to 
stabilize and improve the efficiency of irrigataion and water supply system. However, there have   7 
been some cases internationally where these efforts have failed or generated negative influences 
(Easter and Hearne 1993; Vermillion 1997; Groenfeldt and Svendsen 2000). 
In fact, even as early as the 1980s, but more so since the late 1990s, China’s policy 
makers have promoted water management reforms, and like similar attempts outside China, the 
record seems to be mixed although most evaluations are only based on anecdotes or case studies 
(Nian 2001; Huang 2001; China Irrigation Association 2002).  Even in those areas in which 
management  reforms  have  been  well-designed,  effective  implementation  of  the  reforms  have 
been  difficult  (Ma  2001;  Management  Authority  of  Shaoshan  Irrigation  District  2002).  
Collective action, information problems and getting the incentives right may be among the most 
important reasons why water management reform has failed.  The design of water management 
reforms themselves may also create a number of negative externalities.  Since the reforms provide 
financial  incentives  to  the  manager  to  more  efficiently  manage  water,  it  is  possible  that  the 
manager could take a number of actions that could negatively affect the production, income and 
the poverty status of certain individuals.  For example, managers could deliver less water than 
demanded by farmers or cut off water deliveries to slow-paying, poor households.  Surprisingly, 
despite the high stakes of the reforms there is little or no empirical-based work that has been 
conducted to understand and judge the effectiveness of water management reforms. 
While there is no doubt that creating new irrigation systems will bring about significant 
increases in productivity and decreases in poverty levels in the limited areas which can still be 
irrigated, the overall extent of future poverty alleviation through irrigation expansion is certainly 
circumscribed.  Hence, in those areas that are in regions that will never be irrigated, poverty 
reduction strategies must rely on policies that have nothing to do with constructing new irrigation 
facilities, or improving the delivery of water and water-related services.  There may be, however, 
considerable poverty and a need for poverty alleviation efforts, inside irrigated areas.  It is less 
clear how much poverty exists within irrigated areas, since in irrigated agriculture areas there are 
few  studies  conducted  that  have  explored  the  magnitude  of  poverty  and  the  alternatives  for 
poverty reduction through pro-poor intervention. 
To  understand  the  need  for  attention  to  poverty  problems  in  irrigated  areas,  several 
critical questions need to be addressed: 
What is the incidence of poverty in China’s irrigated areas and non-irrigated areas?  What 
has been the contribution made by irrigation in increasing agricultural productivity and reducing 
poverty as regions have become irrigated?  Within irrigated areas, what formal and informal 
irrigation-related institutions exist and how have they affected productivity?  Finally, to what 
extent  has  the  rise  of  certain  institutions  and  creation  of  certain  water  management  policies 
contributed to poverty reduction in irrigated agricultural regions? 
In other words, in the rest of this report we seek to understand the magnitude of poverty 
inside irrigated areas and analyze the factors that contribute to making the life of the poor better 
and/or worse.  In particular, we want to understand how recent innovations in water institutions 





STUDY OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES 
 
The overall goal of the proposed research is to promote performance and sustainable development 
of  irrigation  systems,  and  equity  development  of  rural  areas  through  effective  management 
policy, institutional arrangement and incentive mechanisms in China.  In order to realize the 
overall goal of the research, five specific related objectives will be pursued in our studies: 
 
1.  Review  poverty  situations,  changes  and  socio-economic  and  environmental 
constraints; synthesize pro-poor interventions and their effectiveness at national, river basin and 
local levels in China. 
 
2. Understand water legal and regulation system, water management policy, institutional 
arrangement and their influences on the performance of the irrigation systems at national, river 
basin and local levels. 
 
3.  Assess  the  performance  of  irrigation  systems  in  terms  of  efficiency,  equity  and 
sustainability, and identify its physical, socio-economic, institutional and policy causes. 
 
4. Explore the linkage between the performance of irrigation systems and its impact on 
the  poor  farmers,  identify  other  socio-economic  and  environmental  constraints  to  equal 
development of rural areas. 
 
5.  Develop  the  analytical  tool  and  alternative  policy,  management  and  institutional 
options that can promote the performance and sustainable development of irrigation systems and 
equal development of rural areas. 
 
In order to reach our research objectives, six hypotheses will be tested in our study: 
 
1. Command areas of specific canal reaches receiving less irrigation water per hectare 
have lower productivity and a higher incidence of poverty (poverty and irrigation). 
 
2. Under existing conditions, small, marginal and poor farmers receive less benefits from 
irrigation than large and non-poor farmers. 
 
3. The greater the degree of O&M (Operations and Maintenance) cost recovery, the better 
the performance, of irrigation management. 
 
4. Effective implementation of PIM/IMT leads to improved irrigation system 
performance, which in turn reduces poverty. 
 
5.  An absence of clearly defined water allocation and distribution procedures, and an 
absence of effective and clear water rights (formal and informal), adversely affect the poor more 
than the non-poor. 
 
6. There is scope for improving the performance of irrigation systems under existing 
conditions, with effective and improved institutional arrangements.   9 
 
Table 1.1. Estimates of the number of poor in rural China, 1978-2000. 
 
Estimates by the Government of China ($0.71/day)      International standard ($1/day) 
Year  Poverty line 
(current Yuan) 




Number of rural 
poor (millions) 














1980  na  218  27.6  na  na 
1982  na  140  17.5  na  na 
1984  200  128  15.1  na  na 
1985  206  125  14.8  na  na 
1986  213  131  15.5  na  na 
1987  227  122  14.3  na  na 
1988  236  96  11.1  na  na 
1989  259  102  11.6  na  na 
1990  300  85  9.4  280  31.3 
1991  304  94  10.4  287  31.7 
1992  317  80  8.8  274  30.1 
1993  350  75  8.2  266  29.1 
1994  440  70  7.7  237  25.9 
1995  530  65  7.1  200  21.8 
1996  580  58  6.3  138  15.0 
1997  640  50  5.4  124  13.5 
1998  635  42  4.6  na  na 









na  na 
Note:  na = not available 






 Poverty and Irrigation Development in China—An Overview 
 
 
POVERTY IN CHINA  
 
Poverty measurement and poverty line 
 
Poverty  is  a  multi-dimensional  phenomenon,  encompassing  various  types  of  deprivation  that 
constrain the lives of poor people (Stern 2001).  Income has always been treated as the major 
poverty measurement by many international organizations and governments due to its convenient 
operation and rationality.  While there is no one-to-one correspondence between income and 
other measures of human welfare, Wang and Zhang (1999), and the World Bank (1999), show 
that there is a fairly high degree of correlation between areas with low income and those that do 
poorly on measures such as illiteracy, infant mortality, etc.  The poverty line fixed by the World 
Bank is US$1 per day per capita.  When China’s government decided to set up a large-scale 
poverty alleviation plan in 1986, a standard was necessary for determining which counties would 
receive the specially allocated funds (Park et al. 1998).  The Leading Group of the State Council 
initially adopted a mixed set of poverty lines to choose poor counties.  The basic standard for 
selecting nationally designated poor counties was net income per capita below 150 yuan, in 1985  
(Rozelle, Zhang and Huang 2000).  However, a higher poverty line was applied to counties in old 
revolutionary base areas and counties with large minority populations.  For some counties in 
important revolutionary base areas and for several minority counties in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, 
and Qinghai, the poverty line was raised to as high as 300 yuan.  Three hundred poor counties 
were chosen as counties to be supported by national poverty programs based on these standards, 
which used 1985 State Statistical Bureau data.  In 1988, 37 pastoral counties were added (Tong et 
al. 1994).  Some 370 additional counties were also designated for provincial government support 
in 1986.  By 1988, the Leading Group and its provincial counterparts were running a program 
targeting 698 counties (about 1/3 of China’s counties). 
These official poverty lines were soon criticized by both researchers and local officials 
(Park et al 1998).  First, there was no explanation as to why 150 yuan was chosen as the basic 
poverty line.  Second, the line was not uniform.  Political criteria played an important role in 
county selection.  Third, because incomes in poor, agriculturally dominated areas are influenced 
by  weather,  using  income  data  from  one  year  may  not  reflect  the  average  income  levels  of 
different counties.  Finally, there was also nearly no adjustment in the late 1980s or early 1990s 
(except for the addition of 3 Hainan province counties).  The Leading Group had no set way to 
graduate those counties that developed rapidly or support those that fell into poverty during the 
first few years of implementation.     11 
In response to these complaints and in preparation for the new push to eliminate poverty 
in the mid-1990s (called the 8-7 Plan), the Leading Group asked the State Statistical Bureau to 
calculate a new poverty line based on nutritional criteria (Zhu 1998).  With this new criteria, 
national officials made their first (and only, so far) wide-sweeping adjustment to the designations 
of  poor  counties  in  1994  (Piazza  and  Liang  1997).    The  distinction  between  national  and 
provincial was eliminated.  And, despite the large reduction in poverty counts, the number of 
nationally-supported poor counties was established at 592.  Park, Wang, and Wu (1998), provide 
a detailed province by province listing of the new poverty counties.   
 




































































Income growth, poverty reduction and inequality 
 
Per capita rural income in China was very low prior to the reform.  In 1978, average income per 
rural resident was only 220 yuan per year, or about US$150 (figure 2.1).  During the 29 years 
from 1949 to 1978, per capita income increased by only 95 percent, or 2.3 percent per annum 
(Fan, Zhang, Zhang 2001).  China was one of the poorest countries in the world.  However, since 
rural reforms in 1978, the per capita income increased to 552 yuan in 1984, a growth rate of 15 
percent  per  year  (figure  2.1).    During  the  second  stage  of  reforms  (1985-89),  rural  income 
continued to increase, but at a much slower pace of 3 percent per annum.  This was mainly due to 
the stagnation of agricultural production after the reforms.    
Evidence shows that poverty reduction is greatly related to rural income growth and 
agricultural development, especially in the 1980s.  In 1978, China’s poverty population was as 
high  as  260  million.    However,  in  1984,  poverty  population  reduced  to  89  million,  poverty 
reduction  was  exceptionally  rapid  in  this  period.    The  incidence  of  rural  poverty  (poor  as 
proportion of rural population) decreased from 30.7 percent in 1978 to 15.1 percent in 1984.  This 
was also the quick growth period of rural income and agricultural production in China.  Because 
of the equitable distribution of land to families, income inequality, measured as Gini coefficient, 
increased only slightly, from 0.21 in 1978 to 0.26 in 1984 (Fan, Zhang and Zhang 2001)).   12 
The effects of fast agricultural growth on rural poverty were largely exhausted by the end 
of 1984 (Fan, Zhang and Zhang 2001).  Over the period of 1985-1989, rural income distribution 
became less egalitarian, and the Gini index rose from 0.264 to 0.301.  The ratio of per capita rural 
income in coastal regions to that in other areas also increased, from 1.21 to 1.51.  These changes 
in  income  distribution  probably  resulted  from  the  changed  nature  of  income  gains  and  the 
growing differential in rural non-farm opportunities among regions (Rozelle 1994).  As a result, 
the number of poor increased from 89 million in 1984 to 103 million in 1989, a net gain of 14 
million in five years (figure 2.1). 
Only in 1990 did rural poverty begin to decline once again.  The number of poor dropped 
to 9 percent per annum; from 103 million in 1989 to 50 million in 1997 (figure 2.1).  Moreover, 
the rate of rural poverty reduction was faster than that of income growth (5% per annum) during 
the period, indicating that factors other than income growth were at play (Fan, Zhang and Zhang 




In the 1980s, aside from those in counties under special military administration, most of China’s 
poor lived among the more than 200 million residents, who resided in officially designated poor 
counties (Piazza and Liang 1997).  These poor counties were distributed across 23 of China’s 27 
provinces, but 78 percent of them were concentrated to the west of a north-south line that runs 
through  the  central  mountainous  parts  of  the  country  from  Heilongjiang,  Gansu,  and  Inner 
Mongolia in the north to Guangxi and Yunnan in the south.  The remaining “poor” counties, 
generally better-off among all poor counties, were located in the less contiguous islands in the 
hills of eastern and south-eastern China. 
Poor  counties  in  the  first  wave  of  officially  designated  counties  were  normally 
characterized as being poorly endowed by geographic location (remote and mountainous) and at a 
disadvantage in terms of agricultural resources (such as soil, rainfall, and climate (Tong et al. 
1994).  Many of these areas suffer from severe ecological damage such as deforestation and 
erosion (Li 1994).  Poor counties also tend to have more variable yields (Weersink and Rozelle 
1997).  Partly as a result of these poor natural conditions, and partly as a result of poverty itself, 
farmers in poor areas suffer from below average irrigation facilities, fertilizer use, and general 
infrastructure (Tong et al. 1994).  Poor counties in the 1980s were still highly subsistent in their 
grain needs, and in net terms, often needed to procure grain to meet household demand (Piazza 
and Liang 1997).  Participation in non-farm labor markets in the 1980s lagged far behind the 
national average (Rozelle et al. 1999).   
 
 
PRO-POOR STRATEGIES AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Subsidizing before 1986 
 
Though the leaders had not formulated an explicit national policy on poverty alleviation prior to 
1986, this did not mean that the rural poor did not receive special attention.  With little to lose, 
given  the  marginal  contribution  of  poor  areas  to  the  overall  economy,  reformers  permitted   13 
communes in poor areas to de-collectivize earlier than other areas (as early as the late 1970s).  
The  central  government  was  already  subsidizing  poor  areas,  both  through  direct  budgetary 
transfers (Park et al. 1996) and through subsidized grain sales and other assistance to farmers in 
need  (Park,  Rozelle,  and  Cai  1994).    With  fiscal  decentralization  and  increasing  scarcity  of 
budgetary resources, however, these forms of support were reduced over time. Market reforms 
led  to  widespread  increases  in  production  specialization,  yields,  and  income  (Weersink  and 
Rozelle  1997).    These  changes  helped  many  escape  poverty,  especially  those  in  central  and 
coastal China that had been hurt most by grain-first policies, because they lived in areas not well-
suited for grain production (Lardy 1983). 
 
Investment on increasing growth of Income 
 
After 1986 the government unleashed a major set of investments to increase growth of incomes in 
poor areas.  Between 1986 and 1997 the government invested over 96 billion yuan through its 
main poverty alleviation loan, food for work, and grants programs.  Nominal investments in poor 
areas increased every year except in 1992 and 1996.  In real terms (after adjusting for the impact 
of inflation), however, the picture is still impressive though the trend is worrisome.  In 1985, total 
expenditure reached 46 billion yuan.  After increasing steadily between 1986 and 1990, however, 
real expenditure in poor areas have fallen (when comparing, for example, the first three years of 
the 1990s (1990-92) to the most recent three-year period (1995-97).   
 
Grants and Loans to Households   
 
In 1986, the State Council formed an inter-ministerial Leading Group for Economic Development 
in Poor Areas, at the national level, to administer a new investment program allocating 4 billion 
yuan  per  year  to  300  nationally  designated  poor  counties.    Provincial  governments  also 
designated  additional  poor  counties  to  receive  provincial  support.    By  1988,  698  counties 
received public help through these programs.  Poor Area Development Offices (PADOs) were 
established  at  the  provincial  and  county  levels  to  administer  funds  from  both  national  and 
provincial sources.   
China' s multi-level poverty alleviation network was funded by grants and loans approved 
by the State Council.   In the first  few years, most funds came from programs such as laoshao 
bianqiong diqu daikuan (subsidized credit for supporting old revolutionary bases, minority areas, 
and remote areas) and bu fada diqu fazhan zijin (development capital funds (DCF) for supporting 
under-developed areas).  As the real value of grants declined due to inflation (the nominal level of 
funding for DCF remained largely unchanged from 1986 to 1993), new subsidized loan programs 
became the main form of poverty investment.  In its initial years local PADO offices controlled 
most of the loan portfolios (Li and Li 1992).  Agricultural Banks, which disbursed and collected 
the loans, exercised little decision-making authority, according to interviews with PADO and 
banking officials.   
Policies during the period 1986-1988 stressed that funds should be allocated directly to 
poor households to support agricultural production and other income-generating projects (State   14 
Council 1989a to 1989e; World Bank 1992).  Program rules often required local poverty officials 
to allocate up to 80 percent of their funds for agricultural loans to households (Li and Li 1992).   
After  these  first  few  years  of  implementation,  poor  area  policies  came  under  closer 
scrutiny.  There was a general perception that much of the assistance was not spurring growth but 
was being used to support consumption directly (State Council 1989a to 1989e).  As is typical for 
formal subsidized loan programs, loan repayment rates were low.  Estimates of timely repayment 
on subsidized poverty loans range from 30-65 percent (Park, Wang, and Wu 1998).  The main 
problem, as described in an important policy document, was that the long-term development of 
"social productive forces" in poor areas was being neglected (Zhou 1988; State Council 1989a to 
1989e).  Even after four years of targeted programs, there were still over 100 million rural poor in 
1989.  Interestingly, these conclusions were drawn based on limited data and observation.  No 
systematic, large-scale evaluation of China' s poverty program was ever conducted. 
 
Targeting Development Projects 
 
By the late 1980s, the widespread belief that economic growth in poor areas had stagnated led to 
a major policy shift.  New directives ordered local officials to turn their attention away from 
poverty alleviation through direct transfers to households in favor of projects that would better 
promote economic development (State Council 1991).  The new measures encouraged poor area 
officials to direct loans away from households and towards "economic entities" (jingji shiti) that 
could  better  coordinate  activities  requiring  new  technology,  greater  input use,  and  marketing 
support (State Council 1991).  In recognition of the need for local governments to generate fiscal 
revenues, local officials were allowed to allocate more funds to enterprises.  A new poverty loan 
program was established to support county state-owned enterprises.  The Food-for-Work Program 
to support basic infrastructure construction, which had previously focused on roads and drinking 
water, was expanded to include infrastructure projects in agriculture designed to help spur long-
term productivity increases (Zhu and Jiang 1994).  
Local officials welcomed these changes.  By the end of the 1980s, fiscal decentralization, 
which tied budgetary expenditure more closely to local revenues, had created a budgetary crisis in 
nearly all poor counties (Park et al. 1996).  This created a strong incentive for local officials in 
poor areas to invest in revenue-producing enterprise rather than other growth-oriented activities, 
or to divert earmarked investment funds to meet fixed expenditure obligations such as wage 
payments to government cadres (Wu 1994; Park et al. 1996).  Investment funds and loans were 
commonly channeled to county-run enterprises regardless of the investment' s projected rate of 
return; this infusion of cash allowed government officials to transfer funds to the county budget 
(through fees and remittances or tax payments) or to shift fiscal burdens to enterprises (such as 
for hosting guests or paying travel costs).   
Banking  reforms  in  the  late  1980s  also  affected  the  allocation  of  investment  funds.  
Reforms made bankers more responsible for their profits and losses (Park and Rozelle 1997; Li 
and Li 1992).  In response, bank managers began to assert more influence on loan decisions, 
including subsidized poverty loans.  Conflicts arose between bank managers and PADO officials 
over proposed projects.  Given the excessive demand for low interest loans, bankers also began to 
target  borrowers  with  less  risky  projects  or  larger  projects  that  made  loans  less  costly  to   15 
administer (Du 1994).  As is common in rural settings, banks sought to ration out the poor, who 
have fewer assets, demand small loans with high transaction costs, and face greater uncertainty 
over crop yields (Carter 1988).  Thus, the poverty policy shift in emphasis from household to 
enterprise, and from agriculture to industry, was re-enforced by changing incentives caused by 
fiscal and banking reforms.   
 
Shifts in the 1990s 
 
There was a growing consensus among some of those interested in poverty work that, by the mid-
1990s, the subsidized credit directed at jingji shiti for integrated agricultural/rural development 
had  not  met  any  of its  goals.    Repayment  rate  on  loans  did  not  increase  markedly.    In  one 
interview by the authors with banking officials in northern Shaanxi, we were told that repayment 
rates of subsidized loans in the northernmost prefecture of the province were less than 40 percent.  
A provincial leading group project officer in Sichuan revealed that only about 25 percent of the 
loans to jingji shiti were ever repaid in full, and partial repayments made were only slightly more 
than 50 percent. 
The  effectiveness  in  stimulating  local  development  of  subsidized  poverty  loans  also 
became increasingly suspect.  Field work frequently uncovered cases in which farmers were 
forced into collective projects in pursuit of scale economies that they did not want to participate 
in.    In  other  cases,  loans were  taken  out  by jingji shiti  managers  for  projects  that  were  not 
appropriate for the local economy; projects that often ended in failure and unpaid debts.  Loans 
were often diverted into economic entities that had political and fiscal importance (Park et al. 
1996).  A later section describes the results of one study that measures the ineffectiveness of 
loans to counties and townships, and the greater impact on growth of loans to farm households. 
The largest problem of lending to economic entities was that there was less effort to 
direct the funding to poor households.  Many of the loans were given to township and village 
enterprises (TVEs) or county-owned enterprises, which increased the local revenue base for local 
governments but did not greatly benefit poor households (Wu 1994).  Wu’s work shows how very 
few poor farmers in investment sites get access to loans at all, and when they do, how they 
receive much smaller ones than their non-poor counter parts.  The failure of the program in 
reaching the poor was criticized by researchers and some local leaders.  At the National Work 
Conference on Poverty in September, 1996, the Chinese Government decided to return the focus 
of lending to providing direct loans to poor households. 
With the slowing of poverty reduction, the government introduced several anti-poverty 
programs between 1984 and 1986.  It also established the Leading Group for Poverty Reduction 
(LGPR)  under  the  State  Council  to  coordinate  those  programs  and  expedite  economic 
development in poor areas.  Economic growth did revive, and since 1991 another 40 million 
residents  escaped  poverty  --  about  49  million,  or  about  six  percent  of  the  rural  population, 
remained in absolute poverty at the end of 1997.  By the end of 1998, 42 million people were 
officially reported to live under absolute poverty.  The government has a strong commitment to 
poverty reduction, and most government agencies and ministries have special poverty reduction 
responsibilities,  including,  education  and  health  programs  administered  by  their  respective 
ministries.  The LGPR coordinates special development grant funds, administered through the   16 
fiscal system, and the Poverty Reduction Fund, which provides subsidized loans for developing 
poor areas.  The regional office of the State Development Planning Commission administers a 
Food for Work (FFW) program that supports the construction of roads, potable water systems, 
irrigation, terracing, and other work in rural infrastructure.  Subsidized credit through the Poverty 
Reduction Fund has become the most important element of the poverty program.  During the late 
1980s these funds were allocated primarily to households to support agricultural production and 
other income-generating activities (World Bank 1992).  However, by the early 1990s, borrowed 
funds were generally conceived as financing consumption rather than production, repayment rates 
were very low, and economic growth in poor areas had stagnated, as evidenced by the lack of 
reduction in the number of absolute poor. As a result, leaders shifted the focus of the poverty 
alleviation  programs  from  households  to  “economic  entities”  or  enterprises  that  could  better 
coordinate activities requiring new technology, greater input use, and marketing support (State 
Council 1991).  Fiscal decentralization, however, had created a budgetary crisis in nearly all poor 
counties (Park et al. 1996), which, in turn, created strong incentives for local officials in poor 
areas to invest in revenue-producing enterprises rather than in growth-oriented activities, or to 
divert earmarked investment funds to meet fixed expenditure obligations, such as wage payments.  
By the mid-1990s, it became clear that subsidized credit directed to enterprises was not 
meeting rural development and growth objectives.  The credit did not appear to stimulate local 
development and loan repayment rates did not markedly improve.  The investment approach was 
often “top-down” as local officials identified collective projects without due consultation with 
farmers  in  pursuit  of  economy  of  scale.    Rozelle, Park,  Wong,  and  Ren  (forthcoming)  have 
empirical evidence of the failure of China’s subsidized credit program in Shaanxi during the early 
1990s.  
When  leaders  reassessed  the  poverty  reduction  effort  in  the  mid-1990s,  the  focus  of 
subsidized loans returned to poor households.  Since then, a debate has raged about how to create 
an effective system to reach the poor households.  Officials are searching for a program that will 
lead to growth, reduce poverty, reduce lending costs, and improve repayment rates.  This has led 
to widespread experiments of micro-finance programs, which to date, have had mixed results and 
has stimulated a great deal of debate in terms of its effectiveness and sustainability.    
 
Evidence on effectiveness of pro-poor strategies 
 
Rapid economic growth has led to extraordinary success in reduction of poverty in rural China.  
Few  studies  have  analyzed  the  causes  of  this  success.    A  1992  World  Bank  country  study 
represents the first comprehensive analysis on the incidence and correlates of rural poverty in 
China.  The study concluded that rural economic reforms have contributed tremendously to the 
rapid reduction of rural poverty, and that poverty is now almost entirely restricted to resource-
constrained, remote, upland areas.  In more recent years, rural household survey data have been 
used  to  re-estimate  the  incidence  of  poverty  and  changes  over  time  for  four  provinces  in 
Southwest China (Jalan and Ravallion 1996; Jalan and Ravallion 1997; and Chen and Ravallion 
1996).  A large effort was made to construct a panel dataset at the household level from 1985 to 
1990.  The analyses from this panel dataset reveal that consumption variability accounts for a 
large share of observed poverty, and is likely to be a severe constraint on efforts to reach the   17 
long-term poor.  Therefore, effective insurance and credit options for poor people are critical to 
alleviate persistent inequality problems.  Gustafsson and Li (1998), analyzed the structure of 
Chinese poverty for 1988.  One significant finding from this study is that the rural poor are not 
limited to remote resource-poor areas, in contrast with the World Bank (1992) report.  Using a 
small sample of 500 rural households, Wu et al. (1996), attributed rural poverty to low levels of 
factor endowment and immobility of labor and demographic characteristics of households.  Khan 
(1997), updated the trend and pattern of Chinese poverty in a recent article.  One contribution of 
his study is to adjust the poverty measures at the provincial level, and his measures are sharply 
different from those of the Chinese government.  Rozelle et al. (2000), recently comprehensively 
reviewed the government policies regarding poor area development, concluding that such policies 
have generally failed to reduce rural poverty in these poor areas.   
Using provincial level data for 1970-97, Fan, Zhang and Zhang (2000), has developed a 
simultaneous equation model to estimate the effects of different types of government expenditure 
on growth, regional inequality, and rural poverty in China.  The results show that government 
spending on production enhancing investments, such as agricultural R&D and irrigation, rural 
education and infrastructure (including roads, electricity, and communication) has contributed to 
agricultural  production  growth,  regional  inequality  and  reduction  in  rural  poverty.    But 
differences in their distributional effects and production effects are large among different types of 
spending as well as across regions.  
Government expenditure on education has the largest impact on both poverty reduction 
and growth in the overall rural economy.  Among all types of investments, more investment in 
education in less-developed areas (the west region) also contributed most to greater regional 
equality.  Government spending on agricultural research and extension has improved agricultural 
production  substantially.    In  fact,  this  type  of  expenditure  has  fetched  the  largest  returns  to 
agricultural production.  Government spending on rural communication, electricity, and roads 
have  the  second,  third  and  fourth  largest  impact  on  rural  poverty  reduction.    These  poverty 
reduction effects mainly come from improved non-farm employment and increased rural wages. 
In particular, road investment has the largest impact on the non-farm economy, and the second 
largest impact on the overall rural economy, only slightly lower than education investment.   
Irrigation investment has had only a modest impact on growth in agricultural production 
and an even smaller impact on rural poverty reduction even after allowing for trickle- down 
benefits. This is consistent with the results found by Fan, Hazell, and Thorat (1999), for India.  
China and India have invested heavily in irrigation in the past.  Large-scale irrigation facilities 
have been built, and a high percentage of the arable land is now under irrigation.  Therefore, the 
marginal returns from further investment may be declining and small, and the more limited funds 
should be used for improving the efficiency of existing public irrigation systems. 
Why are the marginal returns of irrigation investment less than other public investments?  
How can irrigation play an important role in poverty reduction? Can irrigation management, 
especially surface water irrigation management reforms be beneficial to the poor people? are 
some issues that need to be addressed. 
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IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT  
 
Since  the  establishment  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China,  emphasis  of  the  rural  water 
conservancy  is  to  increase  effective  irrigated  area  and  improve  the  agricultural  production 
conditions.  Based on increased characteristics of effective irrigated area in China, development 
of rural water conservancy in China can be divided into six stages to analyze the changes of basic 
infrastructure  investments  of  water  conservancy  in  various  periods  (Wang  2000).    For 
Development of irrigation area, see table 2.1. 
 
 






area (10,000 ha) 
Share of effective irrigated 
area (%) 
1949  9,788  1,593  16.3 
1952  10,792  1,934  17.9 
1957  11,183  2,500  22.4 
1962  10,290  2,870  27.9 
1965  10,359  3,204  30.9 
1975  9,971  4,612  46.3 
1978  9,939  4,805  48.3 
1979  9,950  4,832  48.6 
1982  9,861  4,866  49.4 
1983  9,836  4,855  49.4 
1984  9,785  4,840  49.5 
1985  9,685  4,793  49.5 
1986  9,623  4,787  49.7 
1987  9,589  4,797  50.0 
1988  9,572  4,791  50.1 
1989  9,566  4,834  50.5 
1990  9,567  4,839  50.6 
1991  9,565  4,895  51.2 
1992  9,543  4,946  51.8 
1993  9,510  4,984  52.4 
1994  9,491  4,994  52.6 
1995  9,497  5,041  53.1 
1996  9,497  5,116  53.9 
1997  9,497  5,227  55.0 
 




First stage (1949-1957): Rapid growth period of rural water conservancy 
 
In the land revolutionary period, comrade Zhedong  Mao proposed a scientific judgment that 
“water  conservancy  is  the  lifeblood  of  agriculture”.  Three  years  before  establishment  of  the 
People’s  Republic  of  China  were  resume  periods  of  national  economy,  when  resume  and 
construction of water conservancy were treated as an important link of the national economy   19 
resume.    In  1950,  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  held  a  working  conference  of  rural  water 
conservancy;  the  working  guidelines  of  rural  water  conservancy  was:  “Extensively  mobilize 
masses, greatly resume rural water conservancy construction, apply state investment, loan with 
plan and emphasis, greatly organize masses’ fund and absorb private capital to invest in rural 
water  conservancy,  help  improve  original  management  institution,  strengthen  irrigation 
management  and  gradually  realize  rational  utilization  and  establish  and  perfect  various 
institutions”.  In 1953, the Central Government proposed general guidelines for the transition 
period.  At the same time, national economic construction entered into the first five-year plan 
period. Emphasis of rural water conservancy had shifted from resume previous irrigation and 
drainage  engineering,  to  construct  new  engineering  facilities  according  to  national  economy 
development  requirements  step-by-step  in a  planned  way  and  gradually  improve  and  enlarge 
natural disaster resistance ability and play water resources benefits more effectively.  
Water  conservancy  in  this  period  developed  very  quickly;  effective  irrigated  area 
increased from 15,930 thousand hectares in 1949 to 25,000 hectares in 1957; the average annual 
increase rate was 5.8 percent, share of effective irrigated area increased from 16.3 percent to 22.4 
percent.  Water infrastructure investment (real price in 1990) steadily increased from 500 million 
yuan in 1951 to 18 billion yuan in 1957; average annual increase rate was 20.1 percent and it was 
the quickest period since 1949.  Increased rate of water infrastructure investment and national 
water  infrastructure  investment  was  almost  in  the  same  period,  average  share  of  water 
infrastructure investment over national infrastructure investment was 5.3 percent. 
 
 
The second stage (1957-1965): Continue increase period of rural water conservancy. 
 
Although influenced by progressive errors of “Great Leap Forward” and “People’s Commune 
Movement,” effective irrigated area still increased at an annual 3.1 percent; share of effective 
irrigated area reached 30.9 percent in 1965.  Compared with the first stage, increase rate of water 
infrastructure investment (real price in 1990) of this period was relatively slow, average annual 
increase rate is only 2.4 percent, which was still higher than the national infrastructure investment 
(real price in 1990) of 1.5 percent; while share of water infrastructure investment over total 
national infrastructure investment reached 7.6 percent, the largest share period in history.  This 
indicated that rural water conservancy still received high attention of the government. 
 
 
The third stage (1965-1975): Relatively rapid increase period of rural water conservancy 
 
“The Great Cultural Revolution” begun in 1966 plunged the state into a disturbance status of ten 
years, when development of rural water conservancy was not lashed much.  Effective irrigated 
area in this period increased from 32,040 hectares in 1965 to 4,612 hectares in 1975; average 
annual increase rate is 3.7 percent, which was only lower than that of the first period development 
rate.  Average annual growth rate of water conservancy was also very quick at 10.1 percent, 
which was higher than that of the national total infrastructure investment of 8.8 percent; share of 
water conservancy investment reached 7 percent. 
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The fourth stage (1975-1982): Slow increase period of rural water conservancy. 
 
In this period, rural water conservancy was slow, share of effective irrigated area was only 0.8 
percent, water infrastructure investment (real price in 1990) reduced from 5.6 billion yuan in 
1975 to 3.2 billion yuan in 1982; average annual decrease rate was 7.6 percent; share of water 
infrastructure investment over total national infrastructure investment was 5.9 percent. 
 
 
The fifth stage (1982-1986): Backward period of rural water conservancy. 
 
Although  rural  reform  policies  have  greatly  promoted  rural  and  agricultural  development  of 
China, rural water conservancy fell into a never-before-experienced backward period.  Effective 
area  annually  decreased  from  48,660  hectares  in  1982  to  47,870  hectares  in  1986;  790,000 
hectares of effective irrigated areas were reduced; average annual reduce rate was 0.4 percent; the 
only decrease period of effective irrigated area since 1949.  From water conservancy investment, 
average  annual  growth  rate  (real  price  in  1990)  of  water  infrastructure  investment  was  2.1 
percent, only 2.7 percent of the national infrastructure investment.  Obviously, compared with 
other industries’ development in this period, water conservancy was overlooked.  
 
 
The  sixth  stage  (1986-1990):  Stagnation  and  slow  resume  period  of  rural  water 
conservancy construction. 
 
Continued  decrease  in  effective  irrigated  area  from  1982  to  1986  captured  the  attention  of 
government and society.  In 1986 and 1987, two successive rural water conservancy symposiums 
were held by the rural water policy research house of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China, and the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power, which fully confirmed 
achievements of rural water conservancy in the past 30 years; existing crises were also pointed 
out such as: 
1.  Considerable  quantities  of  water  conservancy  are  aging,  poorly  maintained  and 
benefit  decreased;  drainage  and  flood  resistance  ability  of  canals  also  decreased 
obviously.  Urban industry construction occupied irrigated areas and water source 
and water facilities were also destroyed and stolen by people.   
2.  Water  resources  are  very  short  especially  in  North  China  and  coastal  regions.  
Groundwater  was  over-drafted  greatly  which  made  a  sharp  decline  in  the 
groundwater  table  and  land  subsidence  and  disorder  of  the  ecological  system.  
Pollution of water sources also reached a shocking degree. 
3.  Construction  scale  of  rural  water  conservancy  was  somewhat  small;  accumulated 
labor in some provinces could only supply 1-2 labor in winter while water investment 
in some provinces continued to decline.  
 
As a result of lack of attention by society and government, rural water conservancy construction 
shifted from backward to stagnant, and slowed increase; average annual growth rate was only 0.3 
percent; increased from 47,870 thousand hectares in 1986 to 48,390 thousand hectares in 1990,   21 
still equal to effective irrigated area in 1978 and lower than that in 1982.  For water infrastructure 
investment, growth rate of water infrastructure investment (real price in 1990) was quicker than 
that  in  the  early  1980s,  reached  8.6  percent,  while  ratio  of  water  infrastructure  investment 
declined to the lowest level in history at 2.2 percent. 
 
 
The  seventh  stage  (1990-1997):  Relatively  rapid  increase  period  of  rural  water 
conservancy construction.  
 
In  the  1990s,  China’s  economic  system  reform  had  gradually  deepened  and  rural  water 
conservancy had gradually freed away from a stagnant situation and increased relatively quickly.  
In this period, the average annual growth rate of effective irrigated area reached 1.3 percent, the 
quickest  development  stage  since  rural  reform.    Annual  growth  rate  of  water  infrastructure 
investment (real price in 1990) was as high as 19.7 percent, only second to that in the first stage, 
and only in this stage, the growth rate of water infrastructure investment was higher than that of 
the  national  infrastructure  investment.    Although  annual  growth  rate  of  water  infrastructure 
accelerated, share of water infrastructure over total national infrastructure investment was only 
2.8 percent, far lower than that before the 1980s. 
Above analyses of each development stage indicates that the greatest development of 
rural water conservancy mainly occurred in the period 1950s to 1970s.  Before the 1980s, water 
infrastructure construction always occupied an important position in national economy; although 
some fluctuations of share of water infrastructure investment existed, generally, an average 5.3 
percent  to  7.6  percent  was  kept.    Since  rural  reform,  although  there  were  many  “policies”, 
“emphasizing”, “strengthening”, “great development”, etc., most were hard to be implemented; in 
actuality,  the  government  overlooked  water  conservancy  and  the  proportion  of  water 




RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRRIGATION AND POVERTY 
 
On applying provincial data to the percentage of irrigated area over total land area and poverty 
incidence in 1996, we can understand the relationship between irrigation and poverty.  Figure 2.2 
shows  the  negative  relationship  between  share  of  irrigation  area  and  poverty  incidence.  
Generally, except for Xinjiang province (a full irrigation area), if provinces have a high share of 
irrigated  area,  poverty  incidence  in  these  provinces  are  also  relatively  low;  this  implies  the 
importance of irrigation in poverty reduction.   22 
Figure 2.2.  Relationship between irrigated area and





































































































However, from the second section’s analysis of development of irrigated areas, since the 
1980s, development of irrigation area has showed a decline and a stagnant trend.  Even with the 
Central Government’s increased investment in irrigation since the late 1990s, the potential of 
contribution of irrigation area to poverty reduction is still very limited.  This is same as the 
empirical research of Fan, Zhang and Zhang in 2001.  In any case, there is no doubt that irrigation 
is still important for poor farmers; therefore, under conditions of limited development of irrigated 
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Appendix 2.1.  Major Milestones in Reforming Chinese Agriculture 
 
￿  1950-52  Land reform: Land owned by landlords was confiscated and redistributed to 
landless or small-scale farmers.  By 1952, the land reform was complete. 
￿  1953-57  Cooperation:  After  1952,  mutual  aid  farming  groups  were  formed  on  a 
voluntary basis.  Land was still owned by individual households.  From 1955 onwards 
more advanced cooperatives were formed at the strong suggestion of the government.  
Land and other production inputs were owned by cooperatives.  By 1957, 90 percent of 
households participated in these cooperatives. 
￿  1958-60 Great leap forward and communication:  Communes were formed based on 
advanced cooperatives.  The size of communes was large and the distribution of food was 
based on need rather than any economic mechanism. 
￿  1961-65 Economic adjustments: Adjustments and consolidation policy were implemented 
in  1962  after  the  failure  of  the  commune  system.    Agricultural  production  was 
decentralized into small units (the production teams). 
￿  1966-76  Cultural  Revolution:    Three  levels  of  ownership  –  commune,  brigade,  and 
production team – were implemented with the production team as their basis.  Private 
ownership of land and marketing of agricultural products were severely restricted outside 
the government procurement system. 
￿  1979-84 First phase reforms:  In 1979, procurement prices for 18 commodities were 
raised (50% increase for above-quota sales).  The household production responsibility 
system was introduced, and by 1984 more than 96 percent of households operated under 
the system.  The number of commodities under state monopoly procurement control was 
reduced from 100 to 51 in 1993, and to 38 by end-1984. 
￿  1985-89 Second phase reforms: The monopoly procurement system was changed from 
mandatory to a voluntary contract system.  Above-quota prices were reduced. 
￿  1990s  New  stage:    The  urban  grain  rationing  system  was  abolished  in  1993.    Land 
contract  between  farmers  and  collectives  was  extended  for  another  30  years.  
Procurement prices for grains were increased by 40 percent in 1994 and again by 42 
percent in 1996.  In 1997, the government regained a certain amount of control over the 
grain marketing system. 
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Appendix 2.2. Chronology of Poverty Alleviation Policies 
 
September 29, 1984 
The  CPC  Central  Committee  and  State  Council  jointly  issued  a  circular  calling  on  party 
committees  and  governments  at  all  levels  to  adopt  practical  measures  to  help  people  in 
impoverished areas, and eliminate poverty at the earliest possible date. 
April 1986 
Poverty relief work was included in the Seventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and 
Social Development.  The State Council established a Leading Group for Economic Development 
of  Impoverished  Areas.    The  State  Science  and Technology  Commission,  State  Nationalities 
Affairs  Commission,  and the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  launched their respective  poverty-relief 
programs geared to selected areas. 
 
October 30, 1987 
The State Council announced the Circular on Promoting Economic Development in Poor Areas.  
It demanded that the efficiency of funds for development be raised to realize the Seventh Five-
Year Plan objectives for solving problems of food and clothing among the majority of population 
in poor areas. 
 
May 1991 
The State Council approved the Report on the Work of Poverty Alleviation and Development in 
the Eighth Five-Year Plan by the Leading Group for Economic Development of Impoverished 
Areas.  It stipulated that efforts should focus on promoting farmland capital construction and 
raising  grain  output  so  as  to  enable  rural  households  to  have  a  stable  source  of  income  for 
adequate food and clothing. 
 
September 1993 
The  State  Council  approved  the  National  Poverty-Relief  Program,  which  aimed  to  ensure 
adequate food and clothing for the existing 80 million poor within seven years (from 1994 to 
2000).  At the same time, the Leading Group for Economic Development of Impoverished Areas 
was renamed the State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development. 
 
March 6, 1995 
At the UN World Summit on Social Development Held in Denmark, Premier Li Peng announced 
that China will eliminate object poverty in rural areas by the end of this century. 
 
September 23, 1996 
General Secretary Jiang Zemin delivered an important speech at the CPC Central Committee’s 
meeting on poverty-relief work.  He urged that no effort be spared to realize the goals of the 
National Poverty-Relief Program as planned. 
 
May 6, 1997 
At the 25
th Meeting of the NPC Standing Committee, State Councilor Chen Junsheng suggested 
that poverty-relief work be listed on the agenda of legislation to guarantee the continuity and 
stability of the work, and that a national law on poverty relief be formulated. 
 
Sources: Fan, Zhang and Zhang 2001. 
 
 




CHAPTER 3  
 
 
Irrigation Management Institutions in China—An Overview 
 
 
SCARCE WATER RESOURCES IN CHINA 
 
While  China  has  large  water  resources  compared  to  other  countries,  its  population  is 
comparatively even larger and its water is not evenly distributed across the country or across 
important agricultural regions.  China ranks fifth in total water resources among the countries in 
the world, but on a per capita basis, it is among the poorest.  The nation’s water resources are 
overwhelmingly  concentrated in southern  China,  while  northern  China, the area  north  of  the 
Yangtse River Basin, has a far lower per-capita water endowment (Ministry of Water Resources 
1998).  The lower levels of rainfall in North China are also much more seasonal than in the South, 
with over 70 percent of the rain falling between the months of June and September.  Northern 
China,  however,  remains  an  important  agricultural  region  and  the  site  for  much  of  China’s 
industrial production (State Statistical Bureau 1999).  Although it only has 24 percent of the 
nation’s water resources, northern China contains over 65 percent of China’s cultivated land, 
produces roughly half of its grain (and nearly all of China’s wheat and corn), and over 45 percent 
of  the  nation’s  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)  (Ministry  of  Water  Resources  1998;  State 
Statistical Bureau 1999). 
Increasing  industrial  output,  expanding  agricultural  production,  and  rising  domestic 
incomes have all contributed to the depletion of water resources in China.  From 1949 to 1998, 
per capita use has increased 130 percent and total water use in China has increased 430 percent 
(Wang 2000).  The industrial sector has experienced most of the increase; the average annual 
growth in water consumption for industries was 8.6 percent over the period, compared to just 2.7 
percent  for  agriculture.    Hence,  over  the  period  1949  to  1998,  the  share  of  China’s  water 
resources consumed by agricultural producers fell from 97 percent to 69 percent.  Industry’s share 
rose from 2 to 21 percent and domestic and other consumption rose from 1 to around 10 percent. 
The effects of the increase in water demand have been most acute in northern China.  As 
demand increased in the industrial and urban sectors, shortages of water resources forced officials 
to cut back on deliveries of water to farmers in some provinces.  In many parts of northern China 
(for  example,  in  northern  Anhui,  northern  Jiangsu,  Shandong,  Shanxi,  Gansu,  Qinghai,  and 
Xinjiang Provinces and the Provincial-level Municipalities of Beijing and Tianjin), agricultural 
water consumption declined from 1994 to 1998 (Ministry of Water Resources 1994-98). In other 
areas (e.g., Liaoning, Jinlin, Heilongjiang, Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia 
Provinces), water demand in agriculture increased, but only modestly.  In contrast, industrial 
water use increased further over the period, especially in the industrial centers of Beijing, Tianjin   29 
and Shenyang, and provinces such as Hebei and Shandong that have high concentrations of urban 
and rural industries.  
The  rapidly  rising  non-agricultural  demand  for  water  is  not  the  only  problem  facing 
agricultural water users in North China; water deliveries to agriculture are also threatened by 
deteriorating surface water delivery infrastructure and by excessive withdrawals upstream.  Large 
portions of China’s physical water storage and transfer infrastructure, much of which was poorly 
built  during  the  People’s  Communes  (1950s  to  late  1970s)  are  rapidly  deteriorating  and 
investment funds have lagged and are generally towards newer projects rather than maintenance 
of older projects.  The river systems that supply water to many surface systems also sometimes do 
not provide sufficient water because, upstream users withdraw more water than are supposed to 
under law.  Because of excessive upstream withdrawals, the Yellow River has run dry before 
reaching the ocean for at least some period every year since 1974 (except in 2000, due to new 
enforcement rules). 
In  many  areas  in  northern  China,  increased  agricultural  water  use  and  the  related 
production increases have been partly due to easily exploitable ground water that has allowed 
farmers to irrigate a winter wheat crop, usually corn, in addition to another crop in the later 
summer season, (Stone 1993).  For example, in 1995, two wheat growing provinces, Hebei and 
Shanxi,  relied  on  ground  water  for  more  than  50  percent  of  their  total  irrigation  water 
consumption (Ministry of Water Resources 1995). In other important wheat growing provinces, 
such as Shandong and Shaanxi, the share of ground water in irrigation use is above 40 percent.  
Faced with increasing water demand and declining surface water supply and reliability, many 
farmers have begun to exploit ground water instead of surface water (Wang 2000).  The coastal 
parts of northern China (including northern Jiangsu, Shandong, Hebei, and Liaoning) have also 
seen irrigated acreage from ground water exploitation expand more rapidly than in the inland 
areas, where there is relatively less access to ground water (Ministry of Water Resources 1998). 
Ground water is also the primary source of water used in industry and for domestic 
consumption  in  many  regions  (Ministry  of  Water  Resources  1995).    In  1995,  the  share  of 
industrial water deliveries that came from ground water sources was above 50 percent in nearly 
all of northern China, and was above 80 percent for some provinces, such as Hebei and Shaanxi. 
Most of China’s northern provinces also receive a majority of their domestic water deliveries 
from ground water sources.  For example, in Ningxia and Inner Mongolia ground water supplied 
more than 90 percent of the domestic water consumption. 
Increasing demand, limited surface water availability and reliability, and rising reliance 
on ground water extraction has led to falling water tables and a number of other problems in 
North China.  For example, in Feixiang county, a county located in the upstream part of the 
Fuyang River basin in Hebei Province, the shallow ground water table fell at a rate of 0.6 meters 
per year in the 1980s and 1.3 meters per year in the 1990s (Hebei Hydrological Bureau and Water 
Environmental Monitor Center 1999).  Even greater rates of decline occurred in the middle and 
downstream parts of the basin.  In addition, the deep water table is declining at an even faster 
rate, currently declining by about 1.7 meters per year.  Due to the over exploitation of ground 
water, cones of depressions or areas, where the water table has dropped in an upside-down cone 
formation,  have  developed  under  urban  areas  in  six  Hebei  Province  prefectures:  Handan, 
Shijiazhuang, Xingtai, Hengshui, Cangzhou and Baoding municipalities.  Land subsidence has   30 
also occurred in some predominantly rural counties such as in Henshui, Ren and Quzhou counties 
(Smil 1993; Hebei Hydrological Bureau and Water Environmental Monitor Center 1999). 
While the long-run impact of the falling water table in North China is not clear, current 
rates of extraction are not sustainable given the current rates of recharge.  In the longer run, areas 
with cones of depression may even lose their capacity to hold large quantities of ground water.  In 
this and other ways, the subsidence brought on by ground water depletion may permanently harm 
the land’s capacity for ground water storage.  However, if effective water-saving practices can be 
implemented or if new water sources can be found in the near future, the present levels of ground 
water depletion would not necessarily represent permanent damage, because, most of northern 
China’s ground water can be recharged through surface water infiltration, if the withdrawals are 
sufficiently reduced (Nickum 1998). 
Large ground water extractions and the subsequent fall in the water table could also affect 
the quality of water, particularly, through the intrusion of seawater.  A survey carried out in the 
coastal  provinces  of  northern  China  in  the  early  1990s  found  that  over  2,000  square  km  of 
formally fresh water table had fallen below sea level (Nickum 1998).  Farmers, industrialists and 
city water managers abandoned more than 8,000 tubewells, and irrigated area declined by 40,000 
hectares.  While these losses represent only a small part of the overall agricultural production in 
North China, they do significantly impact residents in the affected regions and some observers 
predict that unless ground water sources are allowed to replenish, these problems will increase at 
an accelerating rate. 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO INCREASING WATER SHORTAGE 
 
China is starting to see the long-term impacts of excessive water exploitation and is facing water 
scarcity problems that might become a serious crisis in the near future, unless, of course, policies 
are adopted and institutions emerge to avert such an event.  Although water scarcity in northern 
China has been building up for decades, it has only recently begun to affect the livelihoods of 
people  and  threaten  the  profitability  of  economic  activity.    Unchecked,  the  problems  could 
develop into catastrophic proportions.  China, however, has begun to address these problems at 
nearly all levels, from the national down to the village and farm levels.  In some cases, progress is 
difficult to detect, but given the length of time it took to generate these problems, it is reasonable 
to assume that the solutions will also be difficult to implement and progress will be slow.  To 
understand the actions taken by the government, local leaders and individuals, in the following 
several sections we will examine the complex arrangements that govern how China recovers, 
stores, allocates and manages its water resources and institutional response.   
 
 
WATER-RELATED INSTITUTIONS IN CHINA 
 
In China, water resources are administered by a nested hierarchical administrative system.  Figure 
3.1 presents the structure of water management authorities in China.  Article 9 of the 1988 Water 
Law stipulates that the water management system in China is a complex of sector-responsible and   31 
level-responsible management combined with integrated management under the control of the 
central government.  However, Article 9 has received considerable criticism from officials and 
scholars in China because it results in unclear division of responsibilities across various sectors, 

























The Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) is the highest at the central level directly under 
the State Council, with Water Resource Bureaus (WRB) at the provincial, prefecture and county 
levels.  Water Management Stations at the township are the lowest levels of state administration.  
Water Resource Bureaus at the provincial, prefecture and country levels are controlled jointly by 
the government at the same level and the MWR.  Actually, water resource bureaus at sub-national 
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bureaus are appointed by the government at the same level.  Relationship between the MWR and 
sub-national water resource bureaus is technical guidance through issuing water policy, law and 
regulations  to  sub-national  water  resource  bureaus,  while  the  MWR  can  also  control  part 
functions  of  local  water  resources  bureau  through  allocating  some  water  infrastructure 
investment.   
Below the national level, Irrigation Districts (IDs) were developed to administer water 
resources that span lower-level administrative boundaries.  Any given ID always reports to the 
officials in the WRB that encompasses the district’s entire command area.  For example, if an ID 
includes two or more prefectures, it is under the provincial WRB, but if it lies in two or more 
counties within the same prefecture, it is under the control of the prefecture’s WRB. 
The ultimate duty of Water Resource Bureaus has always been to create and manage 
water allocation plans, conserve limited water supplies in deficit areas, and administer water 
infrastructure investment.  In the early years of the People’s Republic of China, the WRBs were 
mainly in charge of surface water development and management, working through a system of 
regional and local irrigation districts (IDs).  The primary task of local water policy managers is to 
translate  investment  dollars  into  infrastructure,  maintain  the  system  once  it  is  in  place,  and 
manage  the  water  flows  within  and  among  IDs.    More  recently,  WRBs  in  most  regions  of 
northern China spend more of their time assisting in the development of and attempting to control 
ground water resources, though control of groundwater resources has been more difficult.  One 
approach has been to control the number and location of wells.  In the pre- and early reform years 
(up through the late 1980s), the monopolization of well-drilling activity gave local authorities a 
fairly comprehensive control over the access to groundwater since most deep wells (and many 
shallow wells) were sunk by well-drilling enterprises owned and operated by the WRB.
3  In 
recent years, however, the rise of private well-drilling companies and competition among locally 
state-owned (owned by either a township or a village) well-drilling companies has reduced this 
avenue of control.  In this new environment, local WRBs are still charged with controlling ground 
water extraction by using their authority to issue all well-drilling permits for water extraction and 
management (Wang and Huang 2000).
4  We have, however, encountered many exceptions to this 
process.  For example, Urban Construction Bureaus are notoriously independent and in many 
cases urban units operate on their own without the oversight of the WRBs.  The WRBs are also 
charged  with  overseeing  a  system  of permit rights to draw groundwater in addition to well-
drilling rights.  This system is intended to allow them to operate a de facto groundwater allocation 
plan, but it has not always worked in practice.   
This system of water administration is supplemented by seven river commissions, which 
are administered by the MWR.  The Yellow River Basin Commission and Huai River Basin 
Commission  are  all  old  commissions  created  in  the  1930s,  while  the  Pearl  River  Basin 
Commission, Hai River Basin Commission, Songliao River Basin Commission and Taihu Lake 
Commission were all created in the 1980s. The Seven river commissions are responsible for 
                                                 
3Although, until recently, wells were mostly drilled by enterprises set up and controlled by the local WRB, the wells 
themselves were often managed on a day-to-day basis by the collective, enterprise, or some other agency.  Today, many 
of the wells are drilled and operated by private entrepreneurs. 
4The control over water permits in urban areas by local WRBs was institutionalized in 1998 by a State Council 
directive in 1998, although it has not been effectively implemented in all areas (Wang and Huang 2000).   33 
coordinating water allocation between provinces by implementing the policies of the MWR.  As 
subordinate  agencies  of  the  MWR,  these  commissions  have  no  independent  decision-making 
power while coordinating water allocation between provinces. 
Besides  the  administrative  system  of  the  MWR,  there  are  several  other  government 
authorities with some direct or indirect water management responsibilities such as bureaus or 
agencies  of  construction,  geography  and  mining,  environment  protection,  energy  resource, 
meteorology, finance, and so on (figure 3.1).  Therefore, water management in China is very 
complex, as it reflects the various interests of governmental agencies.  Faced with increasing 
water shortages in most northern regions and even in some southern regions, and realizing the 
importance of an integrated water management has recently become an important target of the 




CONFLICTS IN WATER MANAGEMENT   
 
Water management conflicts arise in several areas, including the rural and urban water uses, 
surface and groundwater balance, water quantity and water quality control, et al. For example, 
surface water and rural groundwater is administrated by the MWR, while the urban groundwater 
is administrated by the Ministry of Construction (MOC).  Other special groundwater including 
heat and mining groundwater is governed by the Ministry of Geological and Mining Resources 
(MGMR).  For water pollution, the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) is responsible 
for inspection of pollution and fee collection. While wastewater disposal facilities are inspected 
by the MOC that collect wastewater disposal charges.  As sewage or polluted water is delivered 
into rivers, water pollution control becomes the main duty of the MWR.  Both the MWR and the 
SEPA  monitor  water  pollution  in  surface  and  groundwater;  the  MGMR  also  takes  part  in 
groundwater monitoring.  Conflict in the Management of hydropower between the MWR and the 
Ministry  of  Energy  Resources  (MER)  is  another  example  of  management  friction,  since  the 
MWR and the MER have been divided and merged several times since 1949. 
 
 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS 
 
Water management conflicts also arise between vertical administrative system (from central to 
local  governments)  and  horizontal  local  government  system.    Maximizing  local  revenue  and 
economic growth subject to a certain level of grain self-sufficiency in a region, is the major 
objective of the local governments.  This objective has affected the local water resource bureau' s 
decision on water allocations among sectors, and the local government' s efforts in investment and 
other matters related to water activities.  The regional distributions of industry and agriculture are 
often not consistent with their water resource endowments. 
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CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM 
 
Although the MWR always makes water allocation plans between the upstream and downstream, 
the MWR does not have enough absolute  power to force local governments in water uses to 
follow the allocation plans, which always results in overuse of water in the upstream. The Yellow 
River dry-up is a good example of the outcome of unbalanced water allocation between the 
upstream and downstream, across the provinces.  
 
 
EMERGING TREND IN REALIZING INTEGRATED WATER MANAGEMENT 
 
Water Management Agency Reform 
 
In order to strengthen water management and resolve water conflicts discussed above, China has 
been trying to reform its water management system since the late 1980s, particularly through a 
recent reform initiated after the middle 1990s. 
 
Separation and merging of MWR and MEP 
 
Since 1949, the MWR has been reorganized several times and its functions were also adjusted 
accordingly.  Through reorganization, the water management functions of the MWR have been 
strengthened and some water management conflicts among various relevant sectors have also 
been  gradually  resolved.    Unified  water  management  system  is  becoming  a  reality  in  China 
though there are still many difficulties in realizing integrated and efficient water management. 
In October 1949, after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the MWR 
was also established and mainly responsible for flood control and national water development.  In 
1958, the fifth conference of the first National People’s Congress passed the decision of agency 
adjustment under the State Council; the MWR and the Ministry of Electric Power (MEP) was 
merged  into  the  Ministry  of  Water  Resources  and  Electric  Power  (MWREP).    In  1979,  the 
MWREP was divided into MWR and MWEP.  In 1982, MWR and MWEP were again merged 
into MWREP.  In 1988, MWREP was again divided into MWR and MWEP. 
Because MWR and MEP have been divided and merged several times, the two agencies 
have  many  overlapping  functions  in  water  resources  management,  especially  in  managing 
hydropower.    Similar  to  ministry  level  reform,  sub-national  water  management  agency  and 
energy  management  agency  also  changed  several  times,  with  different  changes  of  agency 
arrangements occurring in each province.  Even in a single province, some sub-province water 
management agency and energy management agency are separate while some are combined. 
 
 
Functions of the MWR regulated in 1988 agency reform 
 
Based on the 1988 agency reform plan of the State Council, the newly organized MWR is the 
main body of water administration and comprehensive water management agency under the State   35 
Council, responsible for national water conservancy management.  The newly organized MWR 
has established 14 functional departments and its main responsibilities include: 
￿  Carry  out  the  Water  Law,  organize  administrative  regulations  of  water  resources 
management. 
￿  Take  charge  of  integrated  national  water  management  and  protection;  promote 
comprehensive  development  and  utilization  of  water  resources,  coordinate  water 
conflicts between departments, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under 
the central government; manage national water saving work. 
￿  Organize  and  draw  up  long-term  and  annual  water  resources  development  plan, 
coordinate other relevant departments to make national and provincial long-term water 
supply and demand plan; formulate water allocation plan across provinces and water 
projects, organize key water conservancy construction. 
￿  Comprehensively  control  and  develop  large  rivers  and  lakes;  cooperate  with  other 
relevant  departments  to  draw  up  comprehensive  watershed  plans  of  main  national 
rivers, international and boundary rivers and supervise and implement watershed plans 
after their approval. 
￿  Plan water resources by taking the whole situation into account and manage rural water 
conservancy, pastoral area water conservancy and town water supply. 
￿  Manage  hydropower  focusing  on  flood,  irrigation  and  water  supply  and  rural 
hydropower. 
￿  Coordinate with relevant departments, manage water regions of national rivers, lakes, 
reservoirs, sea-wall and flood storage areas and water projects. 
￿  Take charge of national flood control and drought fighting. 
￿  Take charge of national soil and water conservancy. 
￿  Organize relevant departments to conduct water resources investigation and evaluation, 
responsible for national hydrological work management. 
￿  Manage and supervise professional national water conservancy and development. 
￿  Manage reservoir resettlement, hydropower, reservoir and fishery management. 
￿  Take charge of national water science and technology, education and foreign exchange 
and coordination of economy and technology. 
￿  Take charge of drawing-up and allocation of main goods and materials supply. 
￿  Manage water resources management staff. 
 
 
Summary of the 1988 water management agency reform 
 
Although  the  1988  agency  reform  firstly  regulated  the  formal  water  resources  management 
functions of the MWR and other departments, on analysis of the above functions of the MWR we 
find, that, responsibility division of water management between the MWR and other departments 
are not very clear and that the MWR has no unified authorities in managing water resources.  
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The 1994 water management agency reform 
In  1994,  water  management  was  again  reformed.    Also,  some  functions  of  the  MWR  were 
changed.  The number of functional departments of the MWR was reduced from 14 to 13 through 
reorganization.  
At first, the 1994 agency reform empowered the MWR to take charge of urban water 
conservancy work including urban water supply project construction and water environmental 
protection.  The 1988 agency reform did not provide such functional regulations of the MWR. 
Although the 1994 agency reform regulated that the MWR has the power to manage urban water 
resources, it was not clear as to how to transfer urban water resources management authorities 
from the MOC and SEPA to the MWR, and in fact, water management functions of the MOC and 
SEPA were still listed in their functional tables. Anyway, this regulation was an advantage for the 
MWR though it was difficult to implement the regulation. 
Secondly,  for  hydropower  management,  the  MWR  takes  charge  of  organizing, 
constructing and managing hydropower station and hydropower network belonging to the water 
conservancy  administration  system.    In  1994,  property  right  of  hydropower was  treated  as a 
standard for dividing management right and responsibility of hydropower between the MWR and 
the Ministry of Energy Resources (MER).  In 1988, the main function of the hydropower station 
was used as a standard for responsibility division.  If the main function of the hydropower station 
is to produce hydropower, then the MER should manage the hydropower station, otherwise, the 
hydropower  should  be  managed  by  the  MWR  since  its  main  function  is  to  supply  water  to 
irrigation and other sectors. 
Thirdly,  in  the  1994  agency  reform,  the  MWR  has  added  its  economic  adjustment 
functions by price, tax and loan measures.  This newly increased function of the MWR indicates 
that  the  Central  Government  has  begun  to  realize  the  importance  of  economic  measures  in 
managing water resources and water conservancy assets. 
However, although functions of the MWR have had some changes compared with the 
1988 reform, functions of other relevant departments had almost no change, which perhaps is the 
main reason why the 1994 agency reform in water resources management did not have much 
obvious achievements in improving water management in China. 
 
 
The 1998 agency reform in water resources management 
 
Due to conflicts of water management among different departments, especially, among the MWR 
and the MOC, the SEPA and the MOE, China’s government reorganized the MWR in 1998 and 
adjusted some conflict responsibilities among these departments.  Compared with the previous 
agency  reforms  of  the  MWR  such  as  in  1994  and  in  1988, it  has  great advances in  clearly 
defining the water management functions between various sectors, though it was still hard to 
implement the reform program in all provinces in a short time.   
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The following two functions were separated from the MWR: 
￿  Governmental functions of hydropower construction will be undertaken by the Economic 
and Trade Commission 
￿  Governmental soil and water conservancy functions of biological prevention and cure 
measures such as tree and grass planting will be undertaken by the State Forestry Bureau. 
 
The following functions were incorporated into the MWR: 
￿  Previous  groundwater  administrative  management  functions  taken  by  the  ministry  of 
Geological  and  Mining  Resources  (MGMR)  will  be  transferred  to  the  MWR.    For 
exploiting mineral water and heat water only water withdrawal permit certification was 
needed. Urban flood control, groundwater management and protection functions of urban 
program region of the MOC will be transferred to the MWR. 
 
The following two functions were transferred between the MWR and relevant departments: 
￿  According  to  relevant  laws,  regulations  and  standards  of  state  resources  and 
environmental protection, the MWR will draw up a water resources protection program, 
organize  water  functional  region  dividing,  monitor  water  quality  of  river,  lake  and 
reservoir, examine and approve pollution accommodating capacity of water regions, pose 
suggestions of total volume of effluents.  Relevant data and information should circulate 
to the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). 
 
￿  Draw up a water saving policy and program, formulate relevant standards, guide national 
water-saving work.  The MOC is responsible for guiding urban water collection and 
water delivery by pipe-network, household water-saving and accept supervision from the 
MWR. 
 
In the 1998 agency reform, the State Council indicated that the MWR will be responsible for 
integrated water management which includes water in the air, surface water and groundwater.  
Before  1998,  it  was  not  clearly  defined  what  part  of  water  will  be  managed  by  the  MWR.  
Further, water withdrawal permit license will only be managed by the MWR; the MWR will not 
entrust other departments to issue it anymore.  However, urban water saving is still undertaken by 
the MOC. 
 
Effects and problems of the 1998 water institutions’ reform: 
 
The  1998  reform  program  of  the  State  Council  transferred  some  functions  relevant  to  water 
management  and  previously  controlled  by  other  departments  to  the  MWR;  however,  if  we 
examine the reforms program of these departments, we will find that these functions transferred 
to the MWR still appeared in the responsibility regulations of these departments.  For example, 
the MOC is definitely stipulated by the State Council to take charge of the urban groundwater 
management  and  protection  and  urban  water-saving  guidance  work.    Such  a  reform  is  not   38 
thorough  and  enough  to  implement  for  local  governments;  department  conflicts  in  water 
management especially between the MWR and the MOC still has not been resolved.  Therefore, it 
was not a wonder to find that the MOC indicated in August 2000 that it should take over the 
unified urban water management. 
It seems that simply transferring overlapping functions between various departments are 
hard to operate, and transaction cost is also very high.  A better way to realize integrated water 
management  is  to  establish  new  management  institutions  such  as  the  Urban  Water  Affairs 
Bureaus in some regions in China, since urban is almost the weakest part of the water resources 
management.  Establishing Urban Water Affairs Bureaus has attracted more and more attention 
from central and local governments.  In the following section we will discuss the institutional 
reform of constructing the Water Affairs Bureau in China. 
 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF WATER AFFAIRS BUREAU 
 
Origin and development of the Water Affairs Bureau 
 
Water Affairs Bureau (WAB) originated in Shenzhen.  In the beginning of the establishment of 
the Shenzhen special region, the Water Resources and Electric Bureau of Shenzhen was canceled 
during agency reform.  With rapid urban development, serious water shortage, flood disaster and 
soil and water loss problems have appeared.  After promulgation of the Water Law in 1988, the 
Municipal Water Resource Bureau was resumed which took charge of the municipal water source 
establishment  and  flood  control  and  drainage  work.    However,  water  supply  program  was 
managed by the Program Department, construction of water supply facilities was managed by the 
Urban  Construction  Bureau  and  water  supply  enterprise  was  controlled  by  the  Urban 
Management Department.  Four governments managed water at the same time which resulted in 
some difficulties: such as coordinating programs, keeping water source construction in step with 
water supply facilities’ construction, unifying water allocation, coordinating relevant interests and 
dividing  responsibilities.    In  1991,  a  serious  “water  crisis”  in  Shenzhen  resulted  in  direct 
economic losses of 1.2 billion yuan and in 1993 two big flood disasters resulted in 1.4 billion 
yuan economic losses.  Drought and flood disaster led the municipal administration of Shenzhen 
to reform the water affairs management system and the Water Affairs Bureau was established in 
July 1993.  As an administrative body of water resources management, the Water Affairs Bureau 
manages water source program, development and construction, construction and management of 
flood control and drainage facilities, urban water supply, planning, construction and management 
of water-saving program, in unison. 
On 13 May 2000, the first provincial unified water management agency was established 
in Shanghai.  The Water Affairs Bureau in Shanghai has integrated previous water- relevant 
functions of the Shanghai Water Resources Bureau, the Public Affair Management Bureau and 
the Urban Project Management Bureau.  Separating management between water quantity and 
water quality and between rural water and urban water, flood control, waterlogging control, water 
demand, water supply, water saving, drainage, water protection, sewage disposal and reuse and 
groundwater recharge has been realized as unified management.  Zhenshu Jin, the general deputy   39 
minister of the Ministry of Water Resources, gave a high evaluation of the reform of water 
resources management in Shanghai.  Mr Jin pointed out that such water resources management 
reform embodied the principle of simplifying government agency, unification and efficiency, and 
resolved the problem of government functions overlapping with law enforcement difficulties.  In 
August 2000, Baotou in Inner Mongolia also established the Water Affairs Bureau, the first Water 
Affairs Bureau along the Yellow River.  
Until May 1999, 160 counties established the Water Affair Bureaus in Shananxi, Shanxi, 
Hebei, Henan, Anhui, Heilongjiang and Shenzhen.  Hebei established 75 Water Affair Bureaus, 
Shanxi had 29, Heilongjiang had 8, Anhui had 7, Henan had 5 and Shenzhen had 3.  Until 
October 2000, 494 cities and counties in 24 provinces have conducted the water affairs reform.  
Among these, there are 258 Water Affairs Bureaus and 236 water resources bureaus implemented 
water affairs’ management.  
 
Achievements and problems in urban water management reform 
 
The  MWR  thought  that  establishing  the  Water  Affairs  Bureau  can  promote  water  resources 
rational  allocation,  improve  water  resources  development  and  utilization,  fully  play  current 
engineering efficiency and promote water-use efficiency and structural adjustment.  Of course, no 
one has made an empirical research on urban water affair reform and it is too early to give a 
conclusion of the achievements of urban water management reform.  However, it is sure, that 
establishing urban water affair bureaus is a valuable measure to solve separating management 
problems between urban and rural water management. 
 
There exists some problems in the urban water management institution reform: 
 
1.  Understanding problems: Some people think water affairs reform means the MWR is 
scrambling for power and profit from the MOC.  Establishing Water Affairs Bureau 
is to put the water tap firmly under a Water Resources Bureau and does not consider 
water resources’ effective allocation. 
2.  Management of system problems: The current water affairs bureau does not divide 
governmental function from enterprising function, and how to divide them needs to 
be considered seriously. 
3.  Investment  sources:  Water  conservancy  investment,  mainly,  came  from  the 
agricultural  department  while  urban  water  supply  project  investment,  especially, 
urban  pipe  network  establishment  do  not  come  under the  agricultural department 
management, which impedes urban water supply investment source of water affairs. 
4.  Slow reform in large and medium cities:  Except for Shenzhen, Shanghai, Baotou and 
a few other cities, reform of most Water Affairs Bureaus established in counties and 
water management institutions in large and medium cities are very slow, and water 
management conflicts are more acute in these cities than in counties. 
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LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WATER MANAGEMENT 
 
National level legal system 
 
With emerging increase in water shortage and environmental problems associated with social and 
economic  development,  China  has  accelerated  its  water  legal  system  establishment  since  the 
1980s.  In 1988, the first comprehensive Water Law was issued, which provides the general 
framework and principles for water resources management in China.  Other than that three water 
laws were formulated or revised in the 1990s.  Except for the four water laws, nearly 30 water 
management regulations were issued, which mainly cover nine aspects of water management 
such as water project, water finance, water price (fee), water withdrawal permit system, water 
saving, irrigation district management, etc. (figure 3.2).  At present, the central government is 
considering drawing up Watershed Management Law, Yellow River Law, and Water Saving Law.  
These new laws will help to strengthen integrated watershed management, focus more on water 
allocation and efficiency issues within and across major river basins.   
 



















Water legal system in  China 
Water laws   Water regulations 
The Water Law (1988) 
Soil and Water Conservancy 
Law (1991) 
Water Pollution Law (1996) 
Flood Control Law (1997) 
Soil and water conservancy regulations 
Water saving demonstration regulations 
Water project management regulations 
Water finance regulations 
Flood control and drought fight regulations 
Water withdrawal permit regulations 
Water administration management regulations 
Irrigation district management regulations 
Water price regulations   41 
It is worthy to note that currently the legal system is mainly dominated by regulations not laws.  
Despite these various regulations, most of them are “temporary” and many lack implementing 
provisions.  Further, water law and regulations are always too general to be implemented.  At the 
same time, some  very necessary laws and regulations such as water resources fee collection 
method and watershed management law have not been issued, though the State Council had 
intended to formulate them even in the 1980s.  Slowness in amendment of existing legislation and 
issuing new necessary legislation reflects sharp conflicts among various stakeholders. 
 
 
Sub-national level legal system 
 
Based on the central government’s water law and regulations, local governments should provide 
implementation details that reflect the local socio-economic and natural resources conditions.  
However, the issue of implementation details of local governments has always been very slow.  
By  1991,  the  People’s  Standing  Committees  or  People’s  Governments  in  nine  provinces  or 
province-level “autonomous regions” had promulgated Water Law implementation measures or 
water resource management regulations.  Such regulations are seen as building blocks for the 
formation  of  more  local  water  legislation.    For  example,  in  the  Ningxia  Province,  the 
implementation details of Water Law (issued in 1988 at national level) was issued in 1993, local 
water price regulation (issued in 1985 at national level) was issued in 1989 and local water 
withdrawal permit system (issued in 1993 at national level) was issued in 1999.   The slow pace 
of formulation of provincial level implementation measures may indicate that lower levels have 
given a low priority to the measures stipulated in the 1988 Water Law.  Another possibility is that 
the provinces are still carrying out experiments in water management and development and will 
postpone implementing legislation.  Yet another explanation could be that political in- fighting 
over  the  rights to  manage  water  and  other  issues at  the  sub-provincial levels (i.e.,  financing 
difficulties) has hindered the promulgation of implementing legislation at provincial levels.  Since 
1991, more provinces have passed implementation measures (e.g., Hunan and Hubei in 1993).   
The problem has replicated itself at sub-provincial levels.  In the Hebei Province near 
Beijing, the People’s Congress or governments in 63 of the 85 areas, cities, and counties had not 
promulgated any sort of unified water resource management document by 1992.  One article 
stated that a major cause of conflict is between governmental departments over the rights to 
manage  water,  in  particular,  to  collect  water  fees  and  give  out  water  withdrawal  permits, 
especially in urban areas.  Local leaders evidently complain that disputes at the center in Beijing, 
and in the provinces, over the control of other water resources create considerable uncertainty and 
make it increasingly difficult for lower levels to manage water or formulate local laws.    42 
WATER POLICY AND MANAGEMENT 
 
Water allocation across provinces 
 
Seven river commissions’ authorities 
As subordinate agencies of the MWR, the seven river commissions are entrusted to manage water 
allocation  across  provinces.    However,  in  actuality,  the  seven  river-basin  commissions  have 
relatively  little  authority  to  deal  with  the  water  issues, they  do  not  control or  provide  water 
resource investment allocations in their basins, and have relatively limited financial resources to 
promote improved water management and policy implementation.  How to make a new type of 
river-basin  management  organization  with  more  control  ability  over  the  allocation  of  water-
related financial resources in the river basin, and more authority for comprehensive, integrated 
management of water resources in the river basin is the key to improve river-basin management.  
The following section will provide the water allocation evolutions of the Yellow River Basin. 
 
Water allocation in the Yellow River Basin 
 
Before the implementation of the Yellow River Water Allocation Program, as a typical “open-
access resource” of the Yellow River, upstream and downstream water users could freely draw 
water. Regional water use is determined by water demand and the major constraints of water 
supply  is  water  withdraw  capacities.    Open-access  resource  implies  high  risks  of  resources 
degradation which will lead to “tomb tragedy”.  Each province along the Yellow River Basin has 
competed for water and actively constructed every kind of water withdraw facility to satisfy the 
increasing water demand.  From the 1950s to 1990s, water consumption of the Yellow River has 
increased 1.5 times.  As a public resource, the Yellow River cannot bear the overdraft resulting 
from low water price and poor management. Cutting-off of the Yellow River has been a frequent 
phenomenon and has aggravated especially after 1991. 
In view of increasing water use conflicts between the upstream and downstream, the 
Yellow River Water Allocation Program was issued in 1987 by the State Council.  Based on this 
program, 34.96 billion cubic meters of water will be allocated to nine provinces along the Yellow 
River, but the actual water use differs greatly in the program.  According to the published data 
from the Yellow River Commission, during 1992-1995, compared with the program, water use in 
Inner Mongolia and Shandong exceeded 13 percent and 11.3 percent, respectively; while water 
use in Shanxi and Shananxi was lower than the plan average by 52 percent and 75.8 percent, 
respectively. A report of the Geological Department of Chinese Academy of Sciences points out 
that due to lack of integrated water management and relevant laws and regulations, it is difficult 
to effectively supervise and control actual water use and no punishment has been conducted for 
some regions and departments who use water above the permitted quota, which result in failure to 
implement  the  Yellow  River  Water  Allocation  Program.    In  the  dry  years  when  water 
consumption peaks, every region along the Yellow River will try to be the first to draw water and 
water allocation is thus thrown into confusion.  Not being effectively carried out the Yellow River 
Water Allocation Program has reflected the management system’s failure of instructive water   43 
allocation measures.  Instructive allocation is to allocate resources by regions based on the central 
government’s instructions.  The characteristics of decision-making mechanism are like the black 
box operation, central government (departments) have the final say and highly centralized power; 
binding  mechanisms  mainly  are  the  administrative  measures  and  commanding  officers’  will.  
Under  such  a  management  system,  water  users  are  in  a  passive  position,  and  neither  have 
participating rights nor expressing rights.  In fact, instructive allocation mechanism is a typical 
planned economy model, in which resource allocation efficiency is very low and constraints of 
interests are also very poor.  The direct consequence is sharper water supply and demand in river 
basin, deterioration in water quality and water environment, serious cutting-off of river. 
Due to easy water withdrawals upstream, over-draft water and water use efficiency is 
very low, while water is very short in downstream.  Per capita water use and per ten thousand 
GDP water use in four upstream provinces (Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia and Inner Mongolia) are 
greatly higher than in downstream provinces (Shananxi, Shanxi, Henan and Shandong). Due to 
constraints of geographical condition Shanxi finds it difficult to get water and its per capita water 
use and per ten thousand GDP water use are less than 200 cubic meters and 400 cubic meters, 
respectively,  while  the  Ninxia  its  more  than  1,500  cubic  meters  and  400  cubic  meters, 
respectively. 
As an agency of the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR), the Yellow River Commission 
(YRC)  has  no  actual  water  allocation  power  in  the  river  basin,  it  is  only  responsible  for 
downstream water management and has limited power in managing upstream and middle stream 
water management.  Water allocations in upstream and middle stream are controlled by upstream 
and downstream control commission of the Yellow River.  Different functions and purposes of 
the two departments lead to difficulties of cooperation in water allocation. 
Increasing serious Yellow River cutting-off received extensive attention from the central 
government, the State Council and the overall societies.   In December 1998, on  approval by the 
State Council, the State Planning Commission and the MWR jointly issued the Annual Allocation 
and  Main  River  Water  Quantity  Controlling  Program  of  the  Yellow  River.  The  YRC  was 
authorized to conduct unified control of the Yellow River water.  Since 1 March 1999, the YRC 
has begun to control non-flood period water from the  Liujiaxia Reservoir to Toudaoguai and 
from the Sanmenxia Reservoir to Lijin main river. Under the high attention and unified leadership 
of  the  MWR,  and  close  cooperation  among  provinces,  autonomous  regions  and  relevant 
departments along the Yellow River, integrated water control has obtained marked achievements.  
Compared with an average 126 cutting-off days during 1995 to 1998, Lijin Station of the Yellow 
River had only 8 cut-off days in 1999, and in 2000 no cutting-off has happened till date.   
Based  on  the  1999  experiences,  the  Yellow  River Commission  has  put  forward four 
elaborate  work  methods:  elaborately  forecast,  elaborately  control,  elaborately  coordinate  and 
elaborately supervise.  They mainly focus on three aspects of work: 
￿  Coordinate, consult and control upstream and downstream reservoirs in union, and 
timely increase of  reservoir discharge.  
￿  Strengthen timely control, issue month and ten-days water control plan, issue 
control instructions in time and deal with emergencies.  Till June 2000, 27 water 
allocation implementation suggestions and nearly 30 water control instructions 
have been released in time.    44 
￿  Strengthen supervision.  To ensure strict implementation of the water control plan, 
the work group of the Yellow River Commission has conducted several circuit 
checks for two main controlled rivers and rigidly control water use above the 
planned quota.   
 
The Yellow River Water Control is the first case for large rivers in China; it involves 
direct interests allocation among the main river pivot and water users in related provinces and 
autonomous regions, and there exists many conflicts and great differences in the Control Plan.  
Obeying the control order completely depends on overall consciousness and coordination of the 
relevant departments.  Although the YRC is authorized to conduct unified control of the Yellow 
River water by the State Council, the YRC is not the first-level government.  Water law does not 
clearly  define  water  administrative  enforcement  power  and  administrative  supervision  and 
punishment power of the YRC, management agency of the Yellow River Water Control has not 
been made clear and the relationship with local governments is still very confused.  Integrated 
control of the Yellow River water is still faced with many difficulties.  Integrated control of the 
Yellow River water is a new work and no readymade river control standard can be followed.  
Further, the Yellow River Water Quantity Control Management Method does not have detailed 
implementing  regulations;  many  contents  of  reservoir  control  application  regulations  of 
hydropower station do not harmonize with the Yellow River Water Quantity Control Plan.  It is 
urgent to establish detailed implementation of the Yellow River Water Quantity Control.  In 
addition, control plan has hardly been implemented and no effective measures have been taken.  
Currently, the YRC has only conducted an integrated control for two main river reaches, i.e., 
from the Liujiaxia Revervoir to Toudaoguai and from the Sanmenxia Reservoir to Lijin main 
river; there are still large distances to integrate and control water for the overall Yellow River. 
Except  for  the  administrative  measures  taken  by  the YRC  to  effectively  allocate  the 
Yellow River water, some provinces have also taken some economic and institutional measures to 
improve water use efficiency to reduce the Yellow River water use.  Ningxia government has 
doubled water price in April 2000 in order to improve irrigation water use efficiency.  Compared 
with 1999, total water use drawing from the Yellow River reduced by 0.53 billion cubic meters in 
2000.  Furthermore, water resources agencies in Ningxia have also taken the following measures 
to  improve  water  use:  introducing  some  water-saving  methods,  reforming  the  irrigation 
management  system,  establishing  water  users  association,  opening  water  affairs  and 
implementing  rotation  irrigation  and  contracting  branch  canals,  supplying  water  by  bill  and 
narrowing water meter scope.  Although Ningxia has increased its water price, it is still not 
enough to realize the real water value of the Yellow River.  Low water price and induced low 
water use efficiency are important reasons for low water allocation efficiency of the Yellow River.  
Using  economic  and  institutional  measures  to  effectively  allocate  water  have  still  not  been 
implemented by the central and local governments. 
Some other inter-province policies have also been discussed recently.  These include 
applying taxes, and different fiscal and financial policies to the provinces along the Yellow River.  
However, formation and implementation of the inter-provincial policies in water use through an 
incentive system requires a lot of information on the efficiency of water use among the provinces 
along the river, and the ability of coordination horizontally (regions) and vertically (central and   45 
local governments). 
WATER ALLOCATION WITHIN A PROVINCE 
 
Generally, upper-level water resources agency such as provincial and prefecture level will make 
an annual water allocation plan for lower-level regions, and then submit the allocation plan to the 
local government at the same level to get the approval.  Before making a water allocation plan, 
the water resources agency at the upper-level will solicit opinions on water requirement from the 
water management agencies at the lower levels.   Opinions on water allocation from lower level 
water management agencies will become the foundation of the water allocation plan and will also 
be adjusted and coordinated by the upper level’s water management agency, according to the 
overall water supply and demand situation.   After the local government approves the water 
allocation plan, will be sent to the lower-level government to be implemented.  Last year’s water 
supply  and  demand  situations  and  the  current  year’s  water  demand  are  important  bases  for 
making the water allocation plan.  Because water supply in the current year cannot be exactly 
predicted and perhaps because some water use sectors do not satisfy the water allocation plan, the 
water allocation plan usually will be adjusted and difficult to be implemented; water conflicts 
among various water use departments will be still harder to be avoided.   
It seems that water resources agency at the upper level will coordinate and decide water 
allocation between upstream and downstream water users.  However, the actual water allocation 
decisions  between  the  upstream  and  downstream  will  be  decided  by  the  upstream  local 
government; downstream water users have no power to compete water with the upstream water 
user. The  upper-level  government’s  role  in  water  allocation  between  regions  is  very  limited.  
Relationships of water resources agencies between higher level and lower level are mainly a 
technical relationship, not an absolute administrative relationship.  This means that the water 
resources agency at the upper level has no absolute power to control the activity behavior of the 
water resources agency at the lower level.   
In  case  of  water  conflict,  the  water  resources  agency  at  the  upper  level  will  try  to 
coordinate; if it still cannot be solved, the local government will interfere.  For some sharp water 
affairs conflict, the local court, sometimes even the higher court, will help interested parties to 
solve the water conflict. 
 
 
WATER ALLOCATION AMONG SECTORS 
 
According to Article 14 of the Water Law, water allocation should firstly ensure domestic water 
demand, then make unified planning with due consideration for agriculture, industry and shipping 
water demand.  In water-short areas, urban scale, high, water-consuming industry and agricultural 
development  should  be  limited.      How  to  actually  arrange  water  allocation  priorities  among 
sectors will be controlled by the local government.    
In fact, water, especially surface water, to be easily controlled by the policy maker will 
first be allocated to the domestic sector, then the water demands of the industry will be ensured 
and then the agriculture water use will be ensured.  Hydropower, shipping and environmental and   46 
other water demands are always arranged before agriculture.  Generally, if agriculture cannot get 
enough surface water, it will turn to groundwater. 
In spite of farmers’ political position or water productivity, the agricultural department 
finds it difficult to compete for  water with the industry department and other departments, and at 
the same, the agricultural department is always criticized for consuming a large share of the water 
resources.    Therefore,  how  to  reduce  agricultural  water  use  and  improve  agricultural  water 
efficiency has become a hot issue of discussion in government agencies and societies faced with 
increasingly serious water shortage problem in China.  Of course, reducing agricultural water 
consumption by transferring water from agricultural sector to non-agricultural sectors is a general 
development trend and is also necessary for promoting social welfare and economic growth.   
However, how to efficiently allocate water between agricultural water users and non-
agricultural water users?  Is higher water use efficiency better for water utilization and water 
allocation  efficiency?  Faced  with  increasing  water  shortage,  how  do  farmers  respond  to 
agricultural production and water use? What kind of policy can lead to social and economic 
sustainable development given a growing gap between water supply and water demand? Although 
all the above problems have great import and practical implications, very little empirical research 
has been done in China; this paper itself can only answer a few questions, more comprehensive 
research needs to be conducted in future.   
For water allocation among sectors, a relationship and mechanism exists between higher 
level government agencies and lower level government, -- the government agency at the higher 
level cannot absolutely control the water allocation patterns but can give technical guidance to 
lower level agencies.  Water allocation among sectors will be decided by the local government 
and service for the local government’s political and social targets, which is usually short-term 
behavior and beneficial for non-agricultural water users.  
   
 
 
WATER FINANCE SYSTEM 
 
Evolution of a Water Finance System for Irrigation Projects 
 
The  total  input  for  irrigation  projects  in  China  can  be  divided  into  two  parts:  input  for  the 
construction  of  new  irrigation  projects  (construction  input)  and  input  for  system  operation 
(operation input). Different policies have been formulated for these two different kinds of inputs. 
The construction input mainly comes from basic national construction funds.  From the 
mid-1950s, China began to use its limited financial and material resources to construct a large-
scale rational economy, among which the basic water conservancy facility is one of the important 
items. The construction input is mainly funded by the government, supplemented by farmers’ 
labor input.  Before the 1980s, the Central Government was in charge of constructing important 
national irrigation projects.  Also, the construction fund and material for main canals and higher-
level key projects of large-scale irrigation districts were allocated to each province annually, 
according  to  the  construction  scale  and  macroscopic  planning  capacity  of  each  province.  
Moreover,  the  Special  Subsidy  Funds  for  Small  Rural Water  Conservancy  Projects  (SSFSP),   47 
water soil conservation projects, and lower-level conveyance system of large projects have been 
funded. 
Following  the  macroscopic  planning  of  the  Central  Government,  each  lower-level 
government carried out its varied project constructions, according to its local economic capacity.  
From the 1950s to the 1980s, government input was mainly utilized in the construction of key 
projects.  The soil-digging work in the construction of reservoirs and canals was mainly finished 
through farmer labor input.  According to studies, farmer labor input accounts for more than one-
third of the total input to the existing irrigation projects.  During construction, farmers performed 
at a very high level.  From the 1960s to the 1970s, since the government could not provide 
enough funds, material subsidies and technical aids, a large number of medium and large projects 
were constructed by farmers themselves, at times even without initial planning.  There are 
countless small projects that have been constructed by farmers. The famous Hongqi and 
Renming  Shengli  Canal  irrigation  projects  in  the    Henan  province  were  constructed  in  this 
manner. 
In principle, the government will not provide any further funds for irrigation projects 
already  constructed,  except  two  kinds  of  subsidies:  1)  operational  subsidy  for  projects  in 
conjunctive use of irrigation and drainage, mainly used as a subsidy of energy charge; and 2) 
some operating expenses allocated from the national finance fund, for the poor regions with 
limited  fund  sources,  which  indicates  the  protectivist  policy  of  the  government  towards 
agriculture.  For all constructed irrigation projects, the operation and maintenance (O&M) costs 
mainly  come  from  the  following  channels:  the  day-to-day  expenditure  (including  salaries, 
travelling and electricity charges, etc.), and maintenance costs, mainly from the water charges 
collected  from  farmers  and  other  water  users.    Different  regions  have  different  measures  of 
making up the difference between O&M costs and water charges.  For example, for the soil-
digging costs, the most popular measure is for the local farmers to simply contribute some labor 
input or to pay a relevant amount of money. In some regions with better economic conditions, a 
proportion of the local industrial benefit can also be arranged as a subsidy fund to sub-serve 
agriculture. 
Farmers  should  also  take  up  the  responsibility  of  field  facilities  maintenance.   
Governments also provide some subsidies for project expanding or enhancing work by using the 
established SSFSP, such as for the lining work, of the small canal system.  Twenty to forty 
percent of the material fee can be provided by using the SSFSP in the local finance fund.  Since 
the collected water charges cannot recover the irrigation costs, there is no fund source for the 
rehabilitation and large-scale repair of irrigation projects at this stage. 
After rural institutional reform was initiated in the later 1970s, the planned financial 
system in water sector has been gradually decentralized since the early 1980s.  The major reform 
has been focus on the responsibility of water management and finance between central and local 
government and between the government and farmers. Since the 1980s, China has experienced a 
financial system transfer.  The Central Government is only in charge of the construction and 
management  of  giant  inter-provincial  projects.  The  construction  and  management  of  projects 
within provinces and the arrangement of SSFSP were transferred from construction to adjusting 
and consolidating, with suitable facilities for extension.  The finance and its management of 
small-scale  rural  water conservancy  projects  had  been  transferred  from  higher  to  lower-level   48 
governments.  Due to different financial abilities among provinces, water conservancy investment 
from  the  public  sector  has  been  declining  in  many  poor  provinces.    The  existing  irrigation 
projects have been developed in two directions: 1) to improve irrigation quality in conjunction 
with  comprehensive  agriculture  development,  and  2)  to  improve  the  living  and  ecological 
conditions of the poor regions.  
Some  specialized  agriculture  development  projects  have  been  founded  by  the 
government,  such  as  the  Food  Grain  Development  and,  the  Comprehensive  Agriculture 
Developing  Fund,  and  the  Special  Fund  for  Commercial  Food  Production  Bases.    For  old 
liberated regions, minority nationality regions and boundary regions, some Poor-Aid Funds were 
arranged to help in the infrastructure construction of these regions.  Sometimes, instead of direct 
fund aid, funds for providing work as a form of relief was arranged.  Funds for Rehabilitation and 
Completion of Water Conservancy Infrastructure are also included in the above.  China is still a 
developing  country,  and  due  to  fund  limitations,  it  is  impossible  to  solve  all  the  irrigation 
problems at this stage, especially, when there is no fund source, for the government, still adheres 
to the policy of letting the farmers contribute funds and labor input every year, on a voluntary 
basis, to carry out rural water conservancy construction and to improve the existing status of 
irrigation projects.  
Today, the socio-economic conditions of the rural areas of China are developing rapidly.  
Farmers’ living conditions have undergone some major improvements.  Farmers have greater 
incomes,  and  especially  those  who  were  already  rich,  have  gained  considerable  investment 
capacity.  In order to obtain a higher quality of irrigation service, they have begun to contribute 
their own money to rehabilitate irrigation projects.  Along with the practicing and improving of 
the water conservancy stocks system and the investment transfer system, farmer consciousness of 
the construction and management of irrigation projects by themselves has heightened.  Some very 
good results have been obtained in many regions, such as in the Laiyang City of Shandong 
Province,  and  the Jiaozhuo  City  of  the  Henan  Province.  This  has  widened the  fund  source 
channel and opened up a new way for the improvement of irrigation engineering status. 
 
 
DECLINE OF WATER INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT IN CHINA 
 
Table  3.1  indicates  that  while  government  expenditure  and  investment  has  shown  a  general 
increasing trend in the pre-reform period, their shares to the total economy has shown a declining 
trend even since the early 1960s.  The bias index (BI) of government expenditure in agriculture is 
much  below  the  100  percent  level,  indicating  strong  government  expenditure  biases  against 
agriculture.  While reform has accelerated the growth of agriculture since the late 1970s, table 3.1 
also indicates that the new institutional arrangement has not provided the incentive for investment 
in agriculture.  Both, shares of agriculture in total public expenditure and water infrastructure in 
total infrastructure investment declined sharply in the early reform period (1979-85). Among the 
various  components  of  the  public  agricultural  expenditure,  the  decline  in  the  share  of  local 
governments in agriculture was the highest in the agricultural capital construction investment 
(i.e., irrigation), which fell from 63 percent in 1978 to 47 percent in 1985. 
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Declining public agricultural and irrigation expenditure attracted attention to agricultural 
production sustainability and future domestic food-supply problems.  Investment policy reviews 
led to increased investment in the early 1990s (table 3.1).  Both the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-
2000) and China’s Long Term Plan to 2010 advocate increased public agricultural investment, 
including investments in rural infrastructure and loans and credits for agricultural production.  
Irrigation and water control are the top priorities of future government investment. 
However, due to the weaknesses of the fiscal system, the new policy to increase public 
investment in agriculture and irrigation has been hardly implemented.  There are many policies 
and  regulations  that  have  been  promulgated  regarding  the  provision  of  a  minimum  level  of 
agricultural and public goods, but there is no budget to back them up. Without sufficient budgets 
or staff policies cannot be effectively carried out. 
 
WATER PRICING POLICY 
 
Evolution of water pricing policy 
 
Water charge collection has a long history in China.  Many famous ancient irrigation projects had 
the  custom  of  water  charge  collection  throughout  history.    For  example,  the  Qingtongxia 
Irrigation Project in Ningxia Province and Dujiangyan Irrigation Project in Sichuan Province, in 
their more than 2000-year operational experience never stopped water charge collection.  Since 
Table 3.1. Government investment (billion yuan,  in 1990 prices) in agriculture and 













investment  Total  Share of water 
project (%) 
1965    98  12  12  26   2      38  5.7 
1970  139  11   8  19   4      67  5.5 
1975  175  21  12  32   6      88  6.4 
1978  233  31  13  48   7  104  7.1 
1980  236  29  12  41   5  107  4.8 
1985  325  25   8  27   3  174  1.9 
1990  308  31  10  37   5  170  2.9 
1992  345  35  10  46   9  278  3.2 
1994  388  36   9  46  11  431  2.9 
1995  398  33   8  41  11  432  2.8 
1996  436  36   8  41  11  471  1.7 
Note: Values are in real 1990 prices. Government investment (expenditure) bias is estimated as: dividing the ratio of government 
expenditure in agriculture to total government expenditure by the ratio of net income of agriculture to total national income. If 
the index is less than 100%, it implies an anti-agriculture bias, otherwise, a pro-agricultural production bias (greater than 100%).   50 
the  founding  of  the  People’s  Republic  of  China,  except  for  water  charge  collection,  many 
exorbitant taxes and levies of the old government have been abrogated.  The development of 
water pricing policy can be divided into the following five stages: 
 
The first stage: 1949-1964 
 
In  1949  China  was  a  low-productivity  agriculture  society  and  many  industries  needed  to  be 
established.    In  order  to  promote  poor  farmers  to  develop  agriculture,  water  supply  was 
characterized as public affairs and almost no water fees had been collected, until 1964. In 1964 
the first National Water Conservancy Conference was held and “Trial Approaches of Water Fee 
Collection and Management” was proposed, which began to change the free water fee situation.  
 
The second stage: 1965-1979 
 
In 1965, the State Council also approved the regulation of “Approaches of Water Fee Collection, 
Use and Management of Water Project”; this is the first important government document on the 
water  price  system.    According  to  this  regulation,  management,  operation  and  maintenance 
expenditure  of  all  water  projects  that  have  produced  benefits  should  come  from  water  fee 
collection.    The  water  fee  standard  should  be  based  on  the  principle  of  self-sufficiency  and 
rational accumulation.  Water fee level should also consider the situation of beneficial units and 
the economic capacity of the water users.  Although the basic principle of this regulation was 
feasible and suited the country status at that time, it did not consider the full water supply cost 
which resulted in low water fee.   
After issuing the “Approaches of Water Fee Collection, Use and Management of Water 
Project” in 1965, the Great Cultural Revolution broke out and all water projects were publicized.  
Limited  by  the  socio-economic  conditions  during  that  time,  the  water  supply  was  simply  a 
requirement-supply activity directly under the administration of a government department.  The 
market economic relationship between water supply and water charge collection has not been 
established.  Also, considering the economic capacity of farmers and their large amount of labor 
input for project construction, the collected water charge standard was always low and even free 
for many water projects.  Subsequently, irrigation projects could only sustain their basic operation 
at a lower level, and management units had no surplus money to repair and maintain the ageing 
and damaged facilities.   
 
The third stage: 1980-1985 
 
From late 1980s to early 1985, the Chinese Government practiced reforms and open policies.  
The pure centralized planning economic system of the former period has been changed, and the 
contract  responsibility  system  is  being  practised in  rural areas.   The  consumers  of  irrigation 
projects has changed from collectives to thousands and ten thousands of individual farmhouses. 
This improved the transfer of irrigation management systems and the reform of water charge 
calculation and levying systems.     51 
In order to deepen the water price reform, the MWR organized four groups to investigate 
water supply costs for 256 large-scale projects in the eastern, middle and north-western China.  In 
this investigation, the concept of water as commercial in nature has been proposed for the first 
time  which  established  the  theoretical foundation  of  free  water  supply.    In  1982, the central 
government took steps to recheck the agricultural and industry water fee.   
After sufficient investigation, a new calculation and levying regulation for water charges 
was issued in 1985.  Some clear and concrete reforms included in this regulation are as follows: 
First, it was decided that all water conservancy projects “should be paid”, instead of 
“could be paid” as in former times, for their water supply services.  Second, the objective of water 
charge reform has been clear, i.e., to meet the project operation and maintenance costs, which 
include salaries of staff, traveling fees, meeting expenditure, office expenditure, large-scale repair 
charges, rehabilitation and reconstruction charges, etc.  A standard for water charge collection 
should  be  formulated  according  to  the  water  supply  costs.    Different  regions  were  asked  to 
formulate different kinds of water charge collecting standards for different kinds of water supply 
services, respectively, according to their local water resource availability and economic condition.  
In the case of agricultural water supply, it is regulated that the water charge collecting standards 
for food grain water supply should be formulated according to the costs of water supply.  The 
standard for commercial plants could be higher than for food grain.  The standard for industrial 
water supply would be the water supply cost plus 4 - 6 percent of investment profit.  In water 
shortage areas, all water charge standards can be promoted to a higher level. There are also clear 
and  decided  regulations  for  water  supply  to  domestic,  hydropower,  environment  promotion, 
public health, planting and/or breeding.  Third, the regulation for water charge collection, use, 
and management is also included.  Principally, water could be collected according to the supplied 
amount of water.  The supplied amount of water should be measured following hydropower 
standards. The management units can stop water supply to any user who does not want to pay the 
water charges.  The collected water charges are duty-free, and belong to the management units.  
There are also limits for the use of water charges, and some regulations have been formulated to 
supervise  the  use  of  water  charges.    Fourth,  the  duties  and  responsibilities  of  the  Central 
Government and local governments at each level are identified.  The Central Government is in 
charge of formulating the standard of water charge collection, the regulation of water charge 
collection, and use or management of the project directly under it.  The local governments at each 
level will be in charge of the above duties for the projects under their supervision. 
 
The fourth stage: 1986 -1996 
 
After issuing the regulation of the water fee approach, many provinces began to issue the local 
implementation regulations that decided the water price level based on the local conditions.  In 
1988, the Water Law was issued.  The Water Law stipulates that all water users should pay water 
fee to water supply units.  This is a very important legal stipulation for the water pricing system.   
After the efforts of the 1980s, a big improvement has been achieved in water charge 
reform.  First, from the Central Government to lower-level governments, this policy has gained 
universal understanding, especially, among lower-level governments and farmers.  A prejudice 
existed among staff of the local government departments and farmers, that, farmers should not   52 
pay any water charges, since they have already contributed some money and labor input for the 
construction  of these  projects.  Moreover,  there  are always  differences  that  exist  between  the 
industry and agriculture in developing countries.  Farmers have already contributed a lot towards 
original accumulation, so that the government must use national funds to sustain the operation, 
maintenance and rehabilitation of irrigation projects.  This kind of lack of understanding formed 
the main constraint at the beginning of the reform, but after many  years of propaganda and 
discussion, the situation has been reversed.  Also, the policy system has been perfected.  For the 
past 20 years, there have been no clear and decided government regulations on water charge 
collection,  the  use  and  management  of  water  charges,  etc.    Consequently,  the  water  charge 
collection standards in different regions became varied; in some regions, water charge collection 
went on very well, while in some other regions there was no water charge collection.  In this 
reform, the government departments at each level, supervised the completion of the water policy 
charge.  Further, the water charge collection linking network between management units and 
farmers has also been established.  In the earlier period, the management units collected water 
charges  from  collectives.    After  the  rural  economic  system  reform,  water  use  expanded  to 
thousands and ten thousands of farm houses.  In this context, a large amount of work has been 
done  in  different  regions,  and  some  rich  experiences  and  effective  methods  of  water  charge 
collection have been established.  For example, charging by goods, collecting through food grain 
purchasing stations, and transferring bills through banks, etc., have reduced collecting staff and 
cost. 
But there are also some problems which have appeared in water charge reform.  The first 
is how to supervise water charge collection while theoretically following the requirements of 
commercial economic laws.  For example, is it suitable for rural water supply where 80 percent of 
water is supplied to food grain plants?  It is still not clear as to whether water charge collection 
should be handed over as public benefit charge collection, or whether it should be brought under 
the national price management system for commercial products.  Especially after China began to 
establish a socialist commercial economic system, the problem became more acute.  The second 
is, that after ten years of water charge reform, the actual collected water charges can only cover 
project operation, management, and normal maintenance, while there is no capacity for irrigation 
management units to complete large-scale repatriation, rehabilitation and reconstruction.  As a 
result, the deterioration of projects is becoming more and more serious.  The third is, that the 
economic  laws  and  regulations  in  water  charge  collection,  such  as  price  formulation,  cost 
examination  and  calculation  and  accounting  management  systems,  etc.,  are  still  not  perfect.  
Especially, assets management is not perfect, which has resulted in deficits of original value 
evidence, and incorrect cost calculations.  The fourth is, that economic development in China is 
unevenly distributed; in poor regions, the collected water charge standards are very low and water 
charge collection is very difficult. 
To counter these problems existing in water charge collection, the Ministry of Water 
Resources started an in-depth study of the reforms, from 1994.  According to the theory of the 
socialist commercial economic system, these reforms will focus on the following four stages: 1) 
Establish a management system for the value form of assets.  Now, a nationwide asset accounting 
and property checking work is underway to identify the ownership, investigate the value amount, 
establish a basic account book management system and to bring it into the normal course of the   53 
nationally-owned assets management system; 2) To formulate new price management regulations 
for water supply.  The basic idea is that the water charge standards for food grain water supply 
should  be  brought  under  a  uniform  macro  prices  management  system;  3)  Formulate  a  new 
examination and calculation method for water supply charges, finance management regulations 
and accounting rules and to provide conditions for further water charge reform; 4) To formulate 
controlling and management regulations for nationally-owned assets and a compensating method 
for asset values, to ensure their sustainability and increase. 
 
The fifth stage: 1997- till date 
 
In 1997, the State Council issued the Water Industry Policy that regulates that “water pricing 
level for new water projects should be decided by the principle of satisfying operating cost and 
expenditure, submitting taxes, returning loans and obtaining rational profits.  Water price for 
previous water projects should be adjusted to water supply cost level and adjusted later, based on 
the changes of water supply cost.  Water price for previous water projects should be based on the 
principal of the state water price policy, cost compensation and rational benefits and consider the 
various  utilizations”.    In  addition,  according  to  the  limits  of  water  project  management 
authorities, water price will be decided and adjusted by the water pricing management authority 
and water administrative management authority at above-the-county level.  Since then, water 
pricing reform has been accelerated.   
Firstly, water price has been involved into the commercial price management system.  
Some provinces such as Shanxi, Shandongm Zhejiang and Hebei, etc., have formally listed water 
price in the national key commercial price management contexts.  The State Development and 
Planning Commission clearly empowered the pricing  management department to manage the 
water pricing.  The MWR also established the economic development and pricing division of the 
economic department to be responsible for the water pricing management.  Many sub-national 
water  resources  bureaus  have  also  established  water  fee  collection  stations  and  a  water  fee 
collection network has been basically formed. 
Secondly, institutional establishment has made some progress.  Many provinces such as 
Zhejiang,  Hebei,  Ningxia,  Henan,  Fujian,  Guizhou,  etc.,  have  issued  the  local  water  pricing 
management regulation. 
Thirdly, water pricing level has been increased through several times’ adjustment.  The 
national water pricing level has been increased from 0.001 yuan/m
3 in 1980, to 0.003 yuan/m
3 in 
1985 and 0.01 yuan/m
3 in 1991. In 1997, the water pricing level has increased to 0.024 yuan/m
3.  
Water pricing increase in Liaoning, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong and Ningxia provinces was 
relatively higher than in other provinces. 
Fourthly,  water  management  units  have  gradually  been  transformed.    Water  pricing 
reform  has  increased  the  commercial  opinion  of  management  units  and  motivated  them  to 
strengthen management and economic accounting.   
Lastly, water fee has been changed from administrative nature to management nature. In 
2000, the Ministry of Finance issued the “Circular on Abolishing Some Fees That Related to 
Farmers’ Burden”.  In this circular, the water fee has been changed from administrative nature to 
management nature and will be not treated as a budgetary fund.  This regulation redefined water   54 
price  and  suited  the  requirements  of  market  economy.    The  nature  change  of  water  fee  has 
promoted business management of water management units. 
 
 
AGRICULTURAL WATER PRICING: COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT 
 
Agricultural water pricing method is related to the water supply method, water measurement and 
calculation methods.  For united management of reservoir and irrigation districts, water will be 
measured in branch inlets; below the tertiary canals, water fee will be collected by the cultivated 
areas.  If reservoir and irrigation districts have been managed separately, water will be measured 
in de-watering outlets of the reservoir; irrigation districts will manage main and branch canals; 
township and village will manage the canals below the tertiary level.  If its directly introduced 
water from rivers, lakes or groundwater, water will be measured at intake (intake gate) or branch 
canal inlets.  Under the tertiary level, water volume is generally allocated by areas.  China had 
tried to implement volumetric water price in 1970s.  However, volumetric water price in the field 
had hardly been implemented due to measurement difficulties.  The common measures adopted 
by the local villages were based on crop areas and household population.  But these measures had 
resulted in conflicts between farmers and village leaders and as such led to difficulties in the 
actual collection of fees from water users. 
Water fee collection is generally from bottom to up, i.e., the village collective will collect 
water fee from farmers and then submit it to township, township will then submit it to county; the 
irrigation district will take the water fee from the county based on certain proportions. After 1983, 
the water fees have been merged with the other payments that farmers have to pay for the services 
provided by the local village and township such as education, rural infrastructure development, 
and other public services as well as agricultural taxes.  In most areas, these merged or aggregated 
payments were often linked with government grain procurement system that allow farmers to pay 
all these merged fees in grain equivalent (in kind).   
Since 1988, with the reform of the  grain circulation system, the state was not allowed to 
collect water fee with grain procurement.  However, this policy was not being implemented well 
until now, and there is still this kind of water fee collection in some regions due to relatively low 
administrative cost. At present, several patterns of water fee collections exist in China: 1) IDs 
contracted with township and township will collect the water fee; 2) ID contracted with village 
and village will collect the water fee, the township will act as the guarantor; 3) ID contracted with 
Water User Association (WUA) and the WUA will collect the water fee; 4) ID will open an 
account in the rural credit cooperative or agricultural bank in the township, the credit cooperative 
or bank will then collect the water fee. 




According to Article 3 of the Water Law of the PRC, there are two kinds of water property rights 
for both surface and groundwater: 1) Collective property right:  If property rights of reservoir and   55 
water pocket belong to the rural collective organization, property rights of water stored in these 
reservoirs and water pockets will also belong to the collective organization. 2) State property 
right:  Except for the collective property right of water resources, other water resources including 
both surface and groundwater all belong to the state.   
Water resources property right mainly embodies a water withdrawal permit system and 
water resources fee. 
 
 
WATER WITHDRAWAL PERMIT SYSTEM AND WATER RESOURCES FEE 
 
The  Water  Law  issued  in  1988  has  initiated  some  new  and  important  water  management 
institutions such as water withdrawal permit system and water resources fee collection.  Although 
the Water Law promises that management methods of water withdrawal permit system and water 
resources  fee  will  be  issued  by  the  State  Council,  the  Implementation  Method  of  Water 
Withdrawal Permit System was not issued by the State Council until 1 August, 1993, and no 
management regulation of water resources fee has been issued by the State Council up to now.   
According to the 1993 Implementation Method of Water Withdrawal Permit System, any 
institution or private person who draws water from river, lake and groundwater through water 
projects or machinery must apply for a water withdrawal permit license except for small-volume 
water-draw  for  domestic, livelihood  or  irrigation  demands  and  the  quota  of  small  volume  is 
decided by the provincial government.  In several cases, water withdrawal permit can also be 
exempted, such as in emergency agricultural drought, ensuring security of groundwater projects 
and avoiding danger of public security or benefit.  Water withdrawal must firstly satisfy domestic 
water consumption and  then  arrange agricultural, industrial and other water demand in overall 
considerations.    Provincial  governments  can  arrange  water  withdrawal  order  based  on  local 
situations under their jurisdictions.   
Groundwater  withdrawal  cannot  exceed  annual  planned  available  groundwater 
exploitation volume under their administrative regions, and it should accord well with the layout 
and  requirement  of  the  water  withdrawal  layer  that  was  decided  by  the  water  resources 
administration of the Government above county level through coordinating geological and mining 
resources administration.  For urban areas, urban construction administration will also make the 
decision. 
Seven  large  river  commissions  were  also  entrusted  to  issue  water  withdrawal  permit 
license in certain sections of rivers, lakes and regions assigned by the MWR.  Based on the 1993 
Implementation Method of Water Withdrawal Permit System, seven large river commissions also 
issued their implementation details of the water withdrawal permit system, such as the Yellow 
River Commission issued in 1994 and the Yangtze River Commission issued in 1995.  River 
Commissions will be responsible for rivers, lakes and groundwater withdrawal permit across 
provinces, and generally, River Commissions can issue larger volume water withdrawal permit 
than provincial management agencies.  The procedure of water withdrawal permit management of 
the seven river commissions is that local governments higher than county level will accept water 
withdrawal permit applications and propose to examine suggestions to the river commissions, 
which in turn will examine, verify and issue water withdrawal permit license to the water users.   56 
For water withdrawal volume above requirement standard, there are some punishments.  
According to the regulation, if water consumption exceeds the water withdrawal standard, in  
coordination  with  relevant  departments,  the  water  resources  administration  will  order  the 
institution  to  improve  or  correct  itself  in  due  time.    If  the  institution  still  cannot  reach  the 
standard, on approval by governments above county level, the water resources administration can 
reduce its water withdrawal according to the regulation.  If Management Regulation of Urban 
Water Savings has special stipulations, then, they should be followed.  If water is withdrawn 
without  getting  permit  certification,  the  water  resources  administration  or  entrusted 
administration will prevent the institution from water withdrawal. 
Although the purpose of the Water Withdrawal Permit System is to realize unified water 
management,  the  existing  separate  water  management  between  rural  and  urban  and  between 
surface  water  and  groundwater  that  has  resulted  in  a  separate  management  of    the  Water 
Withdrawal Permit System has made it very difficult to realize this purpose. 
According to the Report on the Implementation Situation of Water Withdrawal Permit 
System submitted by the MWR in November 1995, until July 1995, 90 percent of water users 
have  applied  for  water  withdrawal  permit  license.    Implementation  of  the  water  withdrawal 
permit system has resulted in some obvious achievements: 1) Clearly define the relationship 
between  water  resources  administration  and  other  departments;  preliminarily  overcome  the 
situation of managing water by many sectors;  2) Put various sectors’ water demand in an overall 
consideration;  3) Preliminarily absorb water withdrawal and water use into water use plan;  4) 
Preliminarily  prevent  non-order  exploitation  and  destroy  ecological  environment  of  water 
resources;  5) Accelerate urban water supply source construction. 
However, among 600 cities, 20 percent had not implemented the water withdrawal permit 
system until July 1995. The main reason for this is that some departments only consider their own 
interests  and  insist  on  being  entrusted  to  issue  water  withdrawal  permit  license  and  conduct 
separate water management of urban and rural areas; they issued some documents that impeded 
the  water  resources  administration  from  issuing  the  water  withdrawal  permit  license.    For 
example,  in  Hebei,  one  department  published  a  notice  in  newspapers  that  “except  for  urban 
construction administration, no other department have a right to issue water withdrawal permit 
license and every city in Hebei will still apply the water withdrawal permit license issued by the 
Hebei  Urban  Construction  Commission”.    Some  departments  in  some  cities  issued  Urban 
Groundwater Withdrawal Permit License to substitute the Water Withdrawal Permit Certification 
of China. 
Although  the  State  Council  has  not  provided  for  the  water  resources  fee  collection 
method,  some  provinces  (autonomous  regions  and  municipalities  directly  under  the  Central 
Government) successively formulated a collection method of water resources fee and began to 
collect water resources fee under their jurisdictions, according to a “Notice Regarding Some 
Problems of Collecting Water Resources Fee” issued by the General Office of the State Council 
in 1995.  The collection method of water resources fee has been listed the legislative plan of the 
State Council; the MWR and the Ministry of Construction are required to draw up a plan as soon 
as  possible  and  submit  it  to  the  State  Council.    Before  publishing  the  water  resources  fee 
collection method of the State Council, the water resources fee collection will abide by each 
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Similar to the management system of the water withdrawal permit system, the water 
resources fee is also managed by various departments, mainly, the water resources agency and 
urban construction agency.  Although the urban construction agency will collect the resources fee 
in urban areas, most resources fee collected by the urban construction agency is not used in water 
resources management, but rather used in urban construction.  Except for the sectors’ conflict, 
another problem in managing water resources fee is rural water resource fee collection.  For rural 
water resources fee collection, according to a stipulation of the “Notice of the General Office of 
the  Central  Government  of  the  Communist  Party  and  General  Office  of  the  State  Council, 
Regarding Examination and Disposal Suggestions of Farmers’ Burden Projects’ in 1993, rural 
water resources  fee  will  be  postponed for  5  years  to  implement.    However,  five  years  have 
already passed, and rural water resources fee has still not been collected in almost all provinces; 
the MWR and the State Council have not indicated clearly whether rural water resources fee 
should be collected from now onwards.  Faced with an increasing water shortage and a sharper 
water competition among sectors, especially groundwater overdraft, more and more provinces 
want to collect the water resources fee.  According to our investigation, the Hebei province will 
begin to try out collection of irrigation groundwater resources fee in some counties in late 2000.  
The problem in collecting irrigation groundwater resources fee is how to monitor and supervise 
groundwater use exactly, since, so many diversified and small farmers draft groundwater.  Local 
governments thought of installing water meters in each agricultural well to solve the problem, 
however, how to ensure farmers will not make changes on the record of the water meter, and 
whether the meter cost will be too high to collect water resources fee is the issue. 
SURFACE AND GROUNDWATER MARKETS 
 
Compared to countries such as America, Mexico and Chile, who legally allow water right trade, 
transferring water withdrawal permit license or water use right is prohibited in China. If a water 
withdrawal  permit  license  is  transferred,  the  water  resources  administration  or  entrusted 
departments will revoke the water withdrawal permit license and expropriate unlawful income, 
according to the 1993 regulation.  More and more evidence show that water right transfer is an 
efficient water allocation measure and water markets development through trading water rights 
will be an important potential strategic measure to solving increasing water shortage.   Since 
agricultural water use is still the largest water user among various sectors, how to transfer water 
from  agriculture  to  non-agricultural  departments  has  attracted  more  and  more  attention  from 
government officials and scholars.  Many people argue that agricultural water use efficiency is so 
low that improved water use efficiency in agriculture can result in water transfer from agriculture 
to industry and domestic water users.  However, farmers do not get much incentive with improve 
water use efficiency, especially, upstream farmers, since water price is so low and water use right 
cannot be traded.  If water use right can be traded, farmers can obtain more benefit through 
trading  water  use  right  than  through  using  more  water  in  agricultural  production;  it  is  also 
possible that farmers will have a great incentive to save water to earn more money.   58 
Although no surface water markets have existed in China, informal groundwater markets 
has  appeared  since  the  late  1980s  with  the  increasing  water  shortage  and  innovation  of 
groundwater irrigation system, mainly in North China. 
DEVELOPMENT OF IRRIGATION PROJECTS 
 
China needs to construct some giant irrigation projects. This has been decided on the basis of its 
large  population,  unevenly  distributed  water  resources,  and  the  complicated  geographic  and 
geomorphic conditions.  Affected by the monsoon climate, the annual precipitation in China 
declines from 1,600 millimeters (mm) in the southeastern coastal regions to less than 200 mm in 
the northwestern region.  It concentrates mainly in the summer season, from June to September, 
and is unevenly distributed.  China is also frequently hit by drought, water logging and flood 
disasters.  The geographic condition of China is very complex, the usable area of plains and 
slopes or basins in mountain areas accounting for 12 percent and 29 percent, respectively, of the 
total land area. 
Most of the existing irrigation projects in China were constructed under special social 
conditions.    Affected  by  long-term  war,  China  was  faced  with  poor  industrial  production 
conditions and an extremely weak national economic capacity at the time of the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China.  Farmers struggled for basic food sufficiency.  In this context, the 
Chinese  Government  clearly  responded  and  paid  attention  to  the  importance  of  water 
conservancy. 
Based on the understanding that “agriculture is the foundation of the national economy”, 
water conservancy is considered as the lifeblood of agriculture.  It is also clear that all water 
conservancy problems cannot be solved at this stage, but efforts need to be undertaken to improve 
water conservancy development as much as possible.  Based on the existing socio-economic 
conditions, the Chinese Government organized millions of farmers to continuously undertake the 
construction  of  basic  water  conservancy  projects,  such  as  constructing  reservoirs  and  canals, 
digging wells and ditches, leveling lands, planting trees and building roads, to improve the living 
environment and production condition.  A large number of irrigation districts have been built 
during this period, and the following stages have been experienced: 
A 3-year rehabilitation period after the founding of the People’s Republic of China: The 
main  objectives  during  this  period  were  to  heal  war  wounds,  and  to  resume  agricultural 
production.    Almost  all  existing  irrigation  districts  were  rehabilitated  during  this  period, 
especially, all the gravity irrigation districts, which reached their best performance level before 
1949.  Some  extensions  were  also  obtained,  such  as  the  world-famous  Dujiangyan  Irrigation 
District, the command area of which after 3 years of rehabilitation reached 0.2 million hectares, 
while conditions for further development were founded. 
A  high-speed  development  period  from  the  mid-1950s  to  the  1970s:  With  the 
development  of  material  industry  and  technology,  the  construction  of  some  large  irrigation 
projects was started.  Almost all the existing medium and large-scale irrigation projects in China 
were constructed during this period.  With the development of the mechanical manufacturing   59 
industry and agricultural production, China began to construct pumping irrigation systems from 
the late 1950s.  Examples are the Jiamakou pumping irrigation districts in Gansu Province, and 
the Jangdu Pumping Irrigation and Drainage Project in Jiangsu Province.  From the early 1970s, 
tubewell technology has been developed to exploit underground water resources.  It developed 
rapidly  and,  especially  in  the  plains  of  North  China,  the  exploitation  of  underground  water 
resources has gradually developed to encompass the entire region. 
A  new  period  of  economic  reform  since  1980:  During  this  period,  especially  after 
practicing of the rural economic contract responsibility system, the ownership system in rural 
areas  changed  rapidly.    To  follow  this  change,  the  focal  point  of  irrigation  was  shifted  to 
management, focusing on basic management work and management system transfer. 
Up to now, China has 5,683 irrigation districts whose command area is over 667 hectares, 
the total effective irrigated areas of these districts are 24,493 thousand hectares -- 45 percent of 
the total effective irrigated areas of China (Ministry of Water Resources  2001).  Among the 5,683 
irrigation  districts,  there  are  101  large-scale  irrigation  districts  whose  command  area  is  over 
33,333 hectares and 141 middle-scale irrigation districts whose command area is between 20,000 
and 33,333 hectares. The construction of such a large number of irrigation districts provided an 
essential environmental condition for China’s agricultural and economic development during the 
past years. But due to insufficient construction and management experience, and poor national 
and individual economic capacity at that stage, construction quality was poor and the conveyance 
systems were not completed.  Added to poor management skills and unsuitable management 
systems were project deterioration and inadequate rehabilitation even after several decades of 
operation.  Today, most of the projects are performing below their potential. 
PROPERTY RIGHT : EVOLUTION OF WATER CONSERVANCY PROJECTS 
IN CHINA 
 
The evolution of property right characteristics of water conservancy projects in China can be 
analyzed in two stages: 
First Stage (1949-1979): Establishment of Public Ownership 
 
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Government began to 
confiscate all bureaucratic capital that included water conservancy capital.  Land Reform Law 
issued in 1950 clearly stipulated that: “Large water projects, ……. Rivers, lakes …….belong to 
the state and are managed by the People’s Government”.  This means that most property rights of 
water conservancy projects are actually controlled by the State.  At the same time, “If water 
projects are invested and managed by private persons, investors can continue to manage them 
according to regulations issued by the Government”.  This means that private investors can keep 
the management right of the water projects.  During the socialist transformation period, private 
water  projects  were  also  transferred  to  the  State.      Rural  water  conservancy  projects  were 
transferred to public ownership in rural cooperative movement, periods which began in 1956.    60 
Demonstration Regulation of Rural Senior Cooperatives explicitly defined that “ private tanks 
and wells attached to farmers’ land should be transferred to cooperative collective ownership, 
collective ownership will compensate owners to a certain degree based on the actual situation”.  
Since  then,  socialist  transformation  of  water  conservancy  projects  was  stopped,  ownership 
patterns  of  water  conservancy  were  preliminarily  formed.    In  1961,  the  Central  Government 
commented and sent out “Ten Suggestions of Strengthening Water Conservancy Management” 
formulated by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and the Ministry of Water Conservancy and 
Electric  Power.    These  ten  suggestions  further  made  clear  the  public  ownership  of  water 
conservancy projects in the management system.  Article 1 in the suggestions stipulated that if the 
service  area  of  water  projects  is  in  one  community,  one  county,  one  special  district  or  one 
province, then the water projects will be managed by that community, county, special district or 
province.  If the service area of water projects includes 2 regions (2 communities, 2 counties, 2 
special districts), then, the water projects will be managed by the higher government or the main 
beneficial units decided by the higher government.  Article 5 stipulated that, water conservancy 
management agencies at each level should be obtained into state labor and wage plan, which 
indicated that water conservancy projects and water management institutions have entered into 
planning an economic system and formed a typical public ownership. 
In 1983, Management Regulations of the Water Conservancy and Electric Power issued 
by  the  Ministry  of  Water  Conservancy  and  Electric  Power  clearly  stipulated  that  water 
conservancy  and electric power  projects  invested by  the  state belong  to state  ownership  and 
should be managed by the State; sometimes, collectives can be entrusted to manage state projects.  
Water conservancy and electric power projects run by the local people and subsidized by the 
State or invested by the communities or production groups will belong to collective ownership 
and managed by the collective; sometimes they can also be managed by the State according to 
demand.  The ownership of land and accessories in the land under the management scope of the 
State-managed projects will belong to the whole people, use right belongs to the management 
units.  For collective-managed projects, the ownership belongs to the collective, use right belongs 
to the project management units. 
There exists several basic characteristics of such property rights of water conservancy 
projects.  At first, the structure of the property right is single.  Public pattern of State ownership 
or collective ownership is the single form.  Whether large-scale or small-scale water projects, 
they are all under state ownership or collective ownership; water conservancy management unit 
or other water conservancy units are all typical institutions owned by the state or collectives.  
Second, property right of state water conservancy projects embodies management relationship 
such as owning, using, allocating or disposing right of water conservancy departments.  Third, 
transfer of property right is strictly limited.  The public nature of the water project property right 
cannot be changed and allocated by administrative order; if subordination of water projects or 
management units is changed, management relationship of water assets will also be changed, 
accordingly.   61 
Second Stage (1979-till date): Changes in Public Ownership 
 
Since  1978,  with  the  deepening  of  the  rural  economic  reform,  implementation  of  household 
production responsibility has weakened the collective economy; management bodies of small-
scale irrigation projects have become vacant and destroy these water projects, there’s no one to 
manage and maintain rural water projects.  To change the situation in time, the Ministry of Water 
conservancy and Electric Power began to try to find management methods to suit water project 
management with household production responsibility system.  The idea was to try out every kind 
of responsibility system (including contract system), combine farmers’ short-term interests and 
long-term interests, plan construction, management of rural water conservancy and agricultural 
production  in  an  overall  consideration,  joint  responsibility,  right  and  benefit  to  arouse  every 
level’s work incentives.  Such methods received good results at that time. 
In  large-scale  water  project  management,  the  state  paid  more  attention  on  position 
responsibility and strengthened management in the water project management units to collect 
corresponding water charge and electricity charges in order to ensure normal operation of the 
water projects. 
To encourage masses to construct the rural water conservancy projects, in November 
1988,  the  State  Council  verified  ten  suggestions  of  “Constructing  Rural  Water  Conservancy 
Projects Depending on Masses” formulated by the Ministry of Water Conservancy.  The key issue 
of  the  ten  suggestions  is that  the  State  advocates  and  encourages farm  household  or  several 
coordinated  farm  households  to  construct  rural  water  conservancy  projects  according  to  the 
unified planning of the local government; the principle of investors as managers and beneficiaries 
was also emphasized.  There is a  need to conduct further research on the impacts of the ten 
suggestions, but at least  it implies that the Central Government has begun to pay attention to 
property right innovation of rural water conservancy projects. 
In the 1990s, there have been many advances in property right innovation of rural water 
conservancy  projects.    In  1992,  the  fourth  conference  of  the  Communist  Party  posed  the 
important decision of establishing socialist market economy.  Based on the arrangement of the 
Central Government and combined with the practical experiences of water conservancy reform, 
the MWR put forward a strategic arrangement of establishing five water conservancy systems in 
the national water conservancy conference; they include: water investment system, water asset 
management system, water price and water charge collection system, water legislation system and 
water service system.  Since then, reform of the rural water conservancy has developed further 
and deepened. 
This  increased  investment  in  rural  water  conservancy;  each  region  extensively  has 
collected funds from multi-channels and multi-levels, which greatly enlarged fund sources of 
rural water conservancy and water conservancy constructed by the farmers have appeared in 
some places. 
Some provinces such as Heilongjiang, Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, Hebei, Shanxi, Sicuan 
and Zhejiang have made an active attempt to explore the rural small-scale water conservancy 
reform.    Through  carrying  out  several  methods  of  auction,  rent,  contract,  or  share  system, 
ownership is clearly defined, use right is auctioned, construction right is opened up, management 
right is made flexible and stock asset is used fully, and incentives of project owners are aroused.    62 
Construction of small-scale water projects by private or coordinated households, private contract 
or share system has changed the only water investment pattern of the State, mobilized the mass 
incentives of water project investment, realized the unity of construction, management and the 
use and unity of responsibility, right and benefit.  Through property right reform of small-scale 
water conservancy, many cadres and masses have liberalized thought, renewed their ideas and 
strengthened  market  economic  consciousness  and  enlarged  investment  channels,  strengthened 
engineering  management  and  accelerated  water  conservancy  construction,  preliminarily 
established the small-scale water conservancy management system suited to the social market 
economy (Chen and Yang 1998). 
Until 1997, there existed about 16 million small-scale water projects, and about 2.41 
million have conducted property right reform, with 0.31 million of share companies and 0.32 
million of auction (Chen and Yang 1998). 
However, property right reform of water conservancy has mainly happened in small-scale 
water  projects;  property  right  reform  of  large  and  medium  water  projects  are  still  in  the 
experimental  stage.    Small-scale  water  projects  occupy  an  important  position  in  agricultural 
production;  property  right  evolution  of  small-scale  water  projects  will  improve  water 
management system innovation and also attract the attention from central and local government.  
Therefore, research in property right innovation of small-scale water projects has large practical 
meanings. 
DETERIORATION OF IRRIGATION PROJECTS 
 
The deterioration of irrigation projects (DIP) in China appeared from the mid-1970s, and reached 
its  peak  in  the  early  1980s.    It  has  become  one  of  the  two  major  crises  in  China’s  water 
conservancy (the other one is the shortage of water resources).  The research program, “The 
Deterioration Assessment and Investigation Methods for Irrigation Projects” was proposed by the 
Ministry of Water resources in 1990, to get a clear view on DIP, find a suitable measure, and 
establish a foundation for improving irrigation management and go deeply into irrigation transfer.  
In this program, the method of “analyzing by levels” has been adopted to formulate a standard for 
DIP assessment and classification.  A nationwide DIP investigation has been made in large-scale 
irrigation  projects,  which  is  based  mainly  on  each  provincial  association.  Targets  of  this 
investigation are key constructions at the heads of large-scale irrigation projects, and in canals 
with over 1 cubic meter per second of water diversion capacity. Results of computer analyses 
indicate that 53.8 percent of the total key constructions dropped into deterioration in varying 
extents.  The deteriorated canal length accounts for 28.6 percent of the total investigated canal 
length.  The damaging ration of lining canals accounts for 32.4 percent, while the deteriorating 
ration of construction along canals accounts for 40 percent.   
 
There are many reasons for DIP as indicated below: 
￿  Natural  ageing:  Over  50  percent  of  total  large-scale  irrigation  districts  having  been 
constructed  before  1960,  most  of  them  have  by  now  reached  their  rehabilitation  or   63 
reconstruction age.  Thus, natural ageing is the main reason for DIP.  According to the 
study, about 67 percent of DIP is caused by ageing. 
￿  Lower  construction  quality:  This  is  because  a  large  number  of  irrigation  projects  is 
constructed within a short period, and the economic conditions and the technical skills of 
construction  groups  are  limited  during  that  time.  Many  project  constructions  are 
completed with whatever facilities are available.  As a result, the construction quality is 
low  and  cannot  meet  the  designed  requirements.  This  situation  causes  congenitally 
deficient irrigation projects, reduces their effective operation time limit, and accelerates 
deterioration.  The investigation results indicate that 12 percent of deterioration is due to 
this reason. 
￿  Unsuitable planning and design: Due to limitation in technical capacity and construction 
standards during the early period, large numbers of irrigation projects were constructed 
without  sufficient  evaluation  and  examination.  This  caused  a  lot  of  planning  and 
designing problems, such as unsuitable canal bed slopes and unsuitable aqueduct inlet 
and outlet allocation, etc. 
￿  Ineffective management, and damage caused by humans: Many management units have 
no  perfect  set-up,  and  the  educational  background  of  management  staff  is  low; 
subsequently, the management work is ineffective.  Unsuitable operation has resulted in 
artificial  damage  upon  the  irrigation  projects.    On  the  other  hand,  as  a  developing 
country,  China’s  legal  system  is  still  imperfect;  people  have  an  indistinct  legal 
consciousness; thus, frequent harm (destruction) was caused to irrigation projects by the 
humans. 
￿  Other  reasons:  Includes  factors  such  as  insufficient  maintenance  funds  which  have 
resulted in insufficient project maintenance, change of water resources, etc. In this case, 
governments, water conservancy administrative departments at each level, and project 
management units have paid special attention to DIP.  With the help of government 
finance  at  each  level,  a  large  amount  of  funds  has  been  put  into  the  reparation  and 
rehabilitation of deterioration projects.  But since there are too many problems left over 
by history, the fund deficits are too big, and the fund sources are limited.  The problem 
has not been solved satisfactorily to-date. 
MANAGEMENT OF SURFACE WATER IRRIGATION SYSTEM 
 
Institutional Arrangement of Surface Water Irrigation System 
 
The Chinese Government has always paid special attention to the establishment and perfection of 
irrigation management systems.  The general principle is that the donors will be owners and the 
managers.  Government departments are the main managers of projects funded mainly by the 
government.    Collectives  and  farmers  manage  projects  which  are  mainly  self-funded.    The 
command  area  of  the  State-managed  irrigation  districts  accounts  for  47  percent  of  the  total 
national irrigation area.  Some small reservoirs, ponds, and pumping irrigation projects (with less   64 
than  667  ha  of  command  area)  are  mainly  managed  by  collective,  with  the  command  area 
accounting  for  27  percent  of  the  total  national  irrigation  areas.    Other  small-sized  irrigation 
projects, mainly tubewells, are managed by farmers, with the command area accounting for 26 
percent of the total national irrigation area.  The government water conservancy departments at 
each level are relevantly in charge of planning, technical supervising, science researching, policy-
making and fund allocating.  They are also in charge of setting up special local management units 
for  irrigation  projects  to  formulate  operation  strategies,  check  and  approve  annual  planning, 
coordinate water allocation, and project maintenance.  According to the regulations formulated by 
the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) in 1981, the management units should be set up by the 
MWR  for  the  projects  covering  different  provinces,  and  by  provincial  water  conservancy 
departments for the projects covering different regions or municipalities, and so on. 
Traditionally, irrigation projects are classified into two categories: canal systems and field 
facilities.  Canal systems consist of reservoirs, water delivering or drifting constructions on the 
heads of main canals, and main-branch-tertiary canal systems; and are managed by professional 
management organizations. Field facilities are managed by mass management organizations.  The 
professional management organizations should be set up by the government water conservancy 
departments at suitable levels, according to the scale of each command area.  This is called 
“management in levels”.  The professional management structure is the institution that directly 
manages the project.  It is the executive unit which concretely carries out management operation 
and implements the policies of the Party and the directives of the higher levels.  The actual 
irrigation management system is complicated, since the management models and systems are 
varied  due  to  regional  differences  in:  economic  conditions;  availability  of  water  resources; 
investment systems for the construction of irrigation projects; project scale, type, construction 
quality and standard; and local customs, etc. In most regions, reservoirs, canal head constructions, 
and  main  canals  of  large-scale  irrigation  districts  are  managed  by  the  same  management 
organization,  while  branch  and  tertiary  canals  are  managed  by  the  organizations  set-up 
respectively by a lower level of the government water conservancy department. 
There is another kind of management model where the entire canal system and even 
within-distribution blocks are all managed by the same management organization, set up by a 
suitable  level  of  government  water  conservancy  department.    It  is  called  the  “uniform 
management model” in China, and is only practiced in a few provinces, such as the 9 large-scale 
irrigation districts in the Guanzhong  region of  the Shaanxi Province. 
No matter what kind of irrigation model, democratic management systems exist at each 
level of management organization.  The participants include the representatives of beneficiaries, 
local  government  officials  and  irrigation  management  units.    They  are  called  democratic 
management committees or democratic representative conferences.  One or two meetings will be 
held  annually  in  these  conferences  or  associations  to  make  important  decisions  for  project 
operation, such as water volume distribution, large-scale reparation and rehabilitation, calculation 
and levy of water charges, etc. 
In  most  cases,  the  village  irrigation  management  group  divided  the  voluntary  labor 
requirements from its village into a quantity of labor to be provided by each household.  If, for 
some reason, a household cannot contribute the required voluntary labor for canal maintenance, 
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maintenance works, different organizations will take responsibility according to the maintenance 
work done on different levels of the canals.  Generally speaking, for important maintenance work 
such  as  lining  of  canals  or  building  a  new  structure  along  the  main  canal,  the  irrigation 
management  office  will  make  the  plan  and  take  responsibility  for  the  organization;  building 
materials will be provided by the office as well. However, one village or more which directly 
benefits from this will be asked to provide the required voluntary labor.  All maintenance on sub-
branch and field canals is organized and conducted by the village irrigation groups through whose 
villages the canal passes.   
FUNCTIONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
The regulation on Irrigation District Management Method defined the following functions for 
professional management units of the irrigation district: 1) Implement relevant water polices and 
orders  from  the  upper-level  governments,  decisions  of  the  representative  conference  and 
management commission of the irrigation district (ID); 2) Establish and complete the water users’ 
management  organization  of  the  ID;  3)  Maintain  the  water  projects  and  ensure  its  security; 
organize the beneficiary units to do well the field projects and land leveling work; 4) Organize the 
beneficiary units to clean the canal, blocking and emergency repair, etc.; 5) Conduct planning of 
water use, improve irrigation technology and quality, conduct drainage work well and improve 
soil  quality;  6)  Conduct  irrigation  experimental  work,  extend  science  and  technological 
achievements; summarize farmers’ experience and guide scientific water use; 7)  Protect water 
resources and prevent pollution; 8) Organize the greening work of the irrigation districts; 9) 
Organize  water  fee  collection,  conduct  diversified  economy,  perfect  financial  system  and 
strengthen  management;  10)  Strengthen  statistical  work  and  establish technological files;  11) 
Organize the training of staff, improve their capability, and resolve the practical difficulties of the 
staff. 
The function of the Management Commission of the Irrigation District is to check the 
work plan and summary of the management unit; make and adjust management regulations of the 
irrigation district, research the key issues of the irrigation district management.  The major task 
for the representative conference of the irrigation district is to reflect beneficial opinions and 
requirement, check work report of the Management Commission of the Irrigation District, discuss 
the important issues that are proposed by the commission and make a decision.  The decision of 
the commission and representative conference can be implemented after approval by the upper 
level administrative authorities. 
From the institutional arrangement of the irrigation district, especially the democratic 
management  it  seems  involves  the  water  users’  participation  in  irrigation  management;  this 
pattern is somewhat similar to participatory management.  However, there is a basic difference 
between China’s democratic management pattern and participatory management (Tao 2002).  The 
differences can be summarized into three points: 
First, the traditional pattern of China’s irrigation district was established in the planned 
economic system, water was not treated as a commercial product and was almost free. Although   66 
some  water  users  were  involved  in  the  irrigation  management,  the  major  management 
responsibilities of the irrigation district was still undertaken by the government.  This situation 
not only resulted in increasing the burden of the government, but also resulted in unclear property 
right relationship, management responsibilities and poor management. 
Second,  the  professional  management  unit  of  the  irrigation  district  is  stipulated  as 
administrative in nature, directly controlled by the government and with no independent rights.  
In  another  aspect,  the  government  has  encouraged  the  irrigation  district  to  be  financially 
independent.    Since  the  professional  management  agency  of  the  irrigation  district  has  no 
independent power it is hard for it to be financial independent.  The conflicting responsibilities of 
the irrigation district have greatly influenced the operation of the irrigation district, a case of low 
income and high expenditure. 
Third, the democratic management organization is not really voted by the water users and 
appointed by the governments.  Most heads of democratic organizations are township or villages 
leaders. In fact, they are governments’ representatives in the field-level.  Water users or farmers 
only  provide  labor  or  money-based  requirement  of  the  democratic  organization  and  seldom 
participate in any other management activities. 
MANAGEMENT REFORM OF SURFACE WATER IRRIGATION SYSTEM 
 
At the beginning of the rural reform in the 1980s, irrigation management systems could not fit the 
requirements of reform, which at once resulted directly in the decrease of irrigation area in China.  
In this case, the Chinese Government strengthened it with  the water conservancy system. A series 
of policies, laws and regulations have been issued by the Central Government, such as the Water 
Law,  the  government  policy  for  water  conservancy  management  transfer,  and  water  charge 
calculation  and  levying,  etc.    Further,  water  management  offices  were  established  in  every 
township, and those found guilty of destroying water conservancy facilities were severely dealt 
with.  Since 1990, along with the establishment of the China Commercial Economic System, 
irrigation management systems were transferred gradually.  The government departments have 
begun: to account for  property and check the financial status of the irrigation districts; to identify 
property rights between farmers, collectives and government departments; to re-divide duties and 
responsibilities  between  governments  and  irrigation  management  units;  to  establish  contract 
responsibility management systems; to practice and improve a stock-sharing system and an inner 
hire irrigation system; to establish water company and Water User Association, etc. In sum, with 
continuous practice, China’s irrigation management transfer has begun in-depth. 
DIVERSIFIED SIDELINE ENTERPRISES 
 
Irrigation districts often have under-utilized assets and resources that have a potential economic 
value.  There was generally a gap between the level of resources which could be raised by the 
irrigation  fees  (because  of  political  reluctance  to  require  farmers  to  pay  for  the  full  cost  of 
irrigation service) and the actual costs of operations and maintenance.  By the 1980s, the salaries   67 
of  irrigation  district  officials  were  dropping  in  real  terms  below  alternative  employment 
opportunities in rural China, and skilled staff were leaving the service due to low salaries and 
poor working and housing facilities in irrigation districts. In order to bridge the gap between the 
limited revenue and the amount needed for O&M and to boost salaries and facilities for irrigation 
workers,  the  government  introduced  the  concept  of  diversified  sideline  enterprises  into  the 
irrigation  sector.    In  the  early  1980s,  the  State  Council  issued  the  regulation  on  Diversified 
Sideline Enterprises.  Irrigation districts were encouraged to develop sideline enterprises to raise 
additional revenue.  Profits from these businesses were to cross-subsidize the costs of irrigation 
management.  By 1988, it was official policy that no central or provincial government funds 
could be used for regular O&M in irrigation districts. 
Officially, the profit from these sideline activities is to be used for the operations and 
maintenance of the water unit in question, but often the profits are reinvested in the sideline 
operation itself or paid out to employees as bonuses.  Some water units are evidently neglecting 
water  management  in  their  pursuit  to  earn  profits  from  economic  sideline  activities.    These 
inefficiencies represent an unintended outcome or necessary evil resulting from the government’s 
policy to encourage economic entities.  Beijing cannot and should not monitor every economic 
sideline operation undertaken by every irrigation district in China.  On the other hand, not all 
water units have succeeded in keeping the sideline activities in operation and have subsequently 
been unable to use this means to finance their water activities.  The main reason has been the lack 
of scientific, technological and managerial experience, leading to the production of items that are 
not competitive. 
The  central  government  has  been  formulating  economic  policies  and  water  laws  to 
encourage  the  development  of  economic  entities  and  help  water  management  units  function 
better.  In the period of the Eighth Five-Year-Plan (1981-1985), every water management unit 
that used its own natural resources to plant crops, raise fish, or construct its own agricultural 
processing plants or water conservancy projects was to be exempt from all state industrial taxes.  
Regulations on water conservancy entity management were promulgated in 1988.  The State Tax 
Bureau  also  issued  a  document  in  1992  which  stated  that  “water  management  and  water 
protection  stations,  and  water  production  station  units  that  provide  technological  expansion, 
irrigation and technological  management  for  a  fee shall  be exempt  from  state  taxes  on  their 
revenue.” 
Many water management units do not appear to be taking advantage of these tax breaks 
or using other conservancy economic policies to look for opportunities to develop economic 
entities and raise funds.  Why have the government’s attempts at providing incentives for better 
management proved unsuccessful?  One possibility is that lower level water bureaus and stations 
lack  the  time,  expertise  and  experience  to  become  financially  self-sufficient.    A  structural 
problem limiting the development of economic entities in much of the interior of China is the lack 
of  market-oriented  infrastructure  such  as  roads  and  railways.    Also,  economic  entities  are  
possibly a self-defeating attempt at providing a solution to the underlying unprofitability of many 
water management operations. 
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WORK POST RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM (WPRS) 
 
Most of the irrigation districts are faced with the following problems: too large in organization, 
too many persons not engaged in management, low work efficiency, high management costs, 
poor staff living conditions, etc.  Since the 1980s, a lot of work has been done by the MWR and 
the water conservancy administrative departments at each level, and by the management units.  
The work post responsibility system (WPRS) was introduced in the early 1980s since the “The 
Regulation  for  disposition  of  establishment  and  personnel  in  management  units  of  water 
conservancy  projects”  issued  by  the  MWR.    It  regulates  the  standards  of  establishment  and 
personnel disposition for management units of all types of water conservancy projects.  The 
general  limits  for  disposition  of  establishment  levels  and  management  of  staff  numbers  in 
different kinds of management units have been set, each position and its responsibilities in the 
unit have been stated clearly.  According to the amount of work of each post, the number of staff 
members for each post can be decided, and the personnel can be allocated according to their 
responsibilities.  Then expenditure such as salaries, office expenses and traveling fees can be 
controlled according to the total number of staff members disposed.  This can save unwanted 
expenses and cut down costs. 
The WPRS was an attempt to introduce a system of incentives to the water resources 
bureau  officials  to  improve  their  work  productivity.    It  was  seen  as  a  counterpart  to  the 
agricultural production responsibility system.  Monetary bonuses and penalties were introduced in 
annual work performance evaluations amounting to 20 percent or more of base salaries. For 
collective-owned  systems,  a  revolutionary  reform  system  was  implemented,  the  economic 
contract responsibility system (ECRS).  Although originally limited to small irrigation systems, in 
many cases, elements of the ECRS have also been implemented -- within larger government 




CONTRACT RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM (CRS) 
 
The principle of contracted management separating proprietary rights from management rights, 
was  the  guiding  thought  for  contracted  management.    This  can  be  elaborated  as  follows:  
Ensuring  the  social  benefit,  contracting  the  base  number  of  income,  and  checking  up  the 
expenditure; extra earning can be used for individual expense but no subsidy will be offered to 
the debtors. 
The  method  for  establishing  contract  responsibility  system  includes  perfecting 
organizations  and  implementing  contracts  at  different  levels.    The  concrete  steps  taken  are 
generally as follows: First, seriously checking up the base number, setting preliminary targets and 
setting the contract schemes.  For this purpose, it is necessary to carry out a general investigation 
of  all-level  canals  and  installations,  to  check  up  fixed  assets  and  to  evaluate  the  present 
management states of the irrigation district.  Based on the preliminarily calculation, such items as 
contractor’s requirement, contract forms, duration, rights and responsibilities of contractor and 
ways of reward and punishment are decided.  The next step is to issue the bid for contract among   69 
cadres  in  the  irrigation  district,  to  evaluate  the  contractor’s  qualification,  and  to  select  the 
contractor by vote.  Finally, the contractor signs the contract with the head office of the irrigation 
district.  The second comes after the perfecting of the relevant organizations; the third is the 
distribution  of  the  contract  targets  level  by  level  to  the  divisions,  stations,  sections  and 
individuals.  A set of evaluation indexes such as irrigation area, project perfect, income and 
outlay, crop yield and production value, water use efficiency, irrigation quota, rebuilding project, 
safety, technical popularization and training, etc. will be established.  The contractor will be 
examined at the end of the year.  The diligent contractors will get rewards while the lazy ones 
will be punished. 
According  to  empirical  evidence,  some  contracted  management  can  get  some 
achievements  on  increasing  water  fee,  improving  water  facilities  and  promoting  working 
efficiency, etc.  However, judging from the demand for reform, there are still many problems of 
contracted water management, such as hard to realize self-sufficiency in funds, ageing and un-
repaired projects, field projects which have a lower completeness, contract targets which still 
remain to be perfected, majority of employees with a lower education level, etc. 
SELF-FINANCING IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE DISTRICT (SIDD) 
 
Although WPRS and CRS have played an important role in improving water management and 
water use efficiency, reducing water management cost and ensuring high quality of irrigation 
service, the planned management system of irrigation districts have not changed basically and 
hardly suit the market economy development. New management reform patterns of irrigation 
districts are urgently needed to cope with some old problems and greatly improve the overall 
water management level.  In this situation, in the middle of 1990, a new water management 
reform  –  Self-financing  Irrigation  and  Drainage  District  (SIDD)  was  introduced  with  the 
implementation of the Yangzi River Water Project funded by the World Bank. 
SIDD was firstly experimented in the Zhanghe Irrigation District of the Hubei Province 
and Tianshan Irrigation District of the Hunan Province.  Experimentation works in the Hubei 
Province have been confirmed by the China Irrigation District Association and Hubei Water 
Resources  Bureau.    The  Hubei  Water  Resources  Bureau  has  planned  to  extend  SIDD  in  all 
provincial irrigation projects.  In the second stage of the irrigation agriculture project of the 
World Bank, the experimentation work of SIDD has been conducted in the irrigation districts of 
Hebei, Jiangsu, Henan, Shandong and Anhui. 
According  to  the  report  of  Dongfeng  Canal  Management  Division  of  the  Zhanghe 
Irrigation district (2002), the establishment of SIDD in 1997, has improved the facility situation 
and some damaged constructions have been repaired, has reduced the administrative costs due to 
labor use reduce (like in 1998, it reduced the administrative cost to 180 thousand yuan ) and 
reduced farmers’ water fee (in 1998, per hectare water fee reduced to 277.2 yuan) which greatly 
reduced farmers’ burden.  Under the new management system of SIDD, water supply procedures 
have been simplified, water supply company directly contact with WUA, water supply guarantee 
rate has increased from 40 percent to 80 percent, 100 percent of water can be supplied in due   70 
time.  Water fee collection rate also increased 50 percent and this greatly improved the WSC’s 
economic status.  However, the reform of SIDD is still faced with the following questions: 1) 
Water price is still far lower than water supply cost; 2) Hard coordination relationship between 
the SIDD and local administrative authorities; 3) Property right of fixed capitals are still not clear; 
4) Poor completion of basic facilities.  The evidence from other regions’ SIDD also shows some 
achievement, especially in reducing water fee level and increasing water supply availabilities.  
However, they are all facing similar problems like the Dongfeng Canal. 
The experiences of SIDD development in China include (Water Saving Irrigation Project 
Office  2002):  1)  Improving  the  understanding  of  the  SIDD.    SIDD  emphasizes  farmers’ 
participation in irrigation management.  According to the economic regulation, self-management, 
independent  financing  and  self-sustaining  management  system  will  be  established;  such  a 
management  system  is  suited  to  the  theory  of  market  economy  and  strategy  of  sustainable 
development.  In SIDD, farmers’ incentive in water management can be motivated and can play 
an important role in improving water management. 2) Accumulating some experience of SIDD 
patterns.  SIDD will establish Water Supply Company (WSC), Water User Association (WUA), 
establish a management system of water supply and utilization, establish a monitoring system of 
water users, project management, pricing and decision institution, etc.  Through establishing such 
a management system, WSC and water users will have clear duties and responsibilities; one 
united management system on water project operation, water utilization and irrigation benefits 
will be established.  3) SIDD needs a certain engineering and socio-environment.  Establishment 
of  SIDD  needs  a  complete  system  of  facilities  and  management  measures.    In  addition,  the 
establishment of SIDD needs to get the support of every level of government and societies.  4) 
Township governments and village collectives are an important foundation for establishing SIDD.  
SIDD will serve the farmers directly and should let farmers fully understand SIDD.  However, 
due to too many small farmers and few water management officials in the water authorities, this 
work  cannot  be  depended  only  on  water  departments  and  should  depend  more  on  township 
governments and village collectives for their rich experience in working with farmers. 5) Pattern 
of SIDD should be suited to the local conditions.  At present, the major pattern of SIDD is to 
transform the water management units at the branch or tertiary canals into WSC, establish WUA 
in the villages or townships.  In fact, there are many patterns for SIDD and local regions should 
explore the suitable management patterns of SIDD. 
MANAGEMENT OF GROUNDWATER IRRIGATION SYSTEM  
 
Process of Property Right Innovation 
Before rural reform, most village Groundwater Irrigation Systems (GWIS) were built in the 1950s 
or 1970s by state or collective investment and farmers’ labor input.  After construction of the  
GWIS,  generally,  collectives  will  be  responsible  for  management  of  the  GWIS.    Before  the 
1980s, property right of the GWIS was collective property right and it suited the agricultural 
production patterns of the planned economic system such property right has played important   71 
roles for agricultural production growth and water resources effective utilization.  However, any 
property right has historical constraints and its existence and development need the support of 
certain social, economic and institutional environments; if it violates the rule, its existence will 
necessarily impede productivity improvement. 
Since the implementation of a household responsibility system, agricultural production 
patterns and management mechanism have greatly changed; agricultural production has shifted 
from  collective  production  to  household  production,  which  implies  that  GWIS  served  for 
agricultural production will also change correspondingly.  
In the past few decades of rural reform, property right of the GWIS represented by the  
Hebei Province in North China exhibits several obvious development trends (Wang 2000):  
 
 
Each kind of property right of GWIS exists at the same time, but structure has changed 
obviously 
 
For collective property right of the GWIS, the number of quasi-collectives has been  basically 
kept constant while the  number of pure collective property right has decreased nearly 3 times 
from the early 1980s to 1998; which results in number decrease of collective property right. 
When  collective  economic  power  is  relatively  weak,  previous  GWIS  of  collective 
property right is either deteriorated or its facility is incomplete, and farmers’ economic condition 
and management ability is not enough to organize GWIS by themselves; quasi-collective property 
right will appear.  On the contrary, if collective still has economic power to manage GWIS, 
collective property right will be kept.  
Outwardly, quasi-collective property right combines the advantages of both collective 
and farmers and both collective and farmers can play their potential, i.e., it not only utilizes 
previous collective water projects and some collective organization and construction abilities, it 
also explores the farmers’ investment ability and involves farmers in the management of the 
GWIS.  However, property constraints (unclear property right), determines that quasi-collective 
property right is only one transition form of property right innovation; it will necessarily be 
substituted by more effective property right.  It may be a nice example to approve that share of 
quasi-collective property right decreased from about 40 percent in 1983-1990 to 26 percent in 
1998. 
One key disadvantage of quasi-property right is unclear property right and management 
responsibilities. In appearance, property right of collective has transferred to each farmer and the 
GWIS will be controlled by farmers, while in fact, property right relationship and management 
responsibilities are not clear, farmers can be free to use water projects but property right of each 
farmer is so small that no one would like to be responsible for GWIS management; in addition, 
since each farmer owns some parts of property right, they are afraid that their property rights 
cannot be fully implemented, they try to be the first to use water, which results in wastage of 
water resources, destruction of water facilities and increasing serious water conflicts. 
For  non-collective  property  right  of  GWIS,  number  of  shareholding  property  right 
increased from 88 in the early 1980s to 599 in 1998, i.e., it increased 5.8 times.  Development of 
shareholding property right has captured much attention of every level government, for instance   72 
the Hebei System Reform Commission and the Hebei Water Resources Bureau jointly issued 
“Trying out Approach of Developing Small Shareholding Property Right of Small Water Projects 
of Hebei Province”.  In order to promote shareholding property right of irrigation system, the 
Hebei Finance and Water Resources Bureau is formulating “Implementation Program of Small 
Shareholding  Water  Projects  in  the  Hebei  Province”  and  “Implementation  Detail  of  Small 
Shareholding Water Projects in the Hebei Province”. Many municipalities and counties of the 
Hebei  Province  also  issued  relevant  documents  on  shareholding  water  projects  to  encourage 
farmers to invest in water projects.  According to information obtained from officials of the 
Ministry  of  Water  Resources  (MWR),  MWR  is  also  formulating  a  national  management 
regulation on shareholding water projects.  
Private property right of GWIS mainly developed after 1990.  In 1990, only 4 private 
property rights of GWIS existed; in 1998, the number of private property right of GWIS reached 
to 99, increased nearly 24 times. According to our field survey, occurrance of private property 
right is mainly due to profit purpose, not for satisfying agricultural production; appearance and 
development  of  private  property  right  of  GWIS  also  indicates  improvement  of  farmers’ 
investment and market consciousness; farmers have a further understanding of water resource’s 
value. 
With quick development of shareholding and private property right of GWIS, number of 
non-collective property right of GWIS has increased rapidly after the 1980s, which results in 
shifting of property right from collective to non-collective property right.  
 
 
Collective property right has been gradually substituted by non-collective property right 
of GWIS 
 
The most significant change in the property right of irrigation system in our study area is shifting 
from collective to non-collective.  In the early 1980s, the collective owned groundwater irrigation 
system  accounted  for  83  percent  of  all  groundwater  irrigation,  while  share  of  non-collective 
property right was only 17 percent.  Till 1990, non-collective property right of GWIS developed 
much and share of collective property right was only higher 12 percent higher than non-collective 
property right.  After 1990, non-collective property right of GWIS has continued to develop and 
collective property right has continued to decline, which resulted in substitution of collective 
property right by non-collective property right.  In 1998, share of non-collective property right 
reached 69 percent and became main pattern of property right; while share of collective property 
right decreased to 31 percent. 
 
 
Within collective property right of the GWIS, quasi-collective property right has been 
gradually substituted by pure-collective property right 
 
Within collective property right system of the GWIS, pure-collective owned irrigation system has 
gradually decreased from 52 percent in the early 1980s to 16 percent in 1997, though it increased 
to 18 percent in 1998, it was still lower than that in the early 1980s. Compared with the decline in   73 
share  of  pure-collective  property  right,  share  of  quasi-collective  property  right  has  increased 
continuously.  Even in the early 1980s, share of quasi-collective property right was as high as 48 
percent,  which  was  somewhat  slower  than  that  of  pure-collective  property  right  at  the  same 
period.  In 1990, share of quasi-collective property right reached 76 percent, which became the 
dominating pattern of collective owned irrigation system. In 1998, the share of quasi-collective 
property right rose to 82 percent.   
 
In non-collective property right of the GWIS, shareholding of property right had been 
a dominating position, private property right developed quickly in recent years. 
 
The  non-collective  owned  groundwater  irrigation  system  was  dominated  by  the  farmers'  
shareholding in the initial stage of property right changes due to credit constraints of individual 
farmers.  Even in 1998, share of shareholding property right was still 86 percent.   The individual 
(private) owned irrigation system has been growing rapidly since the early 1990s, increased from 
1 percent only in 1990 to 14 percent in 1998.  
BEHAVIOR CHANGES OF FARMERS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE 
PROPERTY RIGHT INNOVATION 
 
Property right innovation of the GWIS generally accompanies behavior changes of farmers and 
government, which induce the direction and progress of property right innovation.  Analyzing the 
motive  power  and  socio-economic  and  policy  environmental  conditions  of  property  right 
innovation  of  the  GWIS,  we  found  that  property  right  innovation  is  an  induced  institutional 
change under relaxing constraints of government.  With commercialization improvement and 
market  development,  property  right  of  the  GWIS  has  gradually  became  market-oriented.  
According  to  an  economic  theory,  institutional  innovation  accompanies  technological 
improvement; there exists a mutual influence relationship between institutional innovation and 
technological  improvement.    Therefore,  property  right  innovation  of  the  GWIS  inevitably 
accompanies renewal of water infrastructure. 
Based  on  the  behavior  changes  of  farmers  and  government,  motive  power  and 
characteristics of property right innovation of the GWIS are analyzed as follows: (Wang 2000): 
 
 
Farmers’ behavior has transferred from spontaneous to consciousness. 
 
Property right innovation of the GWIS originated from farmers’ spontaneous behavior under 
serious livelihood stress. When development of agricultural production was constrained mostly 
due to increase of water shortage and drought problems, destroying and aging water infrastructure 
and weakening organizational and investment capacity of village collective, in order to improve 
livelihood ability and improve agricultural growth, non-collective property right of the GWIS 
organized by farmers began to develop. Our field survey also presented that more than 90 percent   74 
of farmers believed that if there was not a serious drought problem and if collective GWIS could 
continue  to  operate and satisfy  their  irrigation  demand, they  would  not  have  invested in the 
GWIS.  One reason that resulted in the farmers’ spontaneous behavior is the farmers’ limited 
knowledge and consciousness; another reason is that of economic constraints. 
With  social  development  and  livelihood  condition  improvement,  some  farmers  have 
begun to organize irrigation systems consciously, which promote quick development of non-
collective property right of the GWIS.  Farmers have gradually realized that water resource is not 
only a natural resource to be used for serving agriculture; water resource is also an important 
economic resource.  Increasing water shortage also force farmers to consider what is the most 
suitable property right patterns for them.  Therefore, farmers’ behavior has gradually changed 
from spontaneous behavior to conscious behavior.  Establishment of market-oriented economic 
system  and  water  management  policy  was  also  an  important  inducement  for  property  right 
innovation of the GWIS. 
 
 
Government behavior has transferred from silent, tacit approval to active mobilizing. 
 
In  the  early  1980s,  rural  water  conservancy  was  ignored  by  every  level  of  government. 
Groundwater  irrigation  system  was  in  an  unclear  policy  position  and  went  unchecked.  
Developing agriculture focused on reforming land tenure and mobilizing farmers’ incentives, 
water resources development was not emphasized.  However, with the decline of irrigated areas 
and  accompanied  agricultural  production  decrease,  government  has  realized  the  influence  of 
mismanagement  of  water  resources  and  the  importance  of  improving  water  resources 
management.  In order to improve water resources management, the water resources management 
system  has  begun  to  reform  and  rural  water  conservancy  reform,  especially,  non-collective 
irrigation system attracted attention from the policy makers.   
For  non-collective  property  right  innovation  of  the  irrigation  system,  government 
originally remained silent, i.e., they neither supported nor prohibited their development.  Since 
innovation  of  non-collective  property  right  of  irrigation  system  has  promoted  agricultural 
development and improved water management, the government was reluctant to express their 
opinion so early and wanted to observe the influences of this innovation for some time. 
Under the relatively relaxing policy environment, non-collective property right of the 
GWIS has developed quickly.  With the improvement of political and economic environment and 
increase in water shortage, reforming water management system has become more urgent, which 
requires every level government to give the property right innovation a definite answer (in a clear 
manner).  Every level government has realized that the achievement of property right innovation 
of irrigation system and a breakthrough in reforming water resources management system was 
what they always wanted.  Therefore, the government has begun to propagate property right 
innovation of the GWIS and actively encourage water investment of social resources.  The state’s 
“Ninth-plan  and  2010  Long-term  Program”  indicates  that  institutional  system  and  economic 
growth patterns should be promoted to change.  In order to promote two basic transformations in 
rural water conservancy and promote rural water conservancy, property right innovation should   75 
become  the  breakthrough  and  a  new rural  water conservancy  management  system  should  be 
established. 
Under government attention and propagation, institutional and policy constraints and cost 
of property right innovation has been reduced, farmers’ incentive has increased and the nature 
and  importance  of  water  resources  have  been  further  realized.  Increasing  understanding  of 
property  right  innovation  has  also  promoted  water  policy  reform.    The  government  has 
increasingly realized the potential and constraints of property right innovation of the GWIS, and 
also gradually found the suitable roles that government should play in promoting property right 




Property right innovation of GWIS is a kind of induced institutional change under 
government, relaxing constraint. 
 
There are two kinds of institutional change: forced institutional change and induced institutional 
change.    Forced  institutional  change  is  supply-oriented;  government  promoted  institutional 
change by legal and administrative power is one kind of specific form of forced institutional 
change.  Induced institutional change is demand-oriented; it is not forced by the government, but 
is  a  conscious  institutional  change  induced  by  obtaining  profit  opportunity  of  imbalanced 
institution.    Some  scholars  believed  that  during  reform,  not  only  forced  institutional  change 
needed the government to compel, but also induced institutional change needed the government 
to relax constraint.  As a normal social representative, the government must be responsible for all 
progress of the reform.  During forced institutional change, government promotes institutional 
change mainly by direct measures such as legal and administrative power; while during induced 
institutional change, government influences institutional change mainly by indirect measures such 
as persuasion and benefit inducement. 
Since property right innovation of the GWIS has originated from farmers’ spontaneous 
behavior,  no  government  force  has  been  implemented,  it  is  a  demand-oriented  institutional 
change; at the same time, a relatively relaxing and beneficial environment has also promoted 
property  right  innovation.    Therefore,  property  right  innovation  of  the  GWIS  is  an  induced 
institutional change under the government, relaxing constraints. 
 
 
Property right of the GWIS has gradually transferred to market-oriented. 
 
Management purpose of the GWIS, especially, non-collective property right, has transferred from 
one purpose of serving agriculture to two purposes of serving agriculture and obtaining profit; 
obtaining profit has even become the main purpose of operating the GWIS. An increasing number 
of farmers have realized the economic value of water resources and treat water resource as a 
tradable good.  Establishing non-collective property right, the GWIS has become one way of 
increasing the income of some farmers.  Our field survey shows that 62 percent of shareholding 
property right of the GWIS have conducted water trading; share of traded water quantity over   76 
total water production in 20 percent of these GWIS exceeds 70 percent, and share of traded water 
quantity in 5 percent of the GWIS reaches 100 percent.  All private property right of GWIS have 
traded water; share of traded water quantity in 85 percent of private property right of the GWIS 
exceeds 70 percent. 
Field  survey  shows  that  water  trade  in  the  GWIS  has  the  following  influences: 
groundwater market has been developed, water pricing has been transferred from administrative 
control to market control; water resources value has been reflected in some degree; water use 
efficiency  has  been  improved;  institutional  and  fund  foundation  of  extending  water  saving 
technology  has  been  ensured  in  some  degree;  water  saving  incentive  of  farmers  has  been 
mobilized and water saving consciousness has been strengthened; natural resources arrangement 




Property right innovation of the GWIS was accompanied by renewal of water 
infrastructure. 
 
In the early 1980s, water resource was relatively sufficient and groundwater table was relatively 
high; most the GWIS used large open-wells (average 10 meters depth) and centrifugal pumps.  At 
that  time,  the  main  form  of  the  GWIS  is  collective  property  right;  most  large,  open-wells 
belonged to collective, and centrifugal pumps either belonged to collective or belonged to farmers 
(if collective centrifugal pump was destroyed), which resulted in pure collective property right 
and  quasi-collective  property  right  of  the  GWIS.    Generally,  one large open-well  can install 
several pumps; the centrifugal pump has easily movable characteristics.  Therefore, one large 
open-well was installed with  several centrifugal pumps which resulted in serious water conflicts 
among farmers.  Although some farmers did use water they also put their pumps into the well in 
order to occupy water for future use, which not only destroyed well and pump and resulted in 
water waste, but also resulted in misallocation of water resources.  Some farmers overused water 
resources,  while  some  farmers  had  no  sufficient  water;  that,  influenced  the  agricultural 
production. 
With groundwater table drop, most collective owned large, open-wells were dried and 
centrifugal pumps were discarded in 1986, shallow-well began to be drilled (30-40 meters depth), 
deep-well pump or small diving pump was used.  At this time, collective owned GWIS was still 
the main form; pure collective and quasi-collective property right still co-existed.  Since mouth 
area of the shallow-well is not large, it is not possible to install several wells at the same time; and 
deep-well type pump and small diving pump are not easy to move and fix; shallow-wells are 
more convenient to manage than large, open-wells.  Therefore, shallow-wells can not only reduce 
water  conflict,  but  also  promote  water  management  improvement  and  make  non-collective 
property of the GWIS development possible.  During the period, non-collective property right of 
the GWIS has developed in some degree. 
After the 1990s, with groundwater table further dropping and water shortage becoming 
serious, most shallow-wells were discarded, deep-shallow wells (more than 50 meters depth) 
were drilled and deep-well diving pumps were used. Deep-shallow wells need large investment   77 
and  strict  management,  which  resulted  in  more  quicker  development  of  the  non-collective 
property right of the GWIS (main form is shareholding property right).  Even for collective 
owned  property  right  of  deep-shallow  wells,  management  mechanisms  also  needed  to  be 
reformed. 
Based on the above analysis we found that during property right innovation of the GWIS, 
water infrastructure will also be renewed.  From this perspective, property right innovation of the 
GWIS  has  promoted  extension  of  advanced  and  highly  efficient  water  infrastructure;  from 
another perspective, it is renewal of water infrastructure that promoted property right innovation. 
Various water infrastructure require various property right of the GWIS.  Induced innovation 
theory believes that, changes of natural resource endowment and market demands will necessarily 
promote technological and institutional innovation.  This theory has been approved many times in 
development  history.    Scarcity  of  land  resources  led  to  development  of  land-substitute 
technologies such as variety, fertilizer and agricultural, chemical and land tenure reform.  Scarcity 
of labor resources and increase in opportunity cost led to extension of machinery technology and 
institutional change of labor hire.  Scarcity of water resources led to innovation of irrigation and 
water-saving  technologies,  while  technological  innovation  ensured  institutional  innovation.  




Determinants and impacts of property rights innovation 
   
Based on the case study of the groundwater irrigation system, Wang, Huang and Scott (2000) 
analyzed internal relationship between property right innovation and inducement factors, impacts 
of property right innovation on water supply efficiency and cropping patterns.  Research results 
show that property right innovation of the groundwater irrigation system is subject to theoretical 
assumptions; it is induced by increasing water resources scarcity and groundwater exploitation, 
worsening  existence  environment,  weakening  local  community  power  (mainly  weakening  of 
collective), improving of human capital, water finance policy and water credit policy, and market 
development.  Property right of the GWIS will change continuously with changes in inducement 
factors. 
Technical efficiency is determined by property right, management mechanism, irrigation 
system  scale  and  irrigation  system  age.    The  impact  of  various  property  rights  on  technical 
efficiency is different; compared with collective property right, non-collective property right can 
improve  the  technical  efficiency  of  the  groundwater  irrigation  system;    obviously,  it  is  also 
identical to theoretical discussions on technical efficiency of property right (Wang and Huang 
2002).    Except  for  property  right,  relevant  related  factors  with  technical  efficiency  include 
management mechanism, irrigation system scale and irrigation system age.   Results show that 
bonus management mechanism, larger scale of irrigation system, and a longer founding year of 
the irrigation system will be beneficial to the technical efficiency of the irrigation system. 
Further, innovation of non-collective property right of the GWIS has advanced changes 
of cropping patterns, which has expanded the share of sown area of high-value crops and declined 
the share of sown area of grain crops (Xiang and Huang 2000).  In addition, rise in price ratio of   78 
grain crops over fertilizer, increase of per capita grain purchase quota and opportunity cost of 
agricultural labor can all result in increase in share of sown area of grain crops.  The following 
sections will discuss policy implications of these research results.   79 
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Study Settings and Data 
 
Data and information used in this study come from secondary and first-hand sources.  We have 
extensively reviewed related literature especially past research reports, government documents 
and publishing materials on poverty and water institution issues at national, river basin and local 
levels (focus on Ningxia and Henan Provinces) in China.  In addition, we also interviewed related 
management authorities at central, provincial, prefecture, county and irrigation system levels, 
such as Ministry and Bureaus of Water Resources, National and local Pro-poor Offices, Ministry 
and Bureaus of Agriculture, River Basin Commissions and its local offices and some others.  
Through these extensive interviews, the related poverty and water institutional issues have been 
further understood.  These interviews also strengthen our cooperative relationship with central 
and local government in field-survey work and further research. 
More  importantly,  we  conducted  surveys  that  covered  the  various  stakeholders  of 
irrigation districts in Henan and Ningxia Provinces along the Yellow River Basin (YRB) during 
the winter of 2001. To increase the variation among regions, we chose our provinces to be located 
in the upper (Ningxia) and lower reaches (Henan) of the Yellow River Basin (YRB).  In selecting 
the irrigation districts for our study, we considered a number of criteria.  From a number of 
Irrigation  Departments(IDs)  in  each  province,  we  chose  the  two  IDs  based  mostly  on  water 
availability, by selecting one that is upstream in the province and one that is downstream.  After 
the IDs were selected, we randomly chose sample villages from the census of villages in the 
upper, middle and lower reaches of the canals within the IDs.  Enumerators also randomly chose 
four households within each village.  After getting the basic information about each plot, the 
enumerators chose two plots from each household for more careful investigation.  In total we 
surveyed 56 village leaders, 68 water managers, 213 farm households and gathered information 
on 426 plots. 
Within our sample IDs in Ningxia and Henan Provinces, the average share of irrigated 
areas are as high as 90 percent, few samples on rainfed-irrigation have been randomly selected.  
In order to explore the pro-poor implications under irrigation and non-irrigation condition, we 
also complemented our study with some household survey data conducted by the Center for 
Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP) in 2000.  These data came from a randomly selected, almost 
nationally representative sample of 60 villages in 6 provinces of rural China (henceforth, the 
China National Rural Survey or CNRS).
5  To reflect accurately the varying income distributions 
within  each  province,  enumerators  selected  randomly  one  county  from  within  each  income 
quintile for the province, as measured by the gross value of industrial output.  The survey team 
selected randomly two villages within each county and used village rosters and our own counts to 
randomly choose twenty households, both with and without their residency permits (hukou) in 
                                                 
5 The provinces are Hebei, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Hubei, and Sichuan.  The data collection effort involved 
students from the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Renmin University, and China Agricultural University.  It was 
led by Loren Brandt of the University of Toronto, Scott Rozelle of the University of California, and Linxiu Zhang of 
the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences.  Households were paid 20 yuan and given a 
gift as compensation for the time that they spent with the survey team.   81 
their village.  The survey included a total of 1,199 households.  The household data from this 
survey are mainly used in chapter 6, analyses in all other chapters are based on the data from the 
four IDs of the Henan and Ningxia Provinces that we collected in 2001.  
 
 
CRITERIA AND SELECTION OF RESEARCH AREAS 
 
To increase the variation among regions, we chose our provinces to be located in the upper and 
middle reaches of the Yellow River Basin.  Ningxia Province is located in the upper reaches of 
the YRB; Henan Province is in the lower reaches (table 4.1.)  In addition, we tried to increase the 
variation among sample regions within each province.  To do so, one irrigation district in each 
province was chosen in the upper reaches of the province’s segment of the YRB.  Another was 
chosen in the lower reaches. 
 
 




   
WID-N  QID-N  PID-H  LID-H 
Total in sample districts          
Primary main canals  1  2  1  1 
Secondary main canals  6  16  5  3 
Branch canals  na  na  50  14 
Total in the study area         
Primary main canals  1  2  1  1 
Secondary level main canals  4  8  3  3 
Branch canals  6  11  8  4 
Tertiary canals  8  24  16  8 
Samples          
      Villages  8  24  16  8 
      Households  34  95  66  36 
 
Note: na = not available 
Data source: Authors’ survey (2001) 
 
In selecting the irrigation districts for our study, we considered a number of criteria.  
From  a  large  number  of  districts,  we  chose  the  irrigation  districts  based  on  the  level  and 
variations of their poverty incidence, size, water availability, and the age of the infrastructure.  It 
turns out, when examining such a wide diversity of irrigated areas,  that we were able to observe a   82 
wide number of institutional arrangements, incentive systems and local operating rules.  Based on 
these criteria, four irrigation districts in two provinces along the Yellow River Basin (YRB) were 
selected.  Specifically,  we  chose  the  Weining  Irrigation  District  (WID-N)  and  Qingtongxia 
Irrigation  District  (QID-N)  in  the  Ningxia  province.
6    In  the  Henan  Province  we  chose  the 
People’s Victory Irrigation District (PID-H) and Liuyuankou Irrigation District (LID-H).
7 Within 
each irrigation district villages were randomly selected since all the villages in each district were 
classified by differences in the size and age of the village’s irrigation systems and variations in 
infrastructure conditions. 
The two districts in Ningxia differ sharply in their size.  Among our four sample districts, 
QID-N is the largest irrigation district with a command area that covers nine counties that are 
evenly spaced along the main canals.  In this district, we chose one county from the upper, middle 
and lower reaches of the district.  In contrast, the other district in Ningxia was smaller.  WID-N’s 
command area covers almost two counties.  Both of these counties are in the sample.  In each 
county, two townships were randomly selected. 
Likewise, the two districts in Henan differ in their size.  PID-H has a total of seven 
counties.  The distribution of these counties along the main canals is spatially complex.  As a 
result, we randomly selected three of the system’s main canals to be in our sample.  These three 
canals cross five counties.  Since the command areas of two selected main canals are much larger 
than the third one, we randomly selected three townships that were served by each of the two 
larger canals and only two townships along the smaller one.  LID-H is the smallest irrigation 
district among the four selected IDs.  A single county, Kaifeng, makes up most of its command 
area.    We  randomly  selected  two  townships  from  the  upper  reaches  of  the  district  and  two 
townships from the lower reaches. 
After the townships were selected, we selected the sample villages and households for 
our primary survey work (table 4.1, rows 8 and 9).  In each township, the survey team selected 
two villages and an average of four households per village.  Sampled in this way, we conducted 
community,  irrigation  system,  and  household  interviews  in  11  counties,  56  villages  and  233 
households.  However, due to data problems, we were forced to drop one household in the LID-H 
and one household in the QID-N, making the actual number of usable number of observations 






BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESEARCH AREAS  
                                                 
6 The WID-N and the QID-N include gravity and lift irrigation regions, in order to compare with Henan’s irrigation 
management (mainly gravity irrigation); we only selected the gravity irrigation regions to do case studies.  In the 
gravity irrigation regions, there are scattered samples of lift irrigation.   
7 The selection of these two provinces is also due to the fact that two other major water projects are located in the 
provinces: IWMI’s rice water saving project in LID-H of Henan and ADB’s Shapatou water project in WID-N of 
Ningxia.  The selection of our irrigation districts in the above 2 project areas helps and complements our project in 
many aspects.   83 
Ningxia and Henan Provinces 
 
Different  from  the  Ningxia  Province,  besides  the  Yellow  River,  the  Henan  Province  is  also 
fostered by several other large rivers.  The Ningxia Province is located in the North-west of China 
and mainly depends on the Yellow River to support its local socio-economic development.  The 
total length of the Yellow River in the Ningxia is 397 kilometers and water area is about 30 
thousand hectares (Ningxia Statistical Bureau 2000).  Located in the middle of China, the Henan 
Province has branches of the Huai River, the Yellow River, the Hai River and the Yangzi River.  
The length of the Huai River in the province is the longest (88.3 thousand kilometers), the Yellow 
River is second (36.2 thousand kilometers), the Yangzi River is 27.2 thousand kilometers, and the 
Hai River is the shortest (15.3 thousand kilometers). 
Despite their differences in the endowment of land and population resources, both the 
sample provinces are mountainous and agriculture-oriented regions.  Although the total area is 
more than three times of Ningxia province, (160 thousand square kilometers), the Henan Province 
faces more severe population pressures.  The population intensity in the Henan Province is 587 
people per square kilometer nearly 30 times that in the Ningxia Province and more than 4 times 
the national average level (China Statistical Bureau 2000).  Both Ningxia and Henan Provinces 
are mountainous regions occupying more than 70 percent of their land.  As  agriculture is the 
most important industry in these two regions, about 70 percent of the population in both Ningxia 
and Henan Provinces are employed in agricultural production activities. 
Given the poverty focus of the study, the two provinces selected for this study are both 
considered  as  less-developed  when  compared  to  the  other  provinces  in  China  (table  4.2).  
Average per capita annual income in rural Ningxia was only 75 percent of the national average 
for rural China in 2000 (1,724 yuan versus 2,253 yuan).
8  The average income of rural residents 
in Henan is about 260 yuan, higher than that in Ningxia, but still 12 percent lower than the 
national average. 
The  lower  average  income  levels  means  that  both  provinces  suffered  from  higher 
incidences of poverty.  According to the most recently available secondary data on poverty (using 
the national poverty line from the State Statistical Bureau 1996), the incidences of poverty in 
Ningxia (18.5%) and Henan (17.6 %) were about three times the national average (6.3%).  At the 
national level, this rate declined to 3.4 percent in 2000.  Based on this national trend and the 
growth of rural income in Ningxia and Henan in the late 1990s, it is highly plausible that  the 
incidence of poverty in these two provinces is about 10 percent. 
Despite the fact that the Yellow River flows through it and it is located in the upstream, 
Ningxia  Province  is  still  a  water-short  region.    Per  capita  water  availability  in  the  Ningxia 
Province is only about 300 cubic meters, 1/7 of the national average level.  As a very dry area, 
average annual rainfall in the Ningxia Province varies greatly from 200mm in the north to 5mm 
in the south; in addition, more than 60 percent of rainfall concentrates in the period June to 
September and cannot be effectively used by crops (Ningxia Statistical Bureau 2000). 
Located in a semi-humid area, though not a water-rich region, the water situation in the 
Henan Province is better than Ningxia at the overall regional level.  In the Henan province, 
                                                 
8 1 US$ = 8.3 yuan   84 
average  annual  rainfall  is  between  700-1,100  mm,  55  percent  of  rainfall  concentrates  in  the 
summer season, i.e., from June to September (Henan Statistical Bureau 2000).  Per capita water 
availability of 2,100 cubic meters in the Henan Province is near to the average national level 
2,200 cubic meters. 
Although the overall water endowment is poor, crop water-use level of irrigated land in 
the Henan Province is substantially higher than that in Ninxia.  In 2000, the average per hectare 
agricultural water use reached 24,525 m
3 in Ningxia, a level about 3.4 times the national average.  
In contrast, Henan farmers used about 3,810 m
3, a level about six times less than that in Ningxia 
(table 4.2, row 3).  Given such differences in water use, it is clear that existing water rights and 
the current allocation system are clearly critical policy issues.  Moreover, under the current water 
use regime, upstream regions -- i.e., those in Ningxia--obviously have access to more water than 
the downstream ones.  As a consequence, we would expect that an alternative water allocation 
scheme could generate large welfare gains for the whole YRB.  However, such a shift (that is, 
providing more water downstream and less upstream) would invariably entail significant changes 
in the local cropping system, land use pattern, water productivity, and farmer income in different 
reaches  of  the  basin.    More  fundamentally,  such  changes  would  also  have  implications  for 
poverty—both positive and negative, depending on whether one were to have water allocations 
cut or raised.  In addition, large differences in water access between the two study areas mean that 
there will likely be fundamental differences in how water is used by farmers and managed by the 
IDs and villages. 
 
Table 4.2.  Basic characteristics of Ningxia and Henan Provinces, 2000. 
 
  National  Ningxia  Henan 
 
Per capita income (yuan)








  7,320  24,525  3,810 
Cereal yields (kg/ha)
  4,953  4,288  4,610 





Share of water use by agriculture (%)
  69  93  70 
Share of surface water (%)
  81  94  47 
Share of groundwater (%)
  19  6  53 
 
a Figures are from 1996 
b Figures are from 1998. 
 
Data sources: Rows 1, 4 and 5: State Statistical Bureau (2001); row 2: World Bank (2001); rows 3, 6 to 8: Ministry of Water Resources 
(2001). 
 
Moreover,  because  of  the  way  the  study  provinces  differ  in  location  and  other 
geographical characteristics, there are different levels of overall irrigation and use of water for 
agriculture which could potentially affect pro-poor intervention strategies.  In Ningxia, irrigated 
land accounts for 48 percent of the province’s cultivated land, 7 percent less than the national 
average in 2000 (55%--table 4.2, row 5).  A much higher proportion of Henan’s cultivated area, 
however, is irrigated, (above 66%).  If one looks at the nature of irrigation in the two provinces,   85 
the higher proportion of irrigated areas in Henan is mainly due to the expansion of groundwater 
use.  In Ningxia, surface water contributed to 94 percent of the total agricultural water use in 
2000; in Henan, one of China’s most diversified areas in terms of conjunctive water use, farmers 
use both surface and groundwater (table 4.2, rows 6 to 8).  Although historically, most irrigated 
areas were from surface sources, currently it is less than 50 percent.  
 
 
SAMPLE IRRIGATION DISTRICTS 
 
The four sample IDs, two in Ningxia and two in Henan, have a number of similarities, but also 
several  fundamental  differences.    Each  of the  sample  IDs  belong  to  a  class of  “large  scale” 
irrigation districts.  The effectively irrigated area, or command area, of the IDs range from 31,000 
hectares (LID-H in Henan) to 304,000 hectares (QID-N in Ningxia--table 4.3, row 2).  The two 
irrigation districts in Henan have been in operation for 40 to 50 years.  In contrast, the Ningxia 
IDs have a much longer history.  In fact, several of the canals and their command area have been 
in operation for more than 2000 years (table 4.3, row 3), although during the past 50 years, 
enormous investment has been sunk into both fundamental renovations of the original system and 
expansion into adjacent areas. 
Despite the importance of irrigation in China’s agriculture, aging infrastructure, outdated 
water delivery technology and chronic funding shortages for canal maintenance have affected the 
irrigation facilities of the four IDs.  All four are plagued by poor physical conditions and low 
efficiency of water delivery.  The water conveyance efficiency in each ID ranges from 40 to 50 
percent.    Consistent  with  the  water  endowments  of  their  host  provinces,  as  the  IDs  have 
developed, their water use patterns have evolved.  The WID-N and QID-N IDs in Ningxia almost 
exclusively rely on surface water; the PID-H and LID-H IDs in Henan are best characterized as 
conjunctive systems, using both surface and groundwater resources. 
Since  both  IDs  are  located  in  the  northern  part of China, they  have  similar climatic 
characteristics  that  basically  can  be  classified  as  rain-short  and  seasonally  variable.    Annual 
rainfall ranges from about 200 mm in the two IDs in Ningxia to 630 mm in the two Henan IDs 
(table 4.3, row 5).  Moreover, because of the dominance of weather patterns created by Siberia in 
the north and the Himalayas far to the south, more than 70 percent of the rainfall is concentrated 
in the summer months. 
In  such  a  dry,  seasonally  variable  climate  and  being  far  from  the  nation’s  booming 
coastal areas, irrigation has played an important role in the economies of the area served by our 
study’s four IDs.  The shares of irrigated area inside the ID boundaries ranged from 82 - 93 
percent in 2000 (table 4.3, row 6).  Without access to the transportation and other locational 
advantages of the provinces in the eastern part of the nation, agriculture is still an important 
sector in the local economies.  Above the national average (16% - NSBC 2001), the share that 
agriculture contributes to GDP ranged from 27 - 46 percent in 2000. 
Although there are unique features about each of the IDs, the cropping patterns of the 
farmers are mostly typical of China’s northern and north-western irrigated areas (table 4.3, rows 9 
to 11).  Wheat is the dominant crop, a crop that is grown almost exclusively in the winter season 
(that is planted in fall and harvested in late spring).  In terms of cultivated area, maize is second,   86 
and is mostly a crop that is grown in rotation with wheat (typically being planted in early June —
sometimes between the rows of wheat that is almost ready to be harvested — and harvested in 
late September or October). 
Some of the farmers in our study areas also produce a number of crops that are somewhat 
special in north China.  For example, rice is an important crop in the upper reaches of the IDs in 
Ningxia (WID-N and QID-N) as well as certain areas in one of the IDs in Henan (PID-H).  
Cotton, a crop that can only be grown with access to irrigation, can also be found being cultivated 
on land in some of our study IDs.  Non-grain crops also vary among the irrigation districts. 
The  tremendous  diversification  of  cropping  systems  that  characterize  all  regions  of 
China, including the IDs, make it difficult to precisely assess the water productivity for the whole 
agricultural sector.  Therefore, our analyses on water productivity concentrate on wheat, maize, 
and rice (table 4.3, rows 12 to 14).  Based on our survey data, water productivity (that is unit of 
output per unit of water input) differs significantly by major crop and between upstream and 
downstream areas along the YRB.  For example, farmers produced somewhat more than 0.5 
kilograms of wheat (in two of the IDs) and rice (in three of the IDs) per cubic meter of water.  In 
contrast, maize farmers produced 1.29 to 2.97 kilograms.  However, the productivity of water of 
wheat farmers varied sharply among IDs.  Farmers in Ningxia produced less than one kilogram 
per cubic meter of water (table 4.3, columns 1 and 2), while those in Henan (LID-H) produced 
more  than  1.5  kilograms.    Such  large  differences  among  crops  and  between  regions  are  an 
indication of the potential opportunities to increase water productivity through water re-allocation 
within and between IDs. 
We also observe large differences in the O&M cost recovery rates among the four sample 
IDs (table 4.3, row 16).  In WID-N and QID-N, both located in Ningxia province, the average 
O&M cost recovery rate is 61 percent.  Although far below 100 percent, the rates are even lower 
in Henan (25% in PID-H and 19% in LID-H).  These large differences among IDs in the O&M 
cost recovery offer an opportunity to investigate how differences in O&M recovery affect the 
performance and management of irrigation systems in our study areas. 
Water prices also differ across the IDs.  Water officials in Ningxia charged less for water 
(0.012 yuan/m
3) in both the sample IDs (WID-N and QID-N) (table 4.3, row 15).  Farmers in 
Henan, however, had to pay a higher price for their water (0.03 yuan/m
3 in LID-H and 0.04 in 
PID-H).  These differences, while large in percentage terms (the price of water in Henan is more 
than  three  time  that  in  Ningxia),  are  consistent  with  the  relative  abundance  of  water  (since 
Ningxia is in the upper reaches of the YRB and Henan is in the lower reach).  If the lower price of 
water is in fact a function of the lower cost of supplying water in Ningxia, it may also help 
explain why IDs in Ningxia have higher O&M cost recovery rates. 
During our survey, we also discovered a great deal of heterogeneity in the way villages 
managed water both within and between the four sample IDs.  Villages in the two IDs in Ningxia 
and one in Henan (PID-H) use Water User Associations (WUAs), contracting with individuals, 
and group and collective management to manage their water.  Interestingly, the collective (village 
leadership)  water  management  dominated  in  only  one  Henan  ID  (LID-H).    A  more  detailed 
discussion of water institutions and management issues is included in the third chapter. 
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 WID-N  QID-N  PID-H   LID-H 
 











Effective irrigated area (000 ha)
  56  304  99  31 
Year of initial construction 
  B.C.   B.C.  1952  1967 
Water use efficiency (%)
  40-45  40-45  40-45  40-45 
Rainfall (mm)
  200  195  620  639 
Share of irrigated area (%)
  82  90  93  86 
Share of agricultural population (%)
  82  72  82  71 
Share of agricultural GDP (%)
  32  27  31  46 
Share of area (%)
         
Wheat  24  29  42  39 
Rice   13  16  6  1 




       
    Wheat  0.58  0.8  na
  1.63 
Rice   0.58  0.53  na  0.62 
Maize  1.29  1.4  na  2.97 
Water price (yuan/m
3)
  0.012  0.012  0.04  0.03 












a WID-N and QID-N districts are in Ningxia Province; PID-H and LID-H are in Henan Province.  
 
Note: na = not available 






DATA DESCRIPTION  
 
Data Collected from IDs in the YRB 
 
In order to meet the study’s objectives, we designed three separate survey instruments — one for 
farmers, one for canal managers and one for village leaders in the survey of IDs of the Ningxia 
and Henan Provinces.  During our survey, three types of management institutions were identified: 
collective management, Water User Associations (WUAs) and contracting.  In our village and 
canal  management  questionnaires  we  recorded  the  share  of  canals  within  the  village  that  is   88 
controlled by each management type for each of the three years (1990, 1995 and 2001).  In 
addition, enumerators also asked about how managers were compensated.  When managers have 
rights to the earnings of the water management activities (that is, to the value of the water saved 
by water management reform), we say that they face strong incentives (or henceforth, merely 
‘with incentives’). If the incomes from their water management duties are not connected to water 
savings, they are said to be ‘without incentives.’ 
The survey also collected information about the development of several measures of the 
effects  of  water  management  reform  —  water  use,  production  and  income.    In  order  to  get 
relatively accurate measures of water use, which in surface water systems is typically difficult to 
elicit,  we  adopted  the  strategy  to  ask  all  those  who  were  involved  in  the  irrigation  scheme: 
farmers, water managers and village leaders.  We asked about crop water use in a number of 
different ways: on a per irrigation basis, the number of irrigations per crop, the number of hours 
per  irrigation,  the  average  depth  of  the  water,  etc.    With  this  information,  we  were  able  to 
combine  the  various  measures  into  a  single  meta-measure  on  which  we  developed  our  final 
estimates of water use (appendix A).    
We also systematically collected information on both income and crop production by plot 
and  by  crop  for  all  cropping  seasons  during  the  year  2001.    Income  is  an  estimate  of  each 
household’s full net income and includes all major sources of income of the household, including 
that  from  cropping,  livestock,  off-farm  wage  labor,  earnings  from  the  family’s  business 
enterprise,  and  other  miscellaneous  sources.    With  information  on  income,  we  were  able  to 
construct a measure of poverty status by comparing household per capita income (dividing total 
household income by the number of family members, which include the household head, the 
household head’s spouse and all individuals that lived in the household for at least three months 
per year) with the national poverty line (625 yuan per capita per year in 2001).   
The  rest  of  our  survey  instrument  asked  for  information  about  a  number  of  other 
important variables that we believe affected either water management institutions or outcomes or 
both.  For example, we asked village leaders and water managers if upper-level government 
officials took steps to encourage the extension of reform in their villages.  A number of other 
questions were asked about the degree of water scarcity, the level of investment in the village’s 
irrigation  system,  as  well  as  a  number  of  other  village,  household  and  plot  characteristics.  
Descriptive statistics of the main variables are shown in appendix B. 
The data for our study come from a randomly selected, almost nationally representative 
sample of 60 villages in 6 provinces (Hebei, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Hubei, and Sichuan) of 
rural  China  (henceforth,  the  China  National  Rural  Survey  or  CNRS).    To  reflect  accurately 
varying income distributions within each province, we selected randomly one county from within 
each income quintile for the province, as measured by the gross value of industrial output.  The 
survey team selected randomly two villages within each county and used village rosters and our 
own  counts  to  choose  randomly  twenty  households,  both  those  with  their  residency  permits 
(hukou) in the village and those without.  The survey included a total of 1,199 households. 
 
Data Collected from Six Provinces 
   89 
Enumerators collected a wide range of information on the household’s production activities, and 
included a special block that focused on collecting by plot information on crop yields and plot-
specific  characteristics,  including  irrigation  status.    The  household  survey  gathered  detailed 
information on the household’s total landholding, its demographics, labor allocation to farm and 
non-farm  activities,  investment  and  other  activities  that  allowed  us  to  create  measures  of 
household per capita income and asset holdings.  In our study, we draw heavily on the part of the 
survey  that  provided  a  census  of  each  household’s  cultivated  plots.    On  an  average,  each 
household cultivated four plots.  For each plot, the respondent recounted the crop or crops that 
were grown during the sample year and the plot’s irrigation status (was it irrigated by surface 
water, groundwater, both, or neither).  In addition, enumerators collected a number of other plot 
attributes, including: land quality (a subjective measure whereby, if the farmer ranked his plot as 
“good” a dummy variable was set equal to 1); topography (measured by two dummy variables 
that were each set equal to 1 if the plot was on a plain or hill); plot size (measured in mu, 1/15
th 
hectare, and translated into hectares); cropping pattern (which is measured as a dummy variable 
that is set equal to 1 if the crop is not grown in conjunction with other crops during the year and is 
set equal to zero if it is cultivated in rotation with other crops); distance of the plot from the 
household (measured in kilometers); and a measure of any shock (e.g., flood or drought) that hit 
the plot during the year (measured in one of the two ways: either as a dummy variable set equal to 
1 if there was a shock of any type, or as a continuous variable based on the farmer’s subjective 






Irrigation-Poverty Nexus: Empirical Evidence from Six Provinces 
 
The overall goal of our paper is to understand the impact that irrigation investments in China have 
had on incomes, in general, and income and poverty alleviation in poor areas, in particular.  To 
meet this overall goal, we have three specific objectives.  First, we describe the relationship 
between irrigation status, on one hand, and crop choice, yields and household crop revenue on the 
other.  Second, we seek to measure the magnitude and nature of the effect that irrigation has on 
yields and crop revenue and if we find a positive effect to try to understand why previous studies 
often failed to do so.  Finally, we seek to understand the impact that irrigation has on incomes in 
poor areas.   
The chapter  is  organized as  follows.   The first  part  is  to  illustrate  the  proportion of 
cultivated  area  that is  irrigated  and  the  unconditional  differences  between irrigated  and  non-
irrigated yields and per hectare crop revenues.  To our knowledge, this is the first set of by-crop 
estimates of sown area and yields for irrigated and non-irrigated areas in China, a statistic that, 
while commonly available in most other countries, till-date has not been available in China.  The 
second and third part presents the results of our multivariate analyses; we first seek to explain the 
impact of irrigation on yields and revenues, holding all other factors constant, and then examine 
the relationship between irrigation and crop income in China’s poor areas.  The final section is 
the summary.  
 
IRRIGATION, CROP CHOICE, AND AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE 
 
Compared  to  other  countries  in  the  world,  the  proportion  of  China’s  cultivated  area  that  is 
irrigated is high (table 5.1).  Data from our survey shows that 52 percent of cultivated land is 
irrigated (table 5.1, row 1).  Of the area that is irrigated, farmers irrigate 61 percent with surface 
water and the rest with groundwater.  Although this figure is higher than the estimates published 
by CNSB (2001) in its annual year book (41%), both our estimates and those of the CNSB are 
higher than that of most other countries in the world (for example, 33% of India’s cultivated area 
is irrigated; 4.8% of Brazil; and 12% of the US)
9. 
While a majority of China’s cultivated area is irrigated, the proportion of area that is 
irrigated varies sharply by crop.  For example, China’s major food grains are mostly irrigated 
(table 5.1, rows 2 and 3).  Ninety-five percent of rice and 61 percent of wheat are irrigated, levels, 
                                                 
9 Our figure may be higher than that used by official statisticians for two reasons.  First, in our sample, we do not 
choose those villages that are more than 4 hours away from township so we are missing a set of sample households that 
would be from an area in which the average proportion of cultivated area that was irrigated was lower than average. 
This would make our number biased upward.  In addition, although almost a representative sample of China, our 
randomly selected sample did not choose some big provinces that happen to be less irrigated than the average national 
level. For example, only 17% of cultivated land in Heilongjiang province is irrigated, only 27% in Inner Mongolia and 
19% in Gansu.  Figures for other countries are from table 8 in Attacking Poverty (World Bank 2001).   91 
which in both cases are above the national average.  In contrast, a majority of area for most food 
grains and lower-valued staple crops is not irrigated (table 5.1, rows 4, 13, and 14).  Despite the 
growing importance of maize in China’s agricultural economy, only 45 percent of China’s maize 
farmers irrigate their crop and even a lower proportion  is irrigated by farmers of coarse grain and 
tuber (white and sweet potatoes).  Although cash crops also vary among themselves, most farmers 
of the important cash crops in our sample irrigate their crops (e.g., 94% of cotton area and 69% of 
peanut area). 
Table 5.1.  Proportion of sown area by irrigation type (%). 
  (1) 
     Total 
    (2)+(5) 
(2) 










       Non-irrigated 
Area 
China  100  52  61  37  48 
Major Grains - aggregate 
         
  Rice 100  95  95  3  5 
  Wheat 100  61  34  63  39 
  Maize 100  45  31  65  55 
Major grains - by season 
Single season rice 100  94  94  4  6 
  Early season rice 100  99  99  0  1 
  Late season rice 100  99  99  0  1 
  Single season wheat 100  10  37  63  90 
Wheat-rice rotation 100  98  96  2  2 
  Wheat-maize rotation 100  77  24  73  23 
  Wheat-other crop 
rotation 100  63  23  76  37 
  Single season  100  15  23  71  85 
  Maize-other crop rotation 100  49  72  27  51 
Coarse grains
b  100  28  26  71  72 
Tubers
c  100  40  88  10  60 
Cash crops           
  Cotton  100  94  13  87  6 
 
 
Peanut  100  69  8  92  31 
a Proportion of irrigated areas include areas irrigated by surface water, by groundwater and by both (conjunctively). Proportion of 
areas irrigated conjunctively is not reported here because it is less than 3%. Thus column (3) and column (4) does not sum up to 
100%. 
b Coarse grains includes sorghum, millet, pearl millet, buckwheat and others. 
c Tubers includes white potatoes and sweet 
potatoes. 
Data source: Authors’ survey 
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Table 5.2.  Crop yield by irrigation type  (Unit: kg/ha). 




















Major grains – aggregate           
 
  Rice  5,947  5,942  5,919  6,663  6,002  -1.0 
  Wheat  3,305  3,853  3,302  4,518  2,255  70.9*** 
  Maize  4,041  4,378  4,276  4,522  3,762  16.4*** 
Major grains - by season 
c  
         
 
  Single season rice   6,195  6,207  6,202  6,367  6,087  2.0 
  Rice-rice rotation   9,934  9,949  9,943  11,250  9,000      10.5 
    Early season rice   4,516  4,516  4,513  5,250  4,500  0.4 
    Late season rice   5,418  5,433  5,431  6,000  4,500  20.7*** 
  Single season wheat  1,931  3,624  4,025  3,223  1,698  113.4*** 
  Wheat-rice rotation   9,266  9,284  9,251  11,357  7,513  23.6 
    Wheat   2,939  2,949  2,972  3,000  1,763  67.3*** 
    Rice   6,327  6,334  6,279  8,357  5,750  10.2*** 
  Wheat-maize rotation   8,263  9,174  8,309  9,617  6,271  46.3*** 
    Wheat   3,877  4,439  3,796  4,746  2,642  68.0*** 
    Maize   4,386  4,735  4,514  4,872  3,628  30.5*** 
  Wheat-other crop rotation  3,331  3,926  3,375  4,212  2,411  62.8*** 
  Single season maize 
d  2,876  3,720  3,056  4,309  2,378  56.4*** 
  Maize-other crop rotation  3,941  3,984  4,181  2,883  3,893  2.3 




4,631  3,918  4,072  2,942  5,141 
-23.8*** 
Cash crops            
 




2,538  2,758  2,731  2,770  2,143  28.7*** 
*** means significant at 99% level. 
a We did not include yield of the plots irrigated by surface water and groundwater conjunctively because there are few observations of them. 
b Percentage increase means irrigated yield compared to non irrigated yield. 
c In this category, we divide rice into single season rice, double season rice (early season rice, late season rice). We divide wheat into single season wheat, 
wheat-rice rotation, wheat-maize rotation and wheat rotated with other crops than major grain. We divide maize into single season maize and wheat-maize 
rotation. 
d We dropped Liao Ning province here because 80% are non-irrigated plots. 46% of the non-irrigated plots and 60% of the irrigated plots suffered from 
draught (loss of produce more than 50%). 
e Tuber includes sweet potato and potato. 
Data Source: Authors’ survey 
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Examining  unconditional  differences  between  irrigated  and  non-irrigated  yields,  it  is 
clear that for almost all crops, yields of irrigated plots are higher than those of non-irrigated ones, 
though there are differences among crops (table 5.2).  Positive differences and large statistics (for 
tests of differences between means) indicate that for almost all crops (except for rice and tubers) 
the average yields of irrigated plots exceed significantly those of non-irrigated ones (column 6)
10.  
For example, wheat yields of irrigated plots are 70.9 percent higher than those of non-irrigated 
plots (table 5.2, row 2).  Irrigated maize yields are 16.4 percent higher and irrigated cotton yields 
are nearly 200 percent higher (table 5.2, rows 3 and 19). 
The annual output of a particular plot of land also varies sharply due to irrigation’s ability 
to increase the intensity of cultivation.  When two crops are planted in rotation with one another 
(table 5.2, rows 5 to 7; rows 9 to 15 and row 17), the annual output per plot rises steeply when 
compared to the yields of a single season crop (table 5.2, rows 4, 8, and 16).  For example, the 
annual  yields  of  rice-rice  (9,934),  wheat-rice  (9,266),  and  wheat-maize  (8,263)  rotations  far 
exceed those of single season rice (6,195), single season wheat (1,931) and single season maize 
(2,876).  And, although in some cases farmers can still produce two crops per year without 
irrigation, with the exception of rice, most single season crops are not irrigated (more than 80%) 
and most of those plots that produce two or more crops (more than 60%) are irrigated (appendix 
C).   
Even larger differences appear when examining differences between the revenues (price 
times yields) earned by farmers on their irrigated and non-irrigated plots (table 5.3)
11.  Overall 
revenue from irrigated plots is 79 percent higher than that of non-irrigated plots (table 5.3, row 1).  
While we can not pinpoint the source of these changes, three factors account for the higher crop 
revenues  of  a  plot  when  irrigation  is  introduced:    higher  yields  (of  same  crop),  increasing 
intensity (producing more than one crop per season) and shifts to higher valued crops that are 
possible after irrigation.   
Our  results  also  provide  evidence  that,  to  the  extent  that  new  irrigation  becomes 
available, it will raise incomes in poor areas.  Dividing villages by wealth level, farmers in rich 
and poor areas earn higher revenue from their irrigated crops (table 5.3, rows 2 to 3).  In rich 
areas, farmer revenue per hectare from irrigated plots is 89 percent higher than that from non-
                                                 
10 There are only two crops that have lower yield in irrigated plots, rice and tuber. If we further divide rice into single-
season rice, rice-rice rotation (early season rice and late season rice) and wheat-rice rotation, we found for each of this 
sub-division, yield of irrigated plots is significantly higher than that of non-irrigated. The averaged yield of irrigated 
plots turns out lower  because yield of single-season rice is higher than other types of rice (rice-rice rotation and wheat-
rice rotation) and so non-irrigated single-season rice is higher than irrigated yield of other rice. Moreover, 64% of rice 
is single-season so it weights more in the average. If we use the weighted average, irrigated yield is higher than non-
irrigated yield. For tuber, we found out that only in south province(Zhejiang, Sichuan and Hubei ) non-irrigated yield is 
higher than irrigated. As is known, in those provinces, tubers’ growing time coincides with rain season and in our 
survey this effect is not included in irrigation although those plots are actually irrigated. 
11 In table 5.3 in our regressions that explain cropping revenue we do not account for rising costs on irrigated plots due 
to data limitations (we did not collect inputs by plot).  Since our regression analysis is based on supply analysis, this 
does not restrict our ability to examine efficiency gains from irrigation (since supply response is a function of prices 
and fixed factors).  However, on the basis of another data set that we collected in 1995 in 2 north-eastern provinces, 
Liaoning and Hebei, we can see that although costs rise when irrigation is introduced, the rise is restricted only to a 
subset of inputs and the total increase in the value of inputs is less than 61% and costs account only for about a half a 
plot’s revenue.   94 
irrigated plots.  In poor areas, revenue in poor areas rises even more in relative terms.  Revenue 
from irrigated plots in poor areas exceeds those from non-irrigated ones by 93 percent.   
 
 
While the data shows that irrigation is effective in both rich and poor areas, differences in 
the nature of rich and poor economies suggest that irrigation may have the largest impact on rural 
welfare  in  poor  areas.    Since  people  are  poorer,  and  since  we  typically  assume  that  utility 
functions  
are concave, if rich and poor areas enjoy equal income gains, the gains in the poorer areas will 
turn into larger increases in welfare.  As seen above, cropping revenues in the poorest areas 
(93%) increase slightly more than those in richer areas (89%).  Moreover, in our sample, the data 
shows that cropping revenues make up the largest part of total income of those in poor areas but 
not those in rich areas (table 5.3, column 3).  In rich areas only 10 percent of total income comes 
from cropping activities; in the poorest area, cropping activities contribute more than 40 percent.  
If we multiply the percentage increase of cropping revenue by proportion of cropping revenue in 
total income, irrigation increases total income in rich areas only by 9 percent, while increasing it 
in poor areas by 38 percent.  Since one characteristic of China’s poverty is that the gap between 
the income of the poor and the poverty line is not overly wide (World Bank 2000), raising the 
income of the poor by more than one-third would almost certainly have the effect of pulling a 
vast majority of those in newly irrigated areas out of poverty. 
 
   
MULTIVARIATE EMPIRICAL MODEL  
 
All the findings from our descriptive analysis support one fact: irrigation has substantial benefits 
for farmers.  Yields of irrigated plots are significantly higher than those of non-irrigated plots for 
almost all the crops we studied.  Cropping revenue of irrigated plots also is higher than that of 
non-irrigated plots in rich and poor areas.   
Table 5.3.  Gross cropping revenue by irrigation type and China' s regions. 

























Cropping revenue for 











China  2,107  23  3,940  4,585  2,568  79 
b 
By wealth level 
c              
  Rich area   3,652  10  4,060  4,603  2,439  89 














a Percentage increase is calculated as (column 4 – column 5)/column 5.  
b The national level is lower than both in rich and poor areas because we do not include the middle-income area here, which has a 65% increase in 
cropping revenue when plots are irrigated.  
c Rich area includes households whose incomes rank in the first 20 percentile in every province and all the households from Zhejiang province. Poor area 
means households whose incomes rank in the last 20 percentile in every province.  
Data source: Authors’ survey except for figures in columns (1) and (2), which are from China National Statistical Bureau (2001).   95 
Such striking differences, however, are curious given the inability of previous studies to 
find significant effects of irrigation on agricultural performance.  The differences may be due to 
several factors, some of which are due to problems with possible interpretations of our descriptive 
statistics (in the above section) and other problems may be due to weaknesses in the previous 
studies.  First, our findings so far do not prove anything beyond correlation since we have only 
been comparing unconditional means of irrigated and non-irrigated plots.  In fact, the observed 
differences may be partly (or could even be fully) due to other factors (such as land quality or 
management ability) that are correlated with irrigation.  Second, due to lack of data, most studies 
in  the  past  have  only  used  rough  proxies  for  irrigation,  such  as  government  expenditure  on 
irrigation.  These proxies, however, may not be an accurate measure of irrigation because there is 
no guarantee that the allocation of funds to water control is ever turned into an effective irrigation 
system.  Third, most analyses have been highly aggregated, both across states or provinces and 
across crops.  This approach could cause omitted variable bias, a problem that would make the 
estimated relationship between irrigation and agricultural performance unreliable.  For example, 
it is possible that we will underestimate the impact of irrigation in rich areas (such as, Zhejiang 
province, a rich east coast province near Shanghai).  Although the proportion of land that is 
irrigated might be higher in Zhejiang than that in poorer provinces, households in richer areas 
have more opportunity to work off-farm and, ceteris paribus, they will almost certainly allocate 
less family labor to farming activities than households in poorer provinces that do not have as 
much a convenient access to off-farm opportunities.  In other words, an omitted variable – in this 
case, for example, it could be the inability to control the household’s employment opportunities -- 
could lead to an underestimation of the impact of irrigation on yield.  In fact, after accounting for 
these factors, it is possible that the results about the direction of irrigation’s impact on yields 
could be reversed.   
In our analysis, we are going to take a different approach to explore the relationship 
between  irrigation  and  agricultural  performances  that  will  attempt  to  address  the  three 
shortcomings.  First, our strategy is to look directly at the relationship between irrigation and crop 
yield (and at the relationship between irrigation and cropping revenues) at the plot level, thereby 
avoiding the need to use a proxy for irrigation.  In addition, by using a rich set of plot-level data, 
we can hold constant many of the plot-specific factors that could be affecting yields and which 
could be potentially correlated with a plot’s irrigation status.  Finally, in our study, we have 
collected information on all of a household’s major plots.  Such data allow us to control all of the 
non-plot  varying  factors  that  could  be  affecting  yields  by  using  household  fixed-  effect 
approaches.   
To explain the impact of irrigation on yields, holding other factors constant, we use a 
fixed effect model to explain the supply response of farmers that are producing a specific crop, 
ih h ih ihj ih X D y e m b g a + + + + =                           (equation 5.1) 
where yih denotes the yield (of a specific crop) or the revenue of the i
th plot of the h
th 
household.  The term, Xih, denotes plot-specific characteristics, including the plot’s land quality, 
its topography, the size of the plot, the distance of the plot from the farmer’s household, and the 
plot-specific shock suffered during 2000, and the parameter, b, represents a vector of parameters 
that corresponds to the effects that these plot-specific variables have on yields.  Holding Xih   96 
constant, the parameter g can be interpreted as our parameter of interest, measuring the effect of 
irrigation status on yields.  The irrigation status variable, Dihj, is written with a separate subscript, 
j,  because  in some  of  our  specifications  we  want to  allow  for  a  disaggregation  of irrigation 
between surface (j=1) and groundwater (j=2).  When the variable is written without a subscript, 
irrigation is a variable that represents irrigation regardless of the type of irrigation.  Equation (5.1) 
also includes a term, mh, which represents all non-plot varying household and village fixed effects 
including management or the opportunity cost of the household.
12 
Estimating equation (5.1) has both strengths and weaknesses.  The trade-offs are seen 
most clearly by rewriting it as a fixed-effects model, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i ih h i ih i ihj i ih X X D D y y e e m m b g a - + - + - + - + = -   (equation 5.2) 
where  i y , i X , m  and  i e  denote the average household level. 
Since  m m - h =0, Equation (5.2) can be simplified to         
( ) ( ) ( ) i ih i ih i ihj i ih X X D D y y e e b g a - + - + - + = - ,            (equation 5.3) 
where all household and village factors (e.g., management ability, opportunity cost of the 
household members, etc.) are accounted for. 
Although  prices  are  not  included  in  equation  (5.1),  it  should  be  noted  that  we  are 
estimating  a  supply  function  and  our  regression  is  examining  the  economic  efficiency  that 
farmers gain when their plots are irrigated.  The price variables, which are part of the mh term in 
equation (5.1), vary only by village and, hence, their effect also is captured by the household 
dummy  variables.    Because  of  the  use  of  a  supply-function  framework,  we  do  not  include 
measures of other variable inputs
13. 
To use equation (5.3) to understand the effect of irrigation on agricultural performance, 
we adopt a four-step strategy.  First, we examine the effect of irrigation on yields of individual 
crops.  While interesting by itself, such a regression does not capture all of the dimensions of the 
irrigation effects, neither the impact of increased intensity, nor the impact from crop switching.  
To do so, we estimate two additional models, one explaining aggregate grain yields (aggregating 
over all grains, including rice, wheat, maize and coarse grains) and one explaining agricultural 
                                                 
12 In some specifications (appendix C) we use more of the inter-village variability of yields to understand the effect of 
irrigation by estimating  
                         
ih v h ih ihj ih X D y e m m b g a + ¢ + + + + =  
where mh  and mv¢   denote household and village fixed effect, respectively. We include 4 household variables (land size, 
wealth, household size, and average education level of household head) to control differences among households and 
include a set of village dummies to control all village fixed-effects.  Although more variability is available for the 
regression estimates, there is a danger that unobserved household-level factors (e.g., management or the opportunity 
cost of the household) are biasing the estimates of the irrigation variable.  
13 In some specifications (appendix D) in which we use more of the inter-village variability of yields to understand the 
effect of irrigation by estimating  
                         
ih v h ih ihj ih X D y e m m b g a + ¢ + + + + =  
where mh  and mv¢   denote household and village fixed-effect, respectively. We include 4 household variables (land size, 
wealth, household size, and average education level of household head) to control differences among households and 
include a set of village dummies to control all village fixed-effects.  Although more variability is available for the 
regression estimates, there is a danger that unobserved household-level factors (e.g., management or the opportunity 
cost of the household) are biasing the estimates of the irrigation variable.  
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revenues.  If irrigation allows farmers to cultivate two crops per year and/or if it allows shifting 
into cash crops that generate higher revenues per hectare, the aggregate grain and agricultural 
revenue equations will capture the higher output from irrigation.  Third, we decompose the effect 
of irrigation on agricultural output by regressing revenues per hectare on a series of interaction 
terms  between  irrigation  and  each  major  crop  in  our  sample.    In  this  way,  the  observed 
differences in revenues per hectare between irrigated and non-irrigated plots can be accounted 
for.  Finally, we explain yields separately for better- off and poorer areas in order to gauge the 
difference in irrigation effects in different parts of the economy.  In all our analyses, we take the 




MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
In most respects, our analyses perform well.  More than half of the regressions have R-square 
goodness of fit statistics that exceed 0.4, levels that can be counted as high for cross-section yield 
regressions (tables 5.4 to 5.6).  Most of the coefficients in the models have the expected signs and 
in some cases are highly significant.  For example, we find that the coefficient on the land quality 
variable positively affects yields in most equations and the coefficient on the variable measuring 
the plot-specific shock,  as expected, reduces yields (e.g., table 5.4, rows 4 and 9). 
Table 5.4.  The impact of irrigation on crop yield with household fixed effect. 
    Dependent Variables: Crop Yield 
b 
1  2  3  4  5 
  Wheat  Maize  Cotton  Coarse Grain  Tuber 
    Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 1  Equation 2             
Irrigation Status                  
 
Irrigated (by 
surface water   0.177    0.294    0.284  -0.147  -0.097 
  or ground water)  (2.81)***    (4.17)***    (5.28)***  -0.59  -0.24 
 
Irrigated by surface 
water     0.171    0.039       
   
  (2.62)***    -0.38       
 
Irrigated by ground 
water    0.203    0.418       
      (2.20)**    (5.18)***       
Land Characteristics               
  Good soil quality   0.174  0.173  0.13  0.119  0.008  0.028  0.996 
    (5.41)***  (5.34)***  (3.50)***  (3.21)***  -0.24  -0.26  (2.74)*** 
  Topography - Plain   0.07  0.068  0.302  0.236  -0.001    -1.614 
           -0.65  -0.63  -1.38  -1.09  -0.02    -1.34 
  Topography - Hill  0.132  0.129  0.181  0.112  0.083  0.013  -0.543 
    (2.53)**  (2.44)**  -0.9  -0.56  -0.92  -0.04  -0.53 
  Plot size   0.041  0.041  0.204  0.197  0.01  0.281  -3.195 
    -0.39  -0.39  -1.42  -1.38  -0.65  -0.97  (2.03)** 
 
Distance from 
home   0.003  0.003  -0.005  -0.001  0.008  0.061  -0.193   98 
    -0.21  -0.25  -0.16  -0.02  -0.24  -0.83  -0.66 
Shock: Severity of 
disaster 
c  -0.009  -0.009  -0.016  -0.015  -0.001  -0.03  0.005 
  (6.22)***  (6.22)***  (12.78)***  (11.41)***  -1.65  (6.38)***  -0.66 
Single Season Crop 
d   -0.04  -0.04  -0.106  -0.082  0.054  0.542  -0.37 
  -0.87  -0.86  (2.06)**  -1.6  (2.43)**  (2.96)***  -1.5 
Number of plots   1027  1027  1116  1116  141  277  510 
Number of 
households  507  507  573  573  69  209  354 
R-square  0.15  0.15  0.47  0.48  0.39  0.48  0.11 
a Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
b Dependent variable in log form. Estimate using fixed effect model at household level. 
c  Severity of disaster means percentage reduction of production.
  
d  A dummy variable that is 1 if the crop is not grown in conjunction with other crops during the year and is 0 if it is cultivated in rotation with 
other crops. 
 
Most importantly, the findings of our study support the hypothesis that irrigation raises 
yields for most crops and show that the descriptive results hold up to multivariate analysis (table 
5.4).  For example, irrigation increases the yields of wheat by 17.7 percent, those of maize by 
29.4 percent, and those of cotton by 28.4 percent (table 5.4, row 1).  Although the coefficients on 
the irrigation variables in the coarse grains and tuber equations are not significant, these findings 
are expected (table 5.4, column 4 and 5, row 1).  The results of the tubers equations are consistent 
with the descriptive results.  In the case of coarse grains, because there are so few households 
(only 9) that grow one plot of irrigated coarse grains and one plot of non-irrigated coarse grains, 
the findings reflect outcomes  on  less than  1  percent  of the sample  (and these  are only  in  3 
villages).  The effects of surface and groundwater are nearly the same for the case of wheat, the 
only  crop  that  is  grown  widely  in  areas  in  which  both  surface  (the  Yangtze  Valley)  and 
groundwater (the North China Plain) are common. 
The multivariate analysis results of crop-specific yields do differ from the descriptive 
results when examining the magnitude of the differences.  With the exception of maize, the 
magnitude  of  impact  of  irrigation  is  lower  in  the  regression  results  than  in  the  descriptive 
statistics.    Most  likely  this  is  because  in  the  regression  the  irrigation  impacts  are  being 
conditioned on the level of other variables, such as soil quality, that is accounting part of the 
irrigation effect (since most irrigated land is “good”).   
Perhaps most significantly from a methodological point of view, when the regression is 
run  with  and  without  household  fixed-effects, the  coefficients  vary  dramatically.    In  fact,  in 
almost all of the equations without fixed effects, the coefficients are zero, a sure sign that omitted 
variables  may  be  a  problem.    One  interpretation  is  that  without  fixed  effects,  the  family’s 
opportunity cost of labor is not accounted for.  If rural residents in irrigated areas, which tend to 
be in richer areas, have a higher opportunity cost, and hence tend to spend less effort on cropping 
activities, the insignificant coefficient in the equations that do not use fixed effects are more 
likely of being biased downward to a point where there is no apparent effect of irrigation (when, 
in fact, once all household-specific effects are accounted for they are positive and significant). 
 
Table 5.5.  Decomposed impact of irrigation on household cropping revenue.   99 
    Dependent variable: Total cropping revenue 
b 
    Household  Village  Household  Village 
c  Household  Village 
Irrigation dummy  0.761  0.429         
  (15.98)*** (13.83)***         
Interaction dummies             
             Major grains             
  Rice*irrigation      1.156  0.947     
        (24.41)***  (27.34)***     
  Wheat*irrigation      0.573  0.421     
        (10.34)***  (10.62)***     
  Maize*irrigation      0.619  0.415     
        (10.85)***  (10.23)***     
  Single season rice*irrigation                     
   
1.004  0.807 
            (18.36)***  (19.94)*** 
  Single season wheat*irrigation     
   
0.206  -0.044 
            (1.83)*  -0.53 
  Single season maize*irrigation     
   
0.912  0.462 
            (4.00)***  (2.78)*** 
  Rice rice*irrigation          1.473  1.226 
            (15.46)***  (18.31)*** 
  Wheat-rice rotation*irrigation     
   
0.106  0.117 
            -1.58  (2.15)** 
 
Wheat-maize 
rotation*irrigation     
   
0.989  0.818 
            (12.32)***  (13.43)*** 
 
Wheat-other crop 
rotation*irrigation     
   
0.863  0.75 
            (9.02)***  (9.71)*** 
 
Maize-other crop 
rotation*irrigation     
   
0.832  0.558 
            (9.18)***  (7.80)*** 
  Coarse grains*irrigation      0.317  0.109  0.532  0.298 
        (3.78)***  -1.55  (5.67)***  (3.97)*** 
  Cash crops - cotton*irrigation      1.365  1.104  1.541  1.241 
                                (15.14)***  (14.22)***  (14.79)***  (14.34)*** 
  Cash crops - peanut*irrigation      0.887  0.693  1.135  0.924 
                                 (9.45)***  (8.19)***  (10.78)***  (10.10)*** 
  Tubers*irrigation      -1.226  -1.464  -1.12  -1.382 
        (17.74)***  (27.77)***  (14.82)***  (24.72)*** 
Land characteristics             
  Good quality   0.286  0.219  0.217  0.178  0.212  0.173 
   (7.09)***  (7.83)***  (6.00)***  (7.07)***  (5.29)***  (6.25)*** 
  Topography - Plain  0.098  -0.004  0.065  0.013  -0.046  -0.029 
   -0.94  -0.07  -0.69  -0.24  -0.44  -0.49 
  Topography - Hill  -0.009  -0.104  -0.027  -0.072  -0.145  -0.113 
   -0.11  (2.02)**  -0.36  -1.52  (1.68)*  (2.11)** 
  Plot size  0.095    0.011    -0.033   
   -1.02    -0.12    -0.33   
  Distance from home  0.02  0.022  0.009  0.021  0.028  0.029   100 
   -1.12  -1.58  -0.43  -1.37  -1.13  (1.70)* 
Shock: Severity of disaster 
d  -0.009  -0.009  -0.009  -0.009  -0.01  -0.009 
  (9.50)***  (11.93)***  (10.35)***  (13.97)***  (9.69)***  (12.70)*** 
Single season crop 
e  0.755  0.716  0.231  0.275  0.4  0.465 
 (26.96)***  (28.48)***  (6.39)***  (9.60)***  (8.55)***  (12.29)*** 
Number of plots  5352  5347  4858  4853  4166  4161 
Number of household/village  1061  60  1058  60  1052  60 
R-square   0.23  0.2  0.45  0.43  0.48  0.46 
a Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
b Dependent variable in log form. Estimate use fixed effect model at household level and village level. 
c In Village Fixed Effect model, we use 4 household characteristic variables, which are not reported here: Household size, Average Education 
Level, Total Wealth and Total Household Land. 
d  Severity of disaster means percentage reduction of production.
  
e  A dummy variable that is 1 if the crop is not grown in conjunction with other crops during the year and is 0 if it is cultivated in rotation with 
other crops. 
 
The impact of irrigation becomes even stronger when we look at the impact of irrigation 
on plot cropping revenue (table 5.5).  Overall, irrigation will increase revenue by 76.1 percent, a 
figure that  is  only  slightly  less  than  the  unconditional  difference observed  in the  descriptive 
statistics (table 5.5, column 1).  In other words, according to these results, most of the differences 
between revenues on irrigated and non-irrigated plots are due to the addition of water and not 
other plot characteristics.  The magnitude of the coefficient drops (to 42.9%) when household 
dummy  variables  are  replaced  with  four  household  variables  and  a  set  of  village  dummies, 
moving in the same direction as was observed in the yield equations when no fixed effects were 
used at all.  Apparently, the use of village dummies and four household-level variables absorbs 
some, but not all, of the unobserved heterogeneity in the yield response behavioral equations in 
this analysis.   
Decomposing  revenue  differences  by  crop  illustrates  differences  among  crops  in  the 
earnings potential that arise with irrigation (table 5.5, column 3).  When a plot is irrigated, rising 
yields and the ability to shift into new crops, such as rice and cash crops, facilitates the largest 
rise  in  revenue  (88.7%  higher  for  peanuts;  115.6%  for  rice;  136.5%  for  cotton).    Although 
somewhat lower, when plots are irrigated rising yields also help increase revenues on wheat 
(57.3%), maize (61.9 %), and coarse grains (31.7%).  Of all the major crops in the sample, tubers 
are the only ones that do not enjoy increased revenue.  The results here are robust, though the size 
of the coefficients somewhat smaller, when village fixed-effects are used in place of household 
effects (table 5.5, column 4).  
Additionally, when the major grain crops, rice, wheat and maize, are disaggregated by 
rotation, the impact of increasing intensity can be seen (table 5.5, column 5).  For example, 
irrigated rice increases yields by 147.3 percent, higher than single season rice (100.4%).  When 
irrigation facilitates the shift to a wheat-maize rotation, revenues generated on a plot rise by 98.7 
percent, higher than either the rise that accompanies single season wheat (20.6%) or single season 
maize (91.2%).
14  
                                                 
14 Significantly, the wheat-rice rotation does not show any statistical difference between irrigated and non-irrigated 
areas.  Most likely this is because only in the case of 4 households does a single household have both irrigated and non-
irrigated plots (the requirement that needs to be met for the observations to be used).   
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When dividing the sample into better-off and poorer areas, we find similar results (table 
5.6).    In  both  rich  and  poor  areas,  irrigation  has  a  significantly  positive  effect  on  cropping 
revenue, increasing by 132.8 percent in rich areas and 43.9 percent in poorer areas (table 5.6, 
columns 1 and 2).  While the higher marginal effects of irrigation on cropping revenue in rich 
areas may explain why most of the past investment in irrigation has gone into more favorable 
areas, it does not mean that the poor do not benefit.  In fact, in terms of income effects, the poor 
may benefit more.  From table 5.6 it can be seen that the share of cropping revenue in total 
income is four times as high in poor areas (41%) as in rich areas (10%). Taking this into account, 
irrigation benefits farmers in poorest areas one and a half times more than it does farmers in rich 
areas (18% in poor areas versus 13% in rich areas). 
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Table 5.6.  Regression analysis of irrigation impact on cropping revenue in rich and poor 
areas in      China. 
 
  Dependent variables: Plot cropping revenue with fixed effects  
  Rich area  Poor Area 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 1  Equation 2 
Irrigation status         
  Irrigated (by surface water  1.328    0.439   
                   or groundwater)  (14.11)***    (3.50)***   
  Irrigated by surface water    1.47    0.296 
      (14.30)***    (2.02)** 
  Irrigated by groundwater    0.717    0.793 
      (3.54)***    (3.55)*** 
Land characteristics         
  Good soil quality  0.147  0.167  0.143  0.139 
    (1.90)*  (2.17)**  -1.5  -1.47 
  Topography - Plain  0.155  0.131  -0.327  -0.309 
    -0.88  -0.75  -0.85  -0.8 
  Topography - Hill  -0.006  0.1  -0.28  -0.277 
    -0.03  -0.53  -1.52  -1.51 
  Plot size  0.048  0.066  -0.22  -0.236 
    -0.25  -0.34  -1.43  -1.54 
  Distance from home  0.134  0.111  -0.302  -0.284 
    (2.96)***  (2.44)**  (3.39)***  (3.18)*** 
Shock: Severity of disaster
 c  -0.01  -0.011  -0.011  -0.011 
  (4.46)***  (4.70)***  (5.99)***  (5.52)*** 
Single season crop 
d  0.624  0.599  1.086  1.105 
  (11.54)***  (11.05)***  (13.91)***  (14.06)*** 
Number of plots   1542  1542  959  959 
Number of households  330  330  187  187 
R-square  0.25  0.26  0.28  0.29 
a Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
b Dependent variable in log form. Estimate use fixed effect model at household level. 
c Severity of disaster means percentage reduction of production.
   
d  A dummy variable that is 1 if the crop is not grown in conjunction with other crops during the year and is 0 if it is cultivated in 
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SUMMARY 
 
In this case study, we explore the relationship between irrigation status and yields, crop choices 
and household cropping revenue.  Our study provides evidence of irrigation’s strong impact on 
yield and cropping revenue, both descriptively and in the multivariate analysis.  Unlike some of 
the  literature  that  used  aggregate  data,  we  find  that  irrigation  increases  yields  and  cropping 
revenue when we look at either different crops or examine grain or crops as a whole.  Moreover, 
we find that although the marginal impact of irrigation on revenue appears to be higher in richer 
areas, since the poor relies more on cropping revenue, our findings suggest that farmers in poor 
areas increase their incomes relatively more than farmers in richer areas.  
The strong findings in our study of the effect of irrigation on agricultural performance 
relative to previous studies almost surely are in part a function of our data and methods.  By using 
plot-level data, we can account for many of the attributes in the natural environment that also 
affect yields as well as irrigation.  By having more than one plot observation per household, we 
show that when we use household fixed-effects (versus only controlling for some household 
effects and village effects or nothing) the effect of irrigation almost always rises.  In fact, when 
we go from controlling of no supra-plot effects to the full model, the impact of irrigation goes 
from  insignificant (zero) to  highly  significant and  positive.    Hence,  it  could be  that  omitted 
variable bias may be one reason why previous studies failed to find the strong effect of irrigation 
on agricultural performance. 
If irrigation has such a great effect on agricultural performance it is no wonder why so 
much  of  the  budget  of  many  countries  has  gone  towards  irrigation  in  the  past.    Moreover, 
although the costs of the project must be considered, the disinterest that seems to be pervading the 
international  community  in  irrigation  needs  to  be  questioned.    Our  findings  of  the  effect  of 
irrigation  on  the  income  of  those  in  poor  areas  mean  that  poverty  alleviation  programs,  in 
particular, may need to consider increasing or at least not diminish the role of irrigation in their 




Do Small Farmers Benefit more than Large Farmers from 
Irrigation ? 
 
In this section, we will further explore the relationship between irrigation and poverty within IDs.  
At  first,  we  need to  understand  whether  small  farmers  benefit less  than  larger  farmers  from 
irrigation; secondly, we need to identify if there are differences in water access between poor and 
non-poor farmers.  Thirdly and fourthly, impacts of access to water and water reliability for pro-
poor will be identified.  The final part is the summary.  
 
 
FARM SIZE AND BENEFIT FROM IRRIGATION 
 
In order to test the hypothesis of whether small and poor farmers receive fewer benefits from 
irrigation than large and non-poor farmers, we classified our sample households into three farm-
size categories.  Each group contains equal number of observations (or contains one-third of the 
sample households).  In the two Ningxia IDs, WID-N and QID-N, the average per capita land 
sizes for small, moderate and large farms are 0.35, 0.67 and 1.22 hectares (table 6.1, row 3).  The 
farm sizes in Henan, both PID-H and LID-H, are even smaller.  For example, the average size of 
a  “large”  farm  is  only  0.72  hectares,  which,  according  to  international  standards,  would  be 
considered to be a small farm (table 6.1, row 11).  
As according to our data, small and large farmers have relatively equal access to water.  
In both Ningxia and Henan, there is not much difference.  In fact, in some cases, small farmers 
have higher per hectare water use than the large farmers (table 6.1, row 6 and row 14).  This 
result, while perhaps somewhat surprising, is not consistent with findings elsewhere such as the 
South-east Asian countries. 
Although this is a somewhat surprising result, caution must be used in interpreting it and 
not inferring that the absence of a relationship between farm size and water access is the same as 
the neutrality of water access and poverty.  After regrouping farms, we test whether the small 
farmers are also the poor farmers.  If the small farmers are also the poorest farmers, the results of 
testing one hypothesis could be applied to the other.  However, table 6.1 shows that, on average, 
the small farmers in our samples have the highest income.  In both of the Ningxia IDs, for 
example, the average per capita annual income of households that live on small farms (2,978 
yuan) is 11 percent higher than the average income of those on large farms (2,682 yuan) (table 
6.1, row 4).  In the Henan IDs, the income gap between small and large farms is even larger 
(28%) (table 6.1, row 12).  Hence, to examine the relationship between poverty and water access, 
a separate analysis must be carried out.  
 
Table 6.1.  Farm size and benefits from irrigation in the sample households of Ningxia and 
Henan Provinces, 2001.   105 







Ningxia       
   The poor I (%)
a  7  7  7 
   The poor II (%)
a  14  7  9 
   Farm size (ha)  0.35  0.67  1.22 
   Per capita income (yuan)  2,978   2,680   2,682  
   Per household water use (m
3)  6,977   11,104   17,517  
   Per hectare water use (m
3)  20,834  16,356  14,657 
   Per capita water use (m
3)  1,691  2,912  4,387 
   Non-agri income share (%)  58   36   19  
Henan       
   The poor I (%)
a  3  12  9 
   The poor II (%)
a  15  24  18 
   Farm size (ha)  0.29  0.47  0.72 
   Per capita income (yuan)  2,125   1,968   1,658  
   Per household water use (m
3)  2,641   4,110   8,285  
   Per hectare water use (m
3)  9,067  8,864  11,104 
   Per capita water use (m
3)  752  993  1,765 








aHouseholds in the poor I category include those with per capita annual income below China’s official poverty standard (625 yuan). 
Households in poor II include those with incomes below the World Bank’s standard (878 yuan). 
Date source: Authors’ survey. 
 
 
While this might be surprising to those unfamiliar with China, the positive relationship 
between farm size and poverty is common in China’s rural economy.  Every household in China 
has its own land contracted from their villages. The households with more constraints in land 
resources have induced farmers to explore alternative uses of their other family resources such as 
labor in non-farming activities.  Table 6.1 shows that small farms allocate a large portion of their 
family  labors  in  off-farming  activities  and  earn  more  than  half  of  their  income  from  non-
agricultural sectors (53%), while large farms receive only 16 percent of their income from non-
agricultural sectors as these large farms allocate their family labor more in agriculture. 
This is not to say that small farms  have large incomes or lower incidence of poverty.  
After control for the impacts of all other factors that affect farmer’s income earning and poverty, 
we should expect that the larger the farms the more is their income and the lower is the incidence 
of poverty.  But the point we are making here is: it is dangerous to use farm size as an indicator of 
poverty in China.  This typical nature of farm size and poverty in irrigated areas in China implies 
that testing the benefit of irrigation to the poor and non-poor and to different sizes of farms 
should be separated.  And testing poverty based on farm size is irrelevant and could result in a 
misleading conclusion.  Indeed, as discussed in the previous chapter, one of the major principles 
in allocating water to agriculture is based on land.  Table 6.1 confirms to this principle.  The 
average size of a large farm is about 3 times a small farm; on the other hand, the average water 
use in a large farm is also about 3 times a small farm for the whole sample.   106 
Econometric analysis results are consistent with our statistical description.  In the 
determinants of water use model, the coefficient of arable land per hectare in most specifications 
are not significant (table 10.5, row 16).  It implies that there is not significant relationship 
between farm size and water use.  Control the influence of other factors and larger farmers earn 
more income than smaller farmers.  The coefficient of arable land per hectare in all specifications 
of the income determinant models are positive and statistically significant at 1 percent (table 
10.17 and table 10.18, row 10).  However, the significant relationship between farm size and 
poverty have not been demonstrated from our multivariate analysis (table 10.19 to 10.22). 
 
 
WATER ACCESS TO THE POOR AND NON-POOR 
 
To directly examine the relationship between poverty and water access, we actually find that the 
poorest farmers in both provinces have the greatest access to water when measured in terms of 
either per capita (table 6.2, rows 2 and 5) or per household use (table 6.2, rows 3 and 6).  This 
finding  also  holds  good  for  all  four  irrigation  districts  (results  not  shown).    Although  the 
differences among income groups using the per capita water use measures in Ningxia are less 
sharp, in the Henan province, the poorest farmers receive 1,348 m
3 water per person for use in 
crop production.  In contrast, the better-off farmers in Henan receive only 1,159 m
3 water per 
person.   
While the exact mechanism for the superior access of poor households cannot be shown 
using  descriptive  statistics,  it  is  likely  that  those  who  are  better-off  in  the  sample  are  those 
households that have more of their members in the off-farm sector.  When this is so, it could be 
that those in better-off households have less time or interest in spending their time lobbying ID 
officials and local water managers to increase the flow of water to their villages.  In contrast, the 
poorer households (who also have more land and rely more on farming), may find it worth their 
while to spend their energy in working with local water managers to find ways to provide them 
with more water access.  Alternatively, it could also be that leaders who are concerned about the 
welfare of the poor in their duties as water managers (in Henan) or contractees (in Ningxia) 
encourage the allocations of water to be directed towards the larger, poorer farmers.  
From the above analysis we know that the poor farmers are even superior in accessing 
water than the non-poor farmers.  In order to further understand the relationship between water 
access and poverty, we will examine the correlation beween water access and production, income, 
employment and food security.  In the first step, we classify crop water use per hectare into three 
groups by the sample numbers.  The lowest 20 percent of samples implies that farmers in this 
group apply the lowest amount of water in their arable land; farmers in the highest group (20% of 
samples) use the most amount of water and farmers falling in the middle group( 40% of samples) 
use water which are between the lowest and highest groups. 
Our sample data shows that water use differences among the three groups are generally 
large.  Farmers in the lowest group use less water than in the middle group by 2 times, and the 
difference is even higher (5 times) when compared with the highest group (table 6.3 column 1).    107 
The  differences  of  water  use  among  groups  are  lowest  in  the  WID-N  that  may  indicate  its 
advantage in the river basin location. 
 
Table 6.2.  Water access for the poor and non-poor in sample households of Ningxia and 
Henan Provinces, 2001. 
  Poor I
 a  Poor II
 a  Non-poor 
 
Ningxia       
    Proportion of households (%)  7.0  3.1  89.9 
    Per capita water use (m
3)  3,052   1,601   3,041  
    Per household water use (m
3)  12,006   8,861   11,959  
Henan       
    Proportion of households (%)  7.8  10.8  81.4 
    Per capita water use (m
3)  1,348   1,126   1,159  









a Households in the poor I category include those with per capita annual income below China’s official poverty standard (625 yuan). 
Households in poor II include those with incomes that fall between China’s official poverty standard and the World Bank’s standard 
(878 yuan). 
Data source: Authors’ survey 
 
Examining the sample data indicates that farmers in a better status with access to water 
intend to plant more rice, while wheat and maize will not be influenced much.  Compared with 
other crops like wheat and maize, rice consumes more water and this is also reflected in our 
collected information.  Either examining the data in overall or in individual IDs, farmers in the 
highest water use groups allocate more land to rice than those farmers in the other two groups.  
For example, the share of rice area in the third group of farmers is 33 percent, which is higher by 
more than 250 percent in the first group and by more than 70 percent in the second group (table 
6.3, column 6).  Different from rice, we can find a consistent relationship between water access 
and wheat or maize (table 6.3, columns 4 and 5) .     108 
 
 
Table 6.3.    Access to water, production and income in the sample households of Ningxia and Henan Province,  2001. 
Crop area (%)    Crop yield (kg/ha)    Per capita income (yuan) 









Wheat  Maize  Paddy    Wheat  Maize  Paddy    Total  Agriculture  Cropping 
Whole sample                             
Lowest (20%)  4,274   619   1.8   46   18   9     4,919   6,114   6,432     2,289   1,194   1,196  
Middle (60%)  12,508   2,070   1.8   42   26   19     4,666   5,925   6,663     2,317   1,347   1,170  
Highest (20%)  27,795   3,952   1.7   32   25   33     4,610   5,392   7,027     2,436   1,314   1,128  
                             
Ningxia Province                             
WID-N                             
Lowest (20%)  13,127   1,801   1.4   21   19   9     4,532   5,505   7,200     2,409   767   739  
Middle (60%)  25,365   3,953   1.6   28   28   26     4,394   5,421   7,477     2,878   1,688   1,403  
Highest (20%)  37,322   3,852   1.5   21   20   49     4,676   5,245   7,063     1,670   1,004   640  
QID-N                             
Lowest (20%)  5,000   1,562   1.4   37   28   18     4,187   5,302   5,861     3,376   1,792   1,799  
Middle (60%)  13,896   2,577   1.7   38   36   16     4,350   5,701   6,765     2,632   1,498   1,149  
Highest (20%)  25,093   4,440   1.6   33   32   29     4,692   5,597   7,180     2,551   1,544   1,333  
Henan Province                             
PID-H                             
Lowest (20%)  3,982   436   1.9   47   20   0     5,214   6,675   n.a.    1,849   891   952  
Middle (60%)  8,940   1,128   2.0   49   23   20     5,683   7,292   6,340     2,188   1,188   1,083  
Highest (20%)  22,871   2,714   1.9   49   2   48     4,470   4,450   6,048     1,389   760   819  
LID-H                             
Lowest (20%)  3,412   396   1.9   57   6   4     5,080   6,641   7,500     1,801   1,255   1,263  
Middle (60%)  7,260   795   2.0   48   15   10     4,994   4,886   7,100     1,873   1,075   1,147  
Highest (20%)  14,171   1,727   2.0   50   0   29     2,604   n.a.  6,550     1,024   900   913  
Data source: Authors’ survey   109 
Despite great water use differences existing in the three groups, farmers do not seem to 
increase the land use intensification even when they are faced with better water access situation.  
Sample  data  shows that multiple  crop-index is almost  the same  among  the  three  groups.   For 
example, farmers in the lowest and middle water use groups have a similar multiple crop index of 
1.8, the number for the highest group is 1.7 (table 6.3 column 3).  Examining the multiple-crop 
index separately in the 4 sample IDs also provides this result.  Reasons for this maybe due to the 
fact that land use is not only determined by water issues, but also determined by many other factors, 
such as soil type, land quality, temperature, labor resources and others.  
Examining  our  sample  data  cannot  provide  us  with any  conclusion  on  the  relationship 
between water and crop yield.  According to our hypotheses, access to good irrigation will lead to 
higher agricultural productivity.  However, this hypothesis is not supported by our sample data.  For 
example, on an average, rice yield in the higher water use group seems to be higher than in the 
other two groups, but when we examine the data in the 4 four sample IDs, such evidence can only 
be supported by one of the IDs (QID-N) in the Ningxia Province (table 6.3, column 9).  For wheat 
and maize, we are also not sure if their yields are positively or negatively related with water access 
issue (table 6.3, columns 7 and 8).  In fact, crop yield differences among groups is not significant.  
For example, despite crop water use in the first group being nearly three times and more than 6 
times that in the second and third group, rice yield in the first group is only lower by 4 percent and 
9 percent, respectively, than that in the second group and third group.   
Further, analyzing our sample data shows that we also cannot find consistent relationship 
between water access and farmers’ income.  Since a strong relationship between water access and 
crop yield has not been revealed by our sample data, there is no doubt that access to water will also 
not influence farmers’ income.  When we compare farmers’ income based on all the samples, it 
seems that farmers facing better water situation will earn higher income (total, agricultural and 
cropping income) though it is marginal (table 6.3, columns 10 to 12).  However, when separately 
examining the income data in the 4 IDs, even a marginal, positive relationship between water and 
income cannot be presented.   
It is interesting to find that farmers who cannot have access to good irrigation, intend to 
explore more opportunities in marketing crops and working in non-agricultural industries.  Sample 
data shows that farmers in a disadvantageous position in irrigation will have a higher share of 
commodity crop than other farmers.  For example, average commodity rate of wheat, maize and 
rice in the lowest group are lower than in the highest groups; farmers in the middle-level of water 
use group also have higher crop (wheat, maize and rice) commodity rate than in the highest group 
(table 6.4, columns 1 to 3). When separately examining the data in the 4 sample IDs, evidence from 
most cases also support the above analysis.  Further analyzing the data shows that in most cases, 
farmers with poor water access situation will allocate more labor in non-agricultural work (table 
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Table 6.4.  Access to water and employment, vulnerability and food security in the sample households 
of Ningxia and Henan Provinces, 2001. 
Commodity crop (%) 
Water use group 





Yield reduction due 
to disasters (%) 
Whole sample             
Lowest (20%)  31  21  40  38  1,062  18 
Middle (60%)  30  26  24  31  1,322  21 
Highest (20%)  14  11  18  44  1,201  16 
             
Ningxia Province             
WID-N             
Lowest (20%)  19  15  0  44  541  13 
Middle (60%)  9  5  26  45  1,238  17 
Highest (20%)  0  11  39  36  752  11 
QID-N             
Lowest (20%)  30  36  44  41  2,009  17 
Middle (60%)  29  32  24  30  1,413  19 
Highest (20%)  23  18  10  33  1,487  18 
             
Henan Province             
PID-H             
Lowest (20%)  35  13  n.a.  33  784  28 
Middle (60%)  36  14  23  36  1,300  26 
Highest (20%)  26  11  22  33  1,227  18 
LID-H             
Lowest (20%)  21  8  26  38  770  22 
Middle (60%)  31  23  23  37  841  18 
Highest (20%)  38  n.a.  20  16  721  27 
Data source: Authors’ survey. 
 
When combining these two evidences together we may arrive at the following conclusion.  
In the IDs, though at present, differences in water use betweens farmers have not generated a 
significant influence on their production and income, farmers receiving less water are always more 
worried about their potential shock from water use variation, especially potential water shortage in 
the future.  Therefore, except for agricultural production, exploring other earning opportunities such 
as non-agricultural jobs and marketing crops can be treated as one way for them to enhance their 
ability to overcome the potential shock. 
Examining  our  sample  data  also  shows  that  food  security  levels  and  vulnerability  of 
farmers under various water access degrees have no obvious differences.  Per capita grain is always   111 
regarded as one of the important indicators to present farmers’ food security level.  Although the 
overall sample shows that farmers who are in better water access situation (middle and highest 
group) will have marginally higher per grain, this evidence cannot be supported by most of the IDs 
(table  6.4,  column  5).    The  result  is  also  consistent  with  the  above  analysis  that  agricultural 
production will not be obviously influenced by water access.  Based on the above analysis, it is also 
not  surprising  to  find  that  farmers’  ability  in  overcoming  natural  disasters  is  almost  the  same 
despite  their  water  use  level  being  different.    Either  analyzing  data  by  whole  samples  or  by 
respective IDs, share of yield reduction due to disaster shock has not presented the consistent 
relationship with water access degree.  
More  importantly,  econometric  results  support  our  statistic  description.    Based  on  the 
specified models in the chapter four, chapter five concludes that upper IDs deliver more water than 
lower IDs; it implies that farmers in the upper IDs have better access to water than those in the 
lower IDs.  If we treat the dummy variable of IDs as the various water access, then we also know 
from  chapter  five  that  the  variable  IDs  have  no  significant  impact  on  production, income  and 
poverty.    Therefore,  we  can  conclude  that  within  our  research  areas,  access  to  water  has  no 
significant relationship with poverty.  
 
 
WATER RELIABILITY AND BENEFIT TO THE POOR 
 
Different from the above section reflecting on water access from the quantity aspect, i.e., how much 
water that can be accessed by farmers, this section will focus on the impact of water access quality, 
i.e., if farmers can get water when they need.  Water reliability is regarded as an indicator of water 
access quality; it is measured by how many times during the past calendar year did farmers need 
water but was not available on time.  Similar to water use analysis, we also classify water reliability 
into three groups, the lowest reliability (20% of samples), the middle reliability (60% of samples) 
and the highest reliability (20% of samples) (table 6.5).  However different the large variations 
existing in the three water use groups, the obvious difference of water reliability can only be found 
between the lowest group and the other two groups; average water reliability in the middle and 
highest is almost the same and near or equal to 100 percent (table 6.5, column 1).  It implies that 
except  for  one-quarter  of  farmers,  all  other  farmers  always  have  a reliable water supply in the 
sample areas.  112 
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index  Wheat  Maize  Paddy    Wheat  Maize  Paddy    Total  Agriculture  Cropping 
Whole sample                           
Lowest (20%)  62   1.7   38   30   22     4,418   5,239   6,505     2,151   1,240   1,194  
Middle (60%)  99   1.8   39   22   23     4,718   5,954   6,946     2,204   1,200   1,095  
Highest (20%)  100   1.6   39   31   14     4,383   5,465   6,133     3,223   1,889   1,466  
Ningxia Province                           
WID-N                           
Lowest (20%)  74   1.7   32   32   29     3,951   5,543   7,065     2,614   1,416   1,350  
Middle (60%)  99   1.5   22   22   27     4,588   5,306   7,669     2,444   1,296   943  
Highest (20%)  100   1.7   26   24   26     4,719   5,471   6,796     2,706   1,473   1,342  
QID-N                           
Lowest (20%)  65   1.5   38   35   22     3,938   4,937   6,512     2,111   1,311   1,184  
Middle (60%)  99   1.6   35   36   21     4,498   5,688   6,866     2,659   1,614   1,403  
Highest (20%)  100   1.5   42   26   13     4,513   6,113   6,689     3,736   1,677   1,184  
Henan Province                           
PID-H                           
Lowest (20%)  38   1.9   47   27   9     5,827   6,604   5,333     1,318   603   631  
Middle (60%)  99   2.0   49   11   34     5,037   6,572   6,198     1,777   922   964  
Highest (20%)  100   1.9   48   16   10     5,417   6,728   4,653     1,980   1,361   1,435  
LID-H                           
Lowest (20%)  80   2.1   48   11   0     4,315   3,506   n.a.    1,899   1,128   1,142  
Middle (60%)  100   1.9   48   3   22     3,618   5,156   6,658     1,598   1,020   1,074  
Highest (20%)  100   1.8   60   23   0     6,699   6,385   n.a.      1,919   1,098   1,167  
Data source: Authors'  survey.       113 
Increasing water reliability seems to have no obvious effect on land intensification.  Sample 
data show that multiple crop-index is almost the same under various conditions of water reliability, 
they are about 1.6 - 1.7 (table 6.5, column 2).  It means that land use intensification is not mainly 
constrained by water reliability; other factors are the major concern of farmers for increasing land 
use intensification.   
Although it is marginal, most evidence indicate that share of wheat area will be increased 
with  water  reliability  improvement.    For  example,  faced  with  62  percent  of  water  reliability, 
farmers will allocate 38 percent of area to wheat; this number will increase by 1 percent when 
reliability increases to nearly 100 percent (table 6.5, column 3).  Except for wheat, the other two 
crops, maize and rice have not presented such a relationship between water reliability and relative 
sown area (table 6.5, columns 4 and 5).  The results here probably implies that compared with other 
crops like maize or rice, wheat is more sensitive to water reliability. 
Examining  sample  data  demonstrates  that  water  reliability  has  a  positive  relationship 
between crop yield and farmers’ income.  Most cases reveal that when farmers have almost no 
problem in accessing water in time, i.e., water reliability is near to 100 percent, farmers’ crop will 
generate higher yield (table 6.5, columns 6 to 8).  For example, in one of the IDs (QID-N) of 
Ningxia province, yields of wheat, maize and rice in the second and third group are all higher than 
that  in  the  first  group.    Similar  to  the  correlation  between  water  reliability  and  crop  yield, 
investigations indicate that farmers will earn more money if water is more timingly and reliably 
supplied to them (table 6.5, columns 9 to 11).  Most cases show that farmers’ income, either in 
terms of total, agricultural or cropping income, will be higher when water reliability has been 
improved, especially when we compare farmers’ income in the first and third groups (such as in 
QID-N, PID-H and LID-H).  
Differing  from  analysis  grouping  by  water  use,  cropping  marketing  and  farmers’ 
employment will not be obviously influenced by level of water reliability.  Examining our sample 
data has not revealed any consistent relationship between water reliability and share of commodity 
crop or water reliability and proportion of non-agricultural labor (table 6.6, columns 1 to 3).  Even 
if water reliability has been improved from about 60 percent to near 100 percent, most evidence 
neither tell us if share of commodity crop will rise or fall, it is also similar to labor allocation in the 
non-agricultural production.   
Similar to the relationship with water use, farmers’ food security and vulnerability are not 
correlated with water reliability.  Our field survey shows that in some cases like in PID-H, per 
capita grain will increase with improvement of water reliability; while in some other cases like in 
QID, per capita grain will decrease even if water reliability has been improved.  The result is the 
same when the relationship between water reliability and yield reduce due to disaster.  Therefore 
evidence from our sample demonstrates that water reliability is not one of the important factors to 
influence food security and farmers’ ability to resist production shock. 
Actually, we also conducted multivariate analysis on the impacts of water reliability on the 
pro-poor  and  the  results  are  consistent  with  statistical  analysis,  i.e.,  water  reliability  has  no 
sinificant influence on the pro-poor.  When we put the variable of water reliability into the specified 
models  (production, income  and  poverty)  in  the  fourth section  or  substitute  the  water  scarcity   114 
variable by water reliability in these models, the coefficient of water reliability is not significant.  It 
may be that the differences of water reliability among IDs are not large enough.  
 
 
Table 6.6.  Surface water reliability, employment, vulnerability and food security in the sample 
households of Ningxia and Henan Provinces, 2001. 
Commodity crop (%)  Surface water reliability 
group 





Yield reduction due to 
disasters (%) 
Whole sample             
Lowest (20%)  21  17  25  36  1,486  21 
Middle (60%)  26  20  19  34  1,131  19 
Highest (20%)  31  37  42  33  1,519  20 
             
Ningxia Province             
WID-N             
Lowest (20%)  12  5  46  38  1,443  25 
Middle (60%)  12  13  29  42  821  12 
Highest (20%)  0  0  11  50  1,041  11 
QID-N             
Lowest (20%)  22  18  19  31  1,683  18 
Middle (60%)  32  34  21  29  1,609  19 
Highest (20%)  21  30  42  46  1,223  17 
             
Henan Province             
PID-H             
Lowest (20%)  24  13  39  30  741  32 
Middle (60%)  31  32  28  36  1,243  24 
Highest (20%)  35  0  0  15  1,193  20 
LID-H             
Lowest (20%)  41  25  n.a.  20  758  n.a. 
Middle (60%)  27  50  8  28  745  26 
Highest (20%)  44  0  n.a.  43  1,039  11 
Data source: Authors'  survey. 
 
 
IRRIGATION INVESTMENT AND BENFIT TO THE POOR 
 
We collected irrigation investment information at village-level since most surface water facilities 
are invested by local government, and farmers mainly contribute labor.  During the survey, we 
asked  about  the  irrigation  facilities’  investment  in  the  sample  villages,  i.e.,  stock  of  irrigation   115 
investment; this variable can also reflect the irrigation conditions of the sample areas.  In order to 
understand  the  contribution  of  irrigation  investment  in  increasing  farmers’  income  and  pulling 
farmers out of poverty status, irrigation investment has also been classified into three groups by the 
number of samples analysed (table 6.7).  Grouping irrigation investment presents large variations 
across the samples (table 6.7, column 1).  For villages in the lowest group investment irrigation per 
hectare is 384 yuan, while in the highest group, irrigation investment per hectare is as high as 8,074 
yuan, more than 21 times that in the first group. 
 
 
Table 6.7.  Irrigation investment and farmers'  income in the sample households of Ningxia and Henan 
Provinces, 2001. 
Per capita income (yuan)    Poverty incidence 
(%) 
  Poverty gap 
(%) 
Irrigation investment group  Irrigation 
investment 
per hectare 
(yuan)  Total  Agriculture  Cropping    Poor I  Poor II    Poor I  Poor II 
Whole sample                     
Lowest group (20%)  384  2,078  1,382  1,208   
9   11     41   66  
Middle group (60%)  1,936  2,191  1,213  1,109   
9   17     15   49  
Highest group (20%)  8,074  3,060  1,550  1,312   
2   4     7   18  
                     
Ningxia                     
WID-N                     
Lowest group (20%)  0   2,372   987   778     -  -    -  - 
Middle group (60%)  2,024   2,499   1,384   1,033     5   14     10   32  
Highest group (20%)  8,728   2,705   1,471   1,484     13   13     39   71  
QID-N                     
Lowest group (20%)  478   2,444   1,602   1,321     4   8     13   29  
Middle group (60%)  1,796   2,468   1,509   1,317     11   11     25   54  
Highest group (20%)  12,279   4,269   1,697   1,304     0   6     0   15  
                     
Henan                     
PID-H                     
Lowest group (20%)  326  1,408  1,124  1,130    19   19     96   144  
Middle group (60%)  1,992   2,036   804   869     9   18     14   48  
Highest group (20%)  4,734   2,449   1,503   1,191     0   0     0   0  
LID-H                     
Lowest group (20%)  -  -  -  -    -  -    -  - 
Middle group (60%)  2,057   1,645   1,013   1,064     7   30     3   53  
Highest group (20%)  4,899   1,935   1,391   1,427     -  -    -  - 
a Households in the poor I category include those with per capita annual income below China’s official poverty standard (625 yuan).  
Households in poor II include those with incomes that below the World Bank’s standard (878 yuan). 
Data source: Authors’ survey. 
 
   116 
Importance of irrigation on farmers’ income supported by our analysis in six provinces also has 
been  confirmed  by  our  sample  in  the  4  IDs  of  Ningxia  and  the  Henan  Province  when  the 
relationship between irrigation investment and farmers’ income is examined.  Sample data shows 
that when irrigation investment per hectare increased from nearly 400 yuan to more than 8,000 
yuan, farmers’ total income increased nearly 50 percent and also increased agricultrual income and 
cropping income respectively, by 12 percent and 9 percent (table 6.7, rows 1 to 3).  Such results can 
also be got from most cases in the 4 Sample IDs.  For example, in one ID in the Ningxia province, 
WID-N, farmers’ income in both the middle and highest groups are higher than in the first group 
(table 6.7, rows 4 to 6).    
Increasing  irrigation  investment  seems  to  play  a  role  in  pulling  more  farmers  out  of 
poverty.    Examining  all  sample  data  demonstrates  that  poverty  occurs  in  the  villages  having 
relatively low irrigation investment; in these villages, it is also harder to improve farmers’ poverty 
condition.    Either  measuring  poverty  by  China’s  official  poverty  standard  or  the  World  Bank 
standard, poverty incidence in the lowest group is higher by 7 percent than that in the highest group 
(table 6.7, rows 1 to 3).  Poverty gap in the first group is also higher than that in the third group, 
higher by 34 percent or 48 percent, when measured by various poverty standards.  Most evidence in 
the sample IDs also indicate an obvious relationship between irrigation investment and poverty.  
For example in one ID of the Henan Province, when irrigation investment was as high as more than 
8,000 yuan per hectare, our field survey did not identify any poverty in these villages; however, 
when irrigation investment was less than 400 yuan per hectare, poverty incidence was high as 19 
percent and poverty gap was also very high, nearly more than 100 percent (table 6.7, rows 10 to 
12). 
Econometric  results  also  show  the  significance  of  the  irrigation  investment  for  farmer 
income.  Irrigation investment is positive and statistically significant (table 10.17 and table 10.18 
row 5).  It implies that increasing irrigation investment in the IDs still has potential to increase 






In this case study, we explore the relationship between irrigation status and yields, crop choices and 
household cropping revenue.  Our study provides evidence of irrigation’s strong impact on yield 
and cropping revenue, both descriptively and in the multivariate analysis.  Unlike some of the 
literature that used aggregate data, we find that irrigation increases yields and cropping revenue 
when we look at either different crops or examine grain or crops as a whole.  Moreover, we find 
that although the marginal impact of irrigation on revenue appears to be higher in richer areas, since 
the poor relies more on cropping revenue, our findings suggest that farmers in poor areas increase 
their incomes relatively more than farmers in richer areas.  
The strong findings in our study of the effect of irrigation on agricultural performance 
relative to previous studies almost surely are in part a function of our data and methods.  By using   117 
plot-level data, we can account for many of the attributes in the natural environment that also affect 
yields as well as irrigation.  By having more than one plot observation per household, we show that 
when  we  use  household  fixed-effects  (versus  only  controlling  for  some  household  effects  and 
village effects or nothing) the effect of irrigation almost always rises.  In fact, when we go from 
controlling  of  no  supra-plot  effects  to  the  full  model,  the  impact  of  irrigation  goes  from 
insignificant (zero) to highly significant and positive.  Hence, it could be that omitted variable bias 
may be one reason why previous studies failed to find the strong effect of irrigation on agricultural 
performance. 
If irrigation has such a great effect on agricultural performance it is no wonder why so 
much of the budget of many countries has gone towards irrigation in the past.  Moreover, although 
the  costs  of  the  project  must  be  considered,  the  disinterest  that  seems  to  be  pervading  the 
international  community  in  irrigation  needs  to  be  questioned.    Our  findings  of  the  effect  of 
irrigation  on  the  income  of  those  in  poor  areas  mean  that  poverty  alleviation  programs,  in 
particular, may need to consider increasing or at least not diminish the role of irrigation in their 
portfolio of activities. 
Based on statistical and multivariate analysis, this chapter further explores the relationship 
between irrigation and poverty within IDs.  Our results show that small and large farmers have 
relatively equal access to water. By controlling the influence of other factors, larger size of farmers 
earn more income than smaller farmers.  Access to water and water reliability has no significant 
relationship  with  the  pro-poor  in  our  sample  IDs.    Even  we  have  not  found  that  irrigation 
investment  can  significantly  improve  the  poverty  situation;  econometric  results  demonstrate  a 
significant relationship between irrigation investment and farmer income.     118 
CHAPTER 7 
 
 Poverty in Irrigation Systems: Status, Characteristics and Distribution 
 
In this chapter we have three objectives.  First, we attempt to calculate the extent of poverty that 
exists in irrigated areas in China.  To our knowledge this is the first time in China that a study has 
attempted to gauge the severity of poverty within China’s main IDs.  Second, we explore where the 
poor are located among the IDs within a province.  Third, we examine the characteristics of the 
poor who live in irrigated areas.   
Two standards of poverty are used in this study.  The first one is China’s official poverty 
standard that is published annually by the CNSB.  The other is the international standard used by 
the World Bank (the so-called $1 per day poverty line).  In 2001, the official poverty in rural areas 
is defined as per capita annual income less than 625 yuan.  In purchasing power parity terms this is 
about 71 cents per day.  Hence, China’s poverty line is 29 percent lower than that used by the 
World Bank (878 yuan per capita per year).  
Although  our  household  survey  was  conducted  by  well-trained  enumerators  with  well-
tested survey instruments, obtaining accurate income estimates for calculating poverty incidences is 
still a challenge.  The survey covered a long list of farmer activities and was designed to produce 
full  household  income,  including  farm,  non-farm,  and  other  income.  During  the  survey  the 
supervisor  tabulated  incomes  that  were  recorded  on  the  survey  forms  and  whenever  potential 
problems were encountered a return visit was made the next day to immediately correct the error.  
In the following analysis, caution should be exercised when comparing poverty incidences to the 
more formal estimates published by China and other international organizations.  We suggest that 
our estimates should be considered as rough approximations of how many people are relatively 
poor in China’s irrigated areas and not accept the absolute poverty incidences without caution.
19   
 
INCIDENCE OF POVERTY 
 
Based on China’s poverty line, the incidence of poverty in our surveyed households is higher than 
the national average.  According to our data, 7 percent of our households earn per capita incomes 
under 678 yuan annually (table 7.1, row 1).  This level of poverty, while not too high, compared to 
                                                 
19 Efforts were also made to avoid the undue influence of idiosyncratic shocks in the calculation of income.  During the 
survey we produced estimates of unexpected crop income shocks from natural disasters and livestock losses from disease 
and other sources.  Adjustments were made to income when positive or negative transfers that were considered abnormal 
were encountered. In this way, our income estimates (especially the variability of income) are similar to those that would 
have been generated had we access to total annual household expenditure.  However, it should be noted that when 
comparing our estimates of poverty incidents to those generated by the CNSB at the national level many factors differ, 
most of which inflate poverty rates.  In particular, while CNSB uses expenditure, we use income, a livelihood metric that 
is generally more variable than expenditure.  Second, our sample is fairly small.  Third, we elicit annual earnings direct, 
while CNSB asks income from many sources on a monthly basis.  All of these will potentially increase the variability of 
our series and create a distribution with a higher variance, part of which is true variance and part of which is due to 
measurement error.  Given equal means (which are actually similar), a series with a greater variance will generate higher 
estimates of the incidence of poverty.   119 
many countries, is still about twice the national level (3.4% in 2000--see table 1.1).  Such a result 
(even  beyond  consideration  of  the  greater  variance  of  our  measures)  in  one  sense  should  be 
expected since our sample areas are entirely in inland provinces and include many villages that are 
heavily  oriented  to  agricultural  production.    According  to  Rozelle  (1996),  most  of  China’s 
inequality is due to inter-regional differences between the coastal and inland provinces and due to 
the differences in earning between farmers who earn less from agriculture and workers and the self-
employed who earn more from non-farm employment.  From this result, we should expect that a 
sample drawn from inland, agricultural areas should be on the low side of income distribution, even 
though the villages are in an irrigated area.  However, before concluding that there are households 
in  China  that  have  access  to  irrigation  and  are  still  poor,  it  must  be  remembered  that  not  all 
households in irrigated areas have land that is irrigated.   
 
Table 7.1.  Poverty distribution and durable consumer goods of the sample households in Ningxia 
and Henan Provinces, 2001. 
Income group
a  Share of households (%)
b  Value of durable consumer goods 
(yuan) 
Whole sample       
   I: the poor I  7  4,711 
   II: the poor II  7  5,241 
   III  51  5,136 
   IV  21  6,444 
   V  14  11,953 
Ningxia     
   I: the poor I  7  5,882 
   II: the poor II  3  7,416 
   III  46  4,258 
   IV  26  5,312 
   V  18  12,436 
Henan     
   I: the poor I  8  3,393 
   II: the poor II  11  4,451 
   III  58  6,013 
   IV  15  9,009 
   V  9  10,719 
a Households in the poor I category include those with per capita annual income below China’s official poverty standard (625 yuan).  
Households in poor II include those with incomes that fall between China’s official poverty standard and the World Bank’s standard 
(878 yuan). Groups III, IV and V are the non-poor category with per capita annual incomes between 878 yuan and 2,500 yuan, 2,500 
yuan and 4,000 yuan, and more than 4,000 yuan, respectively.  
b May not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 
Data source: Authors’ survey. 
   120 
While our estimates of the incidence of poverty within irrigation districts are higher than 
the national level, they are lower than the provincial averages of the Henan and Ningxia provinces.  
According to CNSB (2001), the average poverty incidence in the rural areas of Ningxia and Henan 
is estimated to be around 10 percent in both provinces in 2001.  This means that poverty inside 
irrigation  districts  is  only  a  fraction  of  that  in  non-irrigated  areas  (since  the  average  for  non-
irrigated areas must be substantially higher than the provincial average).   
Applying the World Bank’s poverty standard to our samples, the incidence of the poverty 
rises to 14 percent (7 percent + 7 percent; table 7.1, column 2, rows 1 and 2).  Interestingly, this 
estimate of the number of people who earn below one dollar per day is close to the 1997 poverty 
incidence reported by the World Bank (13.5 %--table 1.1).  Cross-checking our income data with 
durable consumer goods shows that they are positively correlated (and the correlation coefficient is 
significantly different than 0), an indication of the reasonableness of the estimates of income upon 
which we generated our estimates of poverty incidence.   
 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE POOR 
 
Although the IDs in the two sample provinces have similar rates of incidence of poverty when 
using China’s poverty standard, they differ substantially when using the World Bank poverty line 
(table 7.1, rows 6 to 15).  According to our data, 7 percent of households in the Ningxia IDs and 8 
percent of those in the Henan sample do not earn enough to be above China’s own poverty line.  
When moving to the World Bank poverty lines, however, the poverty incidences in Henan and 
Ningxia diverge.  The proportion of households that fall below the one dollar per day line increases 
to 19 percent in the Henan villages (poor I + poor II).  Those in the Ningxia sample only rise 
marginally to 10 percent.  Examining the average incomes in the sample counties in each province 
helps understand the result.  Average incomes of the 6 selected counties in the 2 irrigation districts 
in Henan are lower than the other 5 counties in Ningxia.  These differences between Ningxia and 
Henan Province are consistent with our expectation of the distribution of poverty along a river 
basin.  Because of the superior access to water in the upstream localities, the incidence of poverty 
of the upstream areas is less than that in the downstream.   
Poverty distribution along the IDs within a province has not presented a consistent pattern 
as that presented along the overall river basin.  Applying national poverty line reveals that poverty 
incidence in the up-reach of ID (WID-N) in the Ningxia Province is lower than that in the down-
reach of ID (QID-N), it is also supported by a larger poverty gap in the down ID; anyway, all these 
incidences seem to be consistent with the analysis on the distribution along the overall river basin 
(table 7.2, rows 1 and 2) .  However, examining the sample data in Henan province generates the 
opposite result that more poverty occurred in the up-reach of the ID instead of the down-reach and 
that poverty is deeper in the up ID than in the down ID (table 7.2, rows 3 and 4).  In addition, when 
we compare poverty incidence calculated by the World Bank Poverty line and analyze farmers’   121 
income between up and down IDs, we also cannot get the consistent results as expected by many 
people that farmers located in the up IDs should benefit more than those in the down IDs.   
Table 7.2.  Income and poverty in the four sample irrigation districts of Ningxia and Henan 
Provinces, 2001. 
Total    Cropping     
income    income   
Headcount index 
 
Poverty gap index 
  (yuan)    (yuan)    Poor I  Poor II    Poor I  Poor II 
Ningxia                   
WID-N  2,533    769    5.9  11.8    2.5  6.8 
QID-N  2,765    863    7.4  9.5    2.8  7.5 
Henan                   
PID-H  1,964    713    9.1  15.2    4.9  11.8 
LID-H  1,694    778    5.6  25    0.4  5.4 
a Households in the poor I category include those with per capita annual income below China’s official poverty standard 
(625 yuan).  Households in poor II include those with incomes below the World Bank’s standard (878 yuan). 
Data source: Authors’ survey. 
 
When analyzing poverty distribution along canals within IDs, evidence from our sample 
data further indicates that farmers’ poverty status is not strongly related to their location in the IDs.  
For example, poverty incidence in both IDs of Ningxia Province calculated by the national poverty 
line has almost no differences (table 7.3, rows 1 to 4).  Although there are obvious variations of 
poverty  incidence  between  upper  and  down  reaches  of  both  IDs  in  the  Henan  province,  the 
evidence from this Province has not told us one consistent story (table 7.3, rows 5 to 8).  Analyzing 
poverty  incidence  based on  the World  Bank  poverty  line  has  also  not  provided  a  strong  clear 
relationship between poverty and location in the canals.  
 
Table 7.3.  Poverty distribution along canals in the four sample irrigation districts of Ningxia and 
Henan Provinces,  2001. 
Irrigation district  Reaches of irrigation districts  Poor I (%)
  Poor II (%) 
Ningxia       
   WID-N  Upper  5.6  16.7 
  Lower  6.3  6.3 
   QID-N  Upper  3.2  6.4 
  Lower  9.4  11 
Henan       
   PID-H  Upper  16.0  28.0 
  Lower  4.9  7.3 
   LID-H 
Upper  0.0  13.3 
    Lower  9.5  33.3   122 
a Households in the poor I category include those with per capita annual income below China’s official poverty standard (625 yuan).  
Households in poor II include those with incomes below the World Bank’s standard (878 yuan). 
Data source: Authors’ survey. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR 
 
While  it  could  be  that  access  to  water  and  irrigated  land  accounts  for  some  of  the  income 
differences of households, a number of other factors appear to be correlated with income levels of 
our sample households in the IDs.  For example, in our sample, poorer households, rely much more 
on agriculture than their better-off counterparts (table 7.4, columns 2 to 4).  On an average, the 
poor, which have an average income of only 373 yuan per year during our survey year, receive 
more than 80 percent of their income from the cropping sector and 7.3 percent of their income from 
raising livestock (table 7.4, row 1).  In contrast, poor farm households receive only 12.4 percent of 
their income from the non-agricultural sector.  For those in progressively higher income categories, 
however, the share income generated from cropping declines.  For the highest income group (V), 
households with an average annual, per capita income of 5,877 yuan, more than half (53.8 %) of 
their income comes from off-farm activities (table 7.4, row 5).  Such findings are also consistent 
with various studies that show the importance of off-farm employment in farmer income growth 
and poverty alleviation (Fan et al. 2001; World Bank  2001).  
 
Table 7.4.  Income, structure of income and non-agricultural labor in Ningxia and Henan 
Provinces, 2001. 
Sources of income (%) 
Income group
a  Per capita income 
(yuan) 
Crop  Livestock  Non-agri 
Share of non-
agricultural  labors 
(%) 
Whole sample                 
   I: the poor I  373  80  7  12  3 
   II: the poor II  735  73  7  21  21 
   III  1,672  58  10  33  33 
   IV  3,090  49  11  40  42 
   V  5,877  35  12  54  48 
Ningxia           
   I: the poor I  381  82  12  5  0 
   II: the poor II  715  59  9  32  18 
   III  1,775  49  15  36  35 
   IV  3,083  52  16  32  37 
   V  6,209  34  11  55  49 
Henan           
   I: the poor I  365  78  1  20  7 
   II: the poor II  742  78  6  16  22 
   III  1,570  67  4  29  31 
   IV  3,107  40  2  58  52 
   V  5,028  35  13  52  45   123 
a Households in the poor I category include those with per capita annual income below China’s official poverty standard (625 
yuan).  Households in poor II include those with incomes that fall between China’s official poverty standard and the World Bank’s 
standard (878 yuan). Groups III, IV and V are the non-poor category with per capita annual incomes between 878 yuan and 2,500 
yuan, 2,500 yuan and 4,000 yuan, and more than 4,000 yuan, respectively.  
Data source: Authors’ survey. 
When examining the structure of incomes, it is worth noting that although the absolute 
income from agriculture for the non-poor is generally higher than that of the poor, our data shows 
clearly that the poor generate a higher share of their income from agriculture.  In an economy in 
which the poor rely relatively more on agricultural earnings, if some action of the government (or 
any other entity) increases agricultural income, it means that it is more likely that there may be a 
higher proportional increase in the total income of the poor than of the rich farmers.  Hence, if the 
government can implement policies that increase income in agriculture, including measures that 
increase agricultural income by increasing the amount of newly irrigated areas and by raising the 
efficiency of the existing irrigated areas, the poor may benefit. 
In addition to irrigation and the structure of rural income, some variables vary with income 
and appear to have a simultaneous affect on rural income, while others do not (table 7.5).  For 
example, the size of farms in terms of cultivated land is very similar among the income groups and 
between the poor and non-poor (table 7.5, column 4).  Likewise, there is little noticeable variation 
among income categories in cultivated land per capita (table 7.5, column 5).  Such an equitable 
distribution of land, which is perhaps most characteristic of China, even 20 year after its economic 
reforms, has been shown to play an equity increasing role in China’s rural economy (Brandt et al. 
2002).  In contrast, family size falls and the number of laborers in a household rises (meaning, the 
number of dependents in the household falls) as households move up the income ladder (table 7.5, 
columns 1 and 2).  Likewise, the average education of families rises with income (table 7.5, column 
3).   
 
Table 7.5.  Household characteristics and farm size of the sample households in Ningxia and Henan 
Provinces, 2001. 
Income group
a  Household size  Number of laborers 
per household 
Average education of 





Cultivated land per 
capita 
 (ha) 
Whole sample           
   I: the poor I  4.3   2.9   5.4   0.7   0.18  
   II: the poor II  4.9   3.0   7.0   0.4   0.09  
   III  4.3   3.0   6.4   0.6   0.15  
   IV  3.9   2.9   6.0   0.7   0.18  
   V  3.4   3.0   6.3   0.7   0.22  
Ningxia           
   I: the poor I  3.9   3.0   5.8   0.7   0.22  
   II: the poor II  5.5   3.3   5.7   0.4   0.08  
   III  4.3   3.0   6.1   0.7   0.18  
   IV  3.9   2.9   5.8   0.8   0.21  
   V  3.5   3.1   5.8   0.8   0.25  
Henan           
   I: the poor I  4.8   2.9   5.0   0.6   0.13  
   II: the poor II  4.6   2.9   7.4   0.4   0.10  
   III  4.3   2.9   6.7   0.5   0.12  
   IV  3.9   2.7   6.6   0.4   0.11    124 
   V  3.2   2.8   7.6   0.4   0.13  
a Households in the poor I category include those with per capita annual income below China’s official poverty standard (625 yuan).  Households in poor II 
include those with incomes that fall between China’s official poverty standard and the World Bank’s standard (878 yuan). Groups III, IV and V are the non-poor 
category with per capita annual incomes between 878 yuan and 2,500 yuan, 2,500 yuan and 4,000 yuan, and more than 4,000 yuan, respectively.  
Data source: Authors’ survey. 
SUMMARY  
 
Based on China’s poverty line, the incidence of poverty in our surveyed households is higher than 
the  national  average,  but lower than the  provincial averages  of  Ningxia  and Henan  provinces.  
Poverty distribution along the IDs within a province has not presented consistent patterns as that 
presented along the overall river basin.  While it could be that access to water and irrigated land 
accounts for some of the income differences of households, a number of other factors appear to be 




Irrigation System Performance: Implications for the Poor 
 
The assessment of irrigation system performance and its implications for the pro-poor is focused in 
this chapter.  In fact, some major aspects of the irrigation system performance have already been 
included in the other chapters.  In this section, applying field survey data, we will further assess 
irrigation system performance in terms of water utilization, irrigation investment, output value, land 
productivity, head-tail equity of output, water productivity
20 and labor productivity.    
 
 
WATER SCARCITY AND WATER QUALITY 
 
Our sample data clearly shows a trend of increasing water scarcity over a period of time since 1990 
and more serious water scarcity in the downstream regions (table 8.1).  Except for WID-N, the 
upper ID of the Ningxia Province due to its predominant location, all other IDs show that water has 
become short since 1990 (table 8.1, rows 2 to 4).  For example, in the lower ID of the Ningxia 
Province, only 4 villages reported that they were faced with water scarcity issue in 1990; however, 
this number increased to 17 percent in 1995 and 29 percent in 2001.  Similar trends can be found in 
the Henan Province.  At present, within provinces increasing villages in the downstream IDs are 
faced with severe water scarcity than that in the upstream.  For example, water scarcity villages in 
the QID-N is more by 16 percent than that in the WID-N, and water scarcity in LID-N is more by 
13 percent than that in the PID-H.  In addition, average water scarcity degree in the Henan Province 
is more severe than that in the Ningxia Province.   
On an average, water quality in the sample villages has tended to deteriorate more seriously 
since 1990 (table 8.2).  In 1990, water quality in 31 percent of villages was not good and this 
number increased to 38 percent in 2001 (table 8.2, column 4).  Since 1995, water quality in the 
WID has been improved while water quality in QID deteriorated quickly.  Currently, water quality 
in WID is better than that in QID, maybe due to its advantageous location.  Water salinity is one of 
the water quality issues in our sampled villages (table 8.3).  On an average, 38 percent of villages 
have water salinity issues; water salinity in QID is more serious than that in WID.  Since 1990, 
water salinity in our samples has not expanded to more villages though the seriousness  of water 
salinity was not collected by our survey. 
 
Table 8.1.  Degree of water scarcity in the sample villages of four sample irrigation districts of 
Ningxia and Henan Provinces, 2001. 
                                                 
20 Data applied in analyzing water productivity of the second section  is second hand; in this section, we will use field 
survey data to analyze water productivity.   126 
Share of villages facing severe water shortage (%) 
 
1990  1995  2001 
Ningxia Province       
Upper: WID-N  25  13  13 
Lower: QID-N  4  17  29 
Henan Province       
Upper: PID-H  6  13  25 
Lower: LID-H  0  25  38 
Data Source: Authors'  survey. 
 
 
Table 8.2.  Water quality in the sample villages of four sample irrigation districts of Ningxia and 
Henan Provinces, 2001. 
Degree of water quality (%) 
    Good  Common  Bad 
Ningxia Province         
Upper: WID-N         
  1990  50   25   25  
  1995  50   13   38  
  2001  50   25   25  
Lower: QID-N         
  1990  25   42   33  
  1995  21   46   33  
  2001  25   33   42  
Henan Province         
Upper: PID-H         
  1990  44   50   6  
  1995  38   44   19  
  2001  31   44   25  
Lower: LID-H         
  1990  63   13   25  
  1995  63   13   25  
    2001  63   13   25  









Table 8.3.  Water quality in the sample villages of four sample irrigation districts of Ningxia and 
Henan Provinces, 2001.   127 
    Water salinity (%) 
Ningxia Province     
Upper: WID-N     
  1990  25  
  1995  25  
  2001  25  
Lower: QID-N     
  1990  42  
  1995  42  
  2001  42  
     
Henan Province     
Upper: PID-H     
  1990  0  
  1995  13  
  2001  13  
Lower: LID-H     
  1990  38  
  1995  38  
    2001  38  
Data source: Authors'  survey.   
 
 
WATER UTILIZATION, RELIABILITY AND IRRIGATION INVESTMENT 
 
IDs in the upstream of river basins have been allocated more water than that in the downstream, 
water use differences between IDs within a province is smaller than that between IDs in different 
provinces.  For example, in one ID of the Ningxia Province, WID-N, water use per capita is nearly 
four times that of the ID in the Henan Province; in  LID-H, water use per hectare is more than 3 
times (table 8.4, columns 1 and 2).  However, within the Ningxia Province, water use per capita in 
WID-N is only higher by 30 percent than that in the QID-N, and water use per hectare is higher by 
nearly 80 percent.  While water shortage has emerged as an increasing serious problem in the 
overall river basin, overuse of water in the upstream has been criticized and reallocating water has 
been strongly proposed. 
 
Table 8.4.  Water utilization and irrigation investment in the four sample irrigation districts (water 
supply indicators) of Ningxia and Henan Provinces, 2001. 
Location  Water use per capita 
(m
3/person) 






Irrigation investment per 
hectare 
(yuan/ha) 
Ningxia Province         
Upper: WID-N  3,489   25,307   94   3,363  
Lower: QID-N  2,746   14,356   92   3,201  
         
Henan Province         
Upper: PID-H  1,304   10,707   88   2,257  
Lower: LID-H  898   7,855   95   2,531  
Data source: Authors'  survey. 
It is interesting to find different water allocation patterns between IDs, not all the farmers 
located in the upper stream of IDs will be allocated more water than that in the lower stream.    128 
Although in some IDs, such as QID-N in the Ningxia Province and PID-N in the Henan Province, 
water use in the upper canals is higher than that in the lower canals, it is not always true (table 8.5, 
columns 1 and 2).  In the WID-N, water use per capita in the upper reach is lower by nearly 50 
percent than that in the lower reach, water use per hectare is lower by 15 percent; similar results can 
also be found in one ID of the Henan Province, LID-H.  Evidence of water allocation along canals 
in the ID may imply that it is more easy to control water allocation within an ID than that between 
IDs, especially between IDs in different provinces.  
 
Table 8.5.  Water utilization and irrigation investment along canals in the four sample irrigation 
districts (water supply indicators) of Ningxia and Henan Provinces, 2001. 
Location  Water use per capita 
(m
3/person) 






Irrigation investment per hectare 
(yuan/ha) 
Ningxia Province         
WID-N         
Upper  2,317   23,372   98   3,367  
Lower  4,808   27,484   89   3,359  
QID-N         
Upper  3,064   19,528   96   2,683  
Lower  2,593   11,851   90   3,451  
         
Henan province         
PID-H         
Upper  1,974   16,325   95   1,546  
Lower  895   7,282   82   2,673  
LID-H         
Upper  694   6,526   89   2,036  
Lower  1,044   8,805   100   2,884  
Data source: Authors'  survey. 
 
Examining sample data shows that farmers in the upper reach can receive more reliable 
water supply than those in the lower reach.  For example, average water reliability in the IDs of the 
Ningxia  Province  is  higher  than  that  in  the  Henan  province;  within  Ningxia  Province,  water 
reliability in the upper ID,WID-N, is higher by 2 percent than that in the lower ID, QID-N (table 
8.4, column 3).  On further examining water reliability along canals within IDs, except for the LID-
H in the Henan Province, all the other three IDs show that farmers in the upper canals can irrigate 
more reliable water than those in the lower canals (table 8.5, column 3).  For example, reliability in 
the upper canals of WID-N in the Ningxia Province is higher by 10 percent than that in the lower 
canals.  The reasons why water reliability in LID-H is higher than that in PID-H maybe due to the 
fact that for surface water, farmers in the LID-H can also get water from ground river, which is 
especially true for the downstream of the Yellow River. 
In order to improve water supply reliability, more irrigation investment generally has been 
put in the lower than in the upper reaches.  For example, irrigation investment per hectare in WID-
N is higher by 5 percent than that in QID-N (table 8.4).  Most evidence on irrigation investment 
along canals further prove the result (table 8.5).  For example, irrigation investment in the lower 
reach of QID-N is more by nearly 30 percent than that in the lower reach; regions in the lower   129 




CROPPING INTENSITY, LAND PRODUCTIVITY AND OUTPUT VALUE 
 
Examining data show that differences of cropping intensity between provinces are higher than 
within provinces or within IDs.  For example, cropping intensity in the IDs of the Ningxia Province 
is about 1.6, while in the Henan Province, this number is more than 1.9, even nearly 2.0 (table 8.6, 
column 1).  However, in the Ningxia Province, QID-N is only higher by 2 percent than WID-N; 
similar  results  can  be  found  in  the  IDs  of  the  Henan  Province.    Although  cropping  intensity 
variation along canals in the WID-N seems large, more than 15 percent; differences in other IDs are 
very small, about 1 percent to 8 percent (table 8.7, column 1).   
 
Table 8.6.   Land productivity in the four sample irrigation districts of Ningxia and Henan 
Provinces, 2001. 
Crop yield (kg/ha) 
Location  Cropping intensity 
Wheat  Maize  Paddy 
Ningxia Province         
Upper: WID-N  1.56   4,596   5,281   7,396  
Lower: QID-N  1.60   4,527   5,672   6,962  
         
Henan Province         
Upper: PID-H  1.94   5,295   6,933   6,097  
Lower: LID-H  1.98   4,748   5,643   7,018  
Data source: Authors'  survey. 
 
Although wheat yield in the upper reach both between and within a province is higher than 
that in the lower reach; consistent results cannot be got from maize and rice.  For example, wheat 
yield in the LID-H is 4,748 kg per hectare, lower than 5,295 kg in PID-H, but still higher than the 
highest yield of 4,596 in WID-N of the Ningxia Province (table 8.6, column 2).  But for maize and 
rice yield, there are not consistent results to show which province has higher yield (table 8.6, 
columns 3 and 4).  For example, rice yield in WID-N is higher than that in the IDs of the Henan 
province, while rice yield in QID-N is lower than that in the IDs of the Henan Province.  Further, 
examining crop yield along canals within IDs also reveal that it is hard to conclude whether upper 
or  lower  reach  farmers  along  the  canals  will  have  higher  agricultural  productivity  (table  8.7, 
columns 2 to 5).   
 
Table 8.7.  Land productivity along canals in the four sample irrigation districts of Ningxia and 
Henan Provinces, 2001. 
Location  Cropping intensity  Crop yield (kg/ha)   130 
   
Wheat  Maize  Paddy 
Ningxia Province         
WID-N         
Upper  1.43   4,579   4,991   7,956  
Lower  1.70   4,620   5,644   6,836  
QID-N         
Upper  1.68   4,872   5,963   7,657  
Lower  1.55   4,363   5,548   6,419  
Henan Province         
PID-H         
Upper  1.93   4,972   4,425   6,230  
Lower  1.95   5,477   7,044   4,905  
LID-H         
Upper  1.99   6,010   5,510   n.a. 
Lower  1.97   3,661   7,500   7,018  
Data source: Authors'  survey. 
 
Farmers in the upper provinces generate lower production value than that in the lower 
provinces, though this is not true within provinces and within IDs.  Both gross and net production 
values in the Ningxia Province are lower than that in the Henan Province (table 8.8, columns 1 and 
2).  For example, Gross and net production value per hectare in WID-N is separately 10,937 yuan 
and  5,767  yuan,  which  are  lower  than  that  in  the  PID-H  with  11,969  yuan  and  6,360  yuan, 
respectively.  On calculating the ratio of net production value over the gross value, the results show 
that  farmers  in  Ningxia  Province  is  less  profitable  than  those  in  the  Henan  Province.    It  is 
interesting to note that despite farmers in the Ningxia Province getting more water than those in the 
Henan province, they earn less money from agricultural production ability in the Ningxia Province 
than those in the Henan Province; this maybe due to many other factors and local production 
conditions.  Consistent with the above discussion, farmers in the Ningxia Province get less income 
from agricultural production than those in the Henan Province (table 8.8, column 3).  For example, 
farmers  in  one  ID  of  the  Ningxia  Province,  WID-N,  earn  41  percent  of  their  income  from 
agricultural production, while this number is 55 percent in PID-H and 69 percent in LID-H of the 
Henan Province. 
Examining  data  shows  that  other  than  production  value  differences between provinces, 
within provinces and IDs, farmers in the upper reaches are more profitable than those in the lower 
reaches.  For example, gross production value in WID-N is higher by 16 percent than that in QID-N 
and net production value is higher by 21 percent; a similar result can be found in the IDs of  the 
Henan Province (table 8.8, columns 1 and 2).  In addition, farmers in the upper canals within IDs 
are more productive and profitable than those in the lower canals (table 8.9, columns 1 and 2).  For 
example, farmers in the upper reach of QID-N has 11 percent more gross production value than 
those in the lower reach and net production value is higher by 17 percent; Such evidence can also 
be  found in  the  other  IDs  within  Ningxia  or  in  Henan.    By  connecting  this result  with  water   131 
reliability, it implies that within provinces and IDs, more reliable water in the upper canals are 
beneficial to farmers’ production and profitability under other similar conditions.   
 
Table 8.8.    Production value in the four sample irrigation districts of Ningxia and Henan Provinces, 
2001. 
Location 
Gross value of agricultural 
production per unit area 
(yuan/ha) 
Net value of agricultural 
production per unit area 
(yuan/ha) 
Net value of agricultural 
production as percent of total 
household income (%) 
Ningxia Province       
Upper: WID-N  10,937  5,767  41 
Lower: QID-N  9,460  4,772  51 
       
Henan Province       
Upper: PID-H  11,969  6,360  55 
Lower: LID-H  11,747  7,007  69 
Data source: Authors'  survey. 
 
Table 8.9.    Production value along canals in the four sample irrigation districts of Ningxia and 
Henan Provinces, 2001. 
Location 
Gross value of agricultural 
production per unit area 
(yuan/ha) 
Net value of agricultural 
production per unit area 
(yuan/ha) 
Share of net value of 
agricultural production over 
total household income (%) 
Ningxia Province       
WID-N       
Upper  11,092  6,212  40 
Lower  10,763  5,267  41 
QID-N       
Upper  10,118  5,281  45 
Lower  9,140  4,526  54 
       
Henan Province       
PID-H       
Upper  12,728  6,123  63 
Lower  11,506  6,505  50 
LID-H       
Upper  11,968  7,396  57 
Lower  11,589  6,729  78 
Data source: Authors'  survey. 
HEAD-TAIL EQUITY OF OUTPUT 
 
Although the above analyses on agricultural production show some differences between head and 
tail  regions,  compared  with  the  other  countries,  especially,    the  southeast  Asian  countries,   132 
distribution of output exihibits relatively equal characteristics.  For example, the largest head-tail 
ratio of output occurs in the LID-H of  the Henan Province for wheat; the difference is nearly 40 
percent (table 8.10, column 1).  On an average, the yield difference for wheat, maize and rice 
between head and tail regions are about 1 to nearly 20 percent.  In some Southeast Asian countries, 
the head-tail ratio is as high as 200 percent (Intizar 2002).  Relatively equal output distribution 
maybe due to equal land allocation.  
 
Table 8.10.   Head-tail equity ratio of output in the four sample irrigation districts of Ningxia 
and Henan Provinces, 2001. 
Head-tail equity ratio of output 
Location 
Wheat  Maize  Paddy 
Ningxia Province       
Upper: WID-N  0.95   0.75   1.23  
Lower: QID-N  1.16   1.08   1.19  
Henan Province       
Upper: PID-H  0.86   0.78   0.99  
Lower: LID-H  0.63   1.04   1.06  




Water is more productive in the down-reach of rivers than the up-reach.  Since we know that 
generally farmers in the upper reaches will be allocated more water than those in the lower reaches, 
differences of agricultural production between up and downstream are not very large; it is not hard 
to understand that water productivity in the downstream is higher than that in the upstream.  For 
example, in the LID-H of  the Henan province, every cubic meter of water can produce 2.1 kg 
wheat, i.e, $0.25; while in the WID-N of Ningxia Province, only 0.8 kg or $0.09 can be produced 
by one cubic meter water, less than 30 percent of that in PID-H (table 8.11, columns 1 and 4).  
Except for wheat, water productivity for both maize and rice in the Henan Province are higher than 
that  in  the  Ningxia  Province  (table  8.11,  columns  2  and  3,  5  and  6).    For  example,  water 
productivity of rice in WID-N and QID-N of the Ningxia province is only half of that in PID-H and 
20 percent of that in LID-H of the Henan province.  Most of the evidence along the canals in the 
IDs also shows that water in the lower canals is more productive than that in the upper canals (table 
8.12).  Differences of water productivity along river reach imply the possibility to reallocate water 
among regions to optimize water utilization.  
 
Table 8.11.  Water productivity along canals in the four sample irrigation districts of Ningxia and Henan 
Provinces, 2001. 
Water productivity (kg/m
3)    Water productivity (US$/m
3) 
Location 
Wheat  Maize  Paddy    Wheat  Maize  Paddy   133 
Ningxia Province               
Upper: WID-N  0.8   0.9   0.3     0.09   0.08   0.04  
Lower: QID-N  1.0   1.5   0.3     0.12   0.13   0.06  
               
Henan Province               
Upper: PID-H  1.4   2.3   0.6     0.17   0.19   0.10  
Lower: LID-H  2.1   2.2   1.4     0.25   0.19   0.22  
Data source: Authors'  survey. 
 
Water  productivity  also  differs  by  crops  which  implies  the  necessity  to  optimize  the 
cropping  structure.    Most  cases  indicate  that  among  the  three  major  grain  crops,  rice  water 
productivity is the lowest and the differences between wheat and maize seem not large, especially, 
when comparing their water productivity by value (table 8.11). For example, in the IDs of Ningxia 
Province, per cubic meter of water can only produce 0.3 kg of rice, while water productivity for 
maize can be as high as 1.5 kg and wheat can reach 1 kg (table 8.11, rows 1 and 2).  Although by 
physical  standards,  wheat  productivity  in  QID-N  is  only  nearly  70  percent  of  maize  water 
productivity,  difference  of  water  productivity  value  between  wheat  and  maize  is  less  than  10 
percent.  Similar results also can be found in the Henan Province (table 8.11, columns 3 and 4) and 
in all IDs when examining data along canals (table 8.12).    
 




3)      Water productivity 
(US$/m
3)  Location 
Wheat Maize Paddy      Wheat Maize Paddy 
Ningxia Province               
WID-N               
Upper  1.0   0.9   0.3     0.11   0.08   0.04  
Lower  0.5   0.9   0.3     0.06   0.08   0.04  
QID-N               
Upper  0.8   1.5   0.3     0.10   0.13   0.05  
Lower  1.1   1.5   0.4     0.13   0.12   0.06  
Henan Province               
PID-H               
Upper  1.6   1.4   0.6     0.20   0.12   0.10  
Lower  1.3   2.4   0.3     0.16   0.20   0.05  
LID-H               
Upper  1.6   2.1   n.a.    0.20   0.17   n.a. 
Lower  2.5   4.5   1.4       0.29   0.38   0.22  




Examining data shows that labor is more productive in the downstream than that in the upstream 
within provinces.  No consistent conclusion can be got from the sample data as to which province 
has higher labor productivity.  However, our sample data shows that in the Ningxia Province, 
though marginal, labor productivity in the lower reach is higher than that in the upper-reach; while   134 
it is the inverse in the Henan Province (table 8.13). For example in the Ningxia province each labor 
can produce 40 kg or $4.72 of wheat, which is lower by nearly 10 percent of QID-N in the lower ID 
(table 8.13 rows 1 and 2). Maize and rice labor productivity differences between the two Ids in the 
Ningxia  Province is about 5%; while in the Henan Province labor is more productive  in PID-H in 
the upper ID, than that in the lower ID, LID (table 8.13, rows 3 and 4).  For example, wheat labor 
productivity in the PID-H is higher by more than 40 percent than that in the LID-H, labors for 
producing maize and rice are more productive by nearly or more than 20 percent.  Most cases also 
demonstrate that apart from the Henan Province, farmers in the lower canals of IDs are more 
productive in labor input than those in the upper canals.  
 
Table 8.13.  Labor productivity along canals in the four sample irrigation districts of Ningxia and 
Henan Provinces, 2001. 
Labor productivity (kg/labor)    Labor productivity (US$/labor) 
Location 
Wheat  Maize  Paddy    Wheat  Maize  Paddy 
Ningxia Province               
Upper: WID-N  40   38   26     4.72   3.19   4.22  
Lower: QID-N  45   40   27     5.35   3.31   4.38  
Henan Province               
Upper: PID-H  61   48   23     7.29   3.99   3.72  
Lower: LID-H  43   41   19     5.09   3.42   3.03  
Data source: Authors'  survey. 
Similar to land productivity, labor productivity also differs by crops and rice has the lowest 
physical labor productivity but not right for value of labor productivity.  Rice not only consumes 
more water than other crops like wheat and maize, it also needs more labor input, that result in 
relatively low labor productivity.  For example, in the WID-N of the Ningxia Province, physical 
labor  productivity  of  rice  is  lower  than  wheat  by  nearly  40  percent,  while  value  of  labor 
productivity is less than 10 percent (table 8.13, row 1).  Although labor productivity differences 
between  wheat  and  maize  seems  smaller  than  that  with  rice,  wheat  seems  to  be  more  labor 
productive than maize (table 8.13, columns 1 and 2, 4 and 5).  For example, in the PID-H of the 
Henan Province, each labor can produce 61 kg of wheat or $7.29, while it can only produce 48 kg 
of maize or $3.99.  Further examining labor productivity along canals also reveal sinilar results 
(table 8.14).  
 
Table 8.14.  Labor productivity along canals in the four sample irrigation districts of Ningxia and Henan 
Provinces, 2001. 
Labor productivity (kg/labor)      Labor productivity (US$/labor) 
Location 
Wheat  Maize  Paddy      Wheat  Maize  Paddy 
Ningxia Province                 135 
WID-N               
Upper  36   33   26     4.26   2.74   4.15  
Lower  45   45   27     5.33   3.75   4.30  
QID-N               
Upper  39   38   21     4.64   3.22   3.45  
Lower  48   40   32     5.69   3.35   5.11  
               
Henan Province               
PID-H               
Upper  93   26   24     11.06   2.17   3.87  
Lower  43   49   15     5.15   4.07   2.39  
LID-H               
Upper  51   41   n.a.    6.1   3.5   n.a. 
Lower  35   34   19       4.2   2.8   3.0  
Data source: Authors'  survey. 
 
 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
 
Irrigation system performance can also be econometrically analyzed by introducing the dummy 
variable of irrigation districts into the outcome models.  In the specified econometric models of 
determinants of water use, production, income and poverty in chapter four, we included all the 
dummy variables of irrigation districts (Dk).  The variable Dk measures differences of water use, 
production, income and poverty between IDs, implying different performances of sample irrigation 
districts. 
Our results show that water use in the upper IDs both within and across provinces along the 
YRB is higher than that in the lower, which is consistent with statistic description. Compared with 
the base ID (WID-N), in upper Ningxia Province, coefficients of all other IDs are negative and 
statistically significant at 1 percent (table 10.5, rows 17 to 19).  The water use differences between 
IDs across provinces are larger than that within provinces.  For example, WID-N delivers more 
than 8,500 cubic meters of water per hectare than the QID-N; however, the water use difference 
between WID-N and IDs in the Henan Province is as high as 10,000 to 15,000 cubic meters per 
hectare.  Similar evidence can also be  found when examining water use by crop (table 10.14). 
Despite  the  significant  differences  of  water  use  among  IDs,  our  results  have  not 
demonstrated  significant differences in crop yield among IDs.  Almost all the coefficients of IDs 
are not significant (table 10.16, rows 16 to 18).  The only significant difference of yield is for 
wheat, i.e., wheat yield in the IDs of Henan is higher than that in WID-N.  Similar to yield, we have 
also not found significant variations in income and poverty among IDs along the YRB, which are 





In  this  chapter,  based  on  the  statistical  description  and  econometric  analysis,  we  assessed  the 
irrigation system performance mainly from water and productivity aspects.  Our data demonstrates 
increasing water scarcity over a period of time especially in the downstream regions.  Water quality 
in the sample IDs also tend to deteriorate.  IDs in the upper reach have been allocated more water 
than  those  in  the  lower  reach,  the  difference  is  more  obvious  across  provinces.    However, 
distribution  of  output  exhibits  relatively  equal  characteristics  which  greatly  differ  from  other 
Southeast Asian countries.  As a result, water productivity in the lower IDs is obviously higher than 






Water Rights, Allocation and Financing Issues: 
Implications for the Poor 
 
In this chapter, we have three obejctives.  At first, we will examine the water rights status in China.  
Secondly, regulation and procedures of water allocations at the level of river basin, IDs and villags 






According to China’s Water Law that was decreed in 1988, water ownership belongs to the State 
and water rights are not associated with land rights.  According to the law, all water users are 
required to apply for water use license from their local governments.  In practice, however, this is 
not needed.  Moreover, the licensing policy is not implemented for a variety of reasons (some of the 
reasons are related to water supply and others are related to water demand).  In addition, according 
to the law, water rights are not transferable.  Curiously, despite this ban, in recent years, officials 
have encouraged water transfer and currently it is being promoted as one of the models of reform 
that has potential to provide another tool to water officials who are trying to influence water use in 
China.  In fact, one sign that the current law is outdated is the increasing pressure to pass a new 
water law.  As a result of the outdated nature of China’s Water Law and the propensity for China’s 
localities to interpret and implement laws in their own idiosyncratic ways, we focus most of our 
attention on the more informal rules, norms, and institutions that affect water management. 
However, despite narrowing the focus to examine institutions, it is still difficult to study 
them because they are changing so fast.  Specifically, water institutions, like the institutions and 
policies in the rest of economy, are under transition (although it could be argued that liberalization 
of the water sector is behind that of most other sectors).  Moreover, during the transition process the 
institutions are changing in many directions.  For example, the water sector transition has been 
moving to a more market-oriented scheme.  But the pace of transition is slow, partly because of the 
high transaction costs that are associated with almost every aspect of trying to move water between 
buyers and sellers.  Looking ahead to the prospects for future liberalization, there are two growing 
forces that are shaping the institutional reform of water.  On the one hand, there is a force for 
lowering transaction costs.  Most of these would be consistent with an increasing emergence of the   138 
market in the water sector.  On the other hand, are the externalities that are associated with water 
demands in which the government plays an important role.  
 
 
WATER ALLOCATION IN THE YRB 
Water Allocation among Provinces along the YRB 
 
In response to increasing water use conflicts among upstream and downstream IDs and other users, 
China has been trying various means to deal with the problems that have been created by its open-
access water resources in the YRB.  Unfortunately, few of these efforts have been successful, 
mainly  due  to  lack  of  enforcement  and  due  to  the  poor  systems  of  incentive  in  the  earlier 
government programs.  With increasing water shortages in the downstream regions of the YRB, in 
1999, China initiated a new program called the Annual Allocation and Main River Water Quantity 
Control  Program.    With  the  experience  and  lessons  learned  from  the  past,  this  new  program 
emphasizes the importance of enforcement and incentive policies to induce water authorities in the 
upstream regions to participate in the program and adhere to the national government’s directives 
and their own agreements.  
Under the new program, water allocated to each province in the upstream regions will be 
reduced gradually.  The volumes to be reduced are based on the reasonable demands claimed by the 
provincial officials in the lower reaches of the YRB, and feasibility of being able to save water in 
each of the upstream provinces.  After an overall water demand increase target in the lower reaches 
is reached, the Yellow River Commission (YRC--the organization that runs the Annual Allocation 
Program) starts negotiations on how much water needs to be cut in each of the upstream provinces.  
According to the officials from the Ministry of Water Resource, this allocation process, a 
process that uses both direct administrative intervention (cuts in water in the upstream regions) and 
market measures (by increasing water prices in upstream areas), has been successful.  Compared 
with the 1995 to 1998 period when water in the Yellow River did not reach the ocean (that is there 
was a complete cut-off of water flow at some point upstream) for an average of 126 days, since the 
implementation of the program, the Yellow River only stopped flowing for eight days in 1999 and 
none in 2000 and 2001. 
However,  the  experience of the  new  Annual  Allocation  Program  has  not  been  without 
critics and there are concerns about the sustainability of the process in the long run.  First, as cuts 
have  begun  and  are  being  increased,  upstream  users  are  beginning  to  object.    For  example, 
compared with 1999, total water use drawing from the Yellow River reduced by 0.53 billion cubic 
meters  in  2000.    To  date,  the  downstream  regions  have  not  had  to  pay  compensation  for  the 
incremental units of water that they have received that were given up by upstream users.  Moreover, 
because water sales in the upstream regions have fallen, the IDs are beginning to experience a fall 
in revenues.  In interviews in 2001, we were told that a significant amount of maintenance would 
have to be delayed or cancelled because of the revenue shortfall.  If such practices continue and 
become more severe, the entire irrigation system could suffer serious damage.    139 
In response, upstream users have demanded that they should be allowed to raise prices for 
water  to  maintain  revenues.    Although  initially  there  was  some  opposition  by  the  central 
government,  after  the introduction  of the  YRB  Water  Allocation  Program,  water  prices  in  the 
upstream were allowed to rise.  For example, the Ningxia Government doubled the price of water in 
agriculture  from  0.006  yuan/m
3  to  0.012  yuan/m
3  in  2000.    With  the  rise  in  price,  the  water 
authorities have regained some of their lost revenues.  However, as soon as the revenues began to 
be balanced, there were more cuts in water that began to cause concern for the Ningxia water 
officials.  The concerns were increased in 2001 when officials kept water prices constant.  Any 
visitor to Ningxia (or any other upstream province) will hear  complaints about the unfair transfer 
of water to downstream users for which they are  now receiving compensation.  
In terms of the effect on the poor, the formulation of such agreements between upstream 
and downstream provinces may have important policy implications.  In general, the re-allocations 
that  are  occurring  are  from  poorer  ones  (such  as  Ningxia  and  Gansu)  to  richer  ones  (such  as 
Shandong).  Most likely, the shift of water access away from the upstream provinces will have a 
negative effect on some producers in the ID and (as discussed above) could adversely affect the 
operation of the ID itself and have an effect on the future of the effectiveness of the ID.  As such, to 
mitigate these negative effects, central government leaders who are concerned about the equity and 
poverty impacts of such policies can devise compensation methods.       
 
WATER ALLOCATION WITHIN A PROVINCE: THE CASE OF NINGXIA 
 
Allocation among and within the main and branch canals     
 
The issues surrounding water allocation among the provinces are similar to those among the main 
and branch canals within an ID.  Water allocation at the main or first-level canals and the second-
level canals within a province’s ID are controlled by one of the following government agencies--the 
provincial, prefectural or county’s Water Management Bureau—depending on the size and reach of 
the ID.  By regulation, the general principle for water allocation is to give first priority to those 
downstream, lift irrigation (vs. gravity irrigation), give priority to the canal’s high offlets (versus 
the  lower  offlets),  to  agriculture  (versus  forestry),  to  more  vulnerable  groups,  and  large 
consolidated tracts of land (versus fragmented land).     
Hence,  while  water  allocation  regulations  in  Ningxia  Province  fully  acknowledge  the 
primacy of efficiency, they still attempt to encourage equity at the same time.  Unfortunately, due 
to lack of data, we cannot conduct a systematic assessment on the implementation of allocation 
regulations.  However, based on our field interviews and certain parts of our data from our survey, 
we  can  provide  partial  and  fragmentary  evidence  on  the  actual  implementation  of  the  water 
allocation principles to see which ones are pursued and which ones are relatively ignored. 
The basic water allocation rule is to allocate water by comprehensively considering water 
volume, canal capacity, water quota and water delivery efficiency while abiding with the allocation   140 
principles.  Among all these issues, water quota is one of the important indices to guide the water 
allocation practices.  In China a water quota is an engineering standard developed by the water 
conservancy bureau that indicates the amount of water that is needed by crops.  The water quota 
differs  by  crop  type,  the availability  of  water  supply,  a  surface  water  system’s  water  delivery 
efficiency, location in the canal, rainfall, climate, soil, and other local characteristics that influence 
the crop water demand.  The purpose of the water quota is to provide IDs with a way to allocate 
water and limit the overuse of an area’s water resources. 
Although the quota-based water allocation rules have been designed so that all areas should 
be able to irrigate their crops with the volume of water specified by the quota, some areas exceed 
their quotas.  For example, the average quota in the WID-N is only 1.1 times that in the QID-N 
(table 9.1).  The actual water use in WID-N is 1.8 times that in QID-N (table 9.1).  To the extent 
that  areas  that  exceed  their  quotas  are  being  allowed  to  by  ID  officials,  the  pattern  of  water 
distribution may indicate that the upstream ID, WID-N, has priority in its water allocation over the 
downstream ID, QID-N.  Moreover, the ability to obtain water above the quota may have a large 
impact on a region’s cropping structure.  For example, due to the prioritization in water allocation, 
farmers in the WID-N can plant more rice (because rice demands more water - table 9.1) in its rice 
area than the farmers in the QID-N (table 9.2).  
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WID-N             
    Zhongwei (upper)  31,500  30,000  28,500  11,250  10,500  9,750 
    Zhongning (lower)  31,500  30,000  28,500  11,250  10,500  9,750 
QID-N             
    Qingtongxia (upper)  33,000  31,500  30,000  12,000  11,250  10,500 
    Helan (middle)  28,500  27,000  25,500  10,500  9,750  9,000 















Data source: Ningxia Water Resources Bureau (2001). 
 
Unlike the differences that occur in the execution of water allocation regulations among 
IDs, in some cases water managers allocate water more evenly among upstream and downstream 
areas within IDs.  For example, within the WID-N, the lower reaches actually use more water than 
the upper reaches of the ID (table 8.5).  In this case, the allocation of water across regions within an 
ID occurs even though there is no difference in the water quotas between the upper and lower   141 
regions (table 9.1).  One reason for the observed pattern may be that officials have implemented the 
provincial’s regulation that downstream water has priority. 
However, officials do not always implement all of the regulations.  For example, the actual 
water use in the upstream region of the QID-N is more than 1.7 times that in the downstream region 
(table 8.5).  The water quota in this region is even less than this number (1.2 times--table 9.1).  This 
indicates that unlike the WID-N, officials in the QID-N do not implement the provincial water 
allocation regulations; instead upstream farmers obtain more water over their allocation quotas and 
this results in a larger share of rice area being in the upper region (table 9.2). 
 
Table 9.2.  Cropping patterns in the four sample irrigation districts, Ningxia and Henan 
Provinces, 2001. 
Share of sown area (%) 
Irrigation District 
Wheat  Rice  Maize 
WID-N  25   27   24  
Upper  22   27   21  
Lower  29   27   28  
QID-N  37   19   34  
Upper  35   23   37  
Lower  38   17   32  
PID-H  48   21   18  
Upper  48   50   1  
Lower  49   4   29  
LID-H  50   12   10  
Upper  52   0   21  
Lower  49   21   3  
Data source: See table 5. 
 
The above analysis shows that the implementation effects of water allocation regulations in 
the Ningxia province are complicated; some regions implement the allocation rules as they are 
written while most regions do not.  To the extent that poorer people live in the downstream areas of 
the ID, there is mixed evidence that official regulations are promoting poverty alleviation.  The 
official regulations certainly read as if officials are supposed to send more water to downstream 
regions  and  give  priority  to  vulnerable  groups,  such  as  the  poor.    The  record  in  our  regions, 
however, is mixed.  Officials in one area follow the downstream first rule; those in other areas do 
not.  There is no evidence, on a district-wide scale, except, that water officials purposely give 
priority to the poor.     
 
Allocation among and within the tertiary canals (within the village) 
 
At  the  tertiary  canal  level,  local  water  managers  are  responsible  for  water  allocation.    In  the 
following sections we will more systematically examine the equity and poverty implications of the   142 
different water management forms.  Our field survey found various allocation rules that managers 
used in the course of their water allocation duties. During our survey, we identified four kinds of 
water allocation approaches: equity, efficiency, payment capacity, and no-rule allocations.  The 
way in which each village decides to allocate water most likely has evolved due to a complex set of 
characteristics of the village, the nature of its water resources and the local cropping patterns. 
Explaining why a certain village allocates water in a certain way is beyond the scope of this report.  
Instead, what we are able to do is to describe the fundamental characteristics of the allocation rules 
and examine how many villages have adopted different approaches. 
Equity allocation means that water resources equally allocated to all water users along the 
canal.  The implication of such a rule is that it allows the poor and other vulnerable groups to get 
access to water.  In practice, rules are often promulgated to provide water to those farmers at the 
end of the canals first, and those nearest last.  In our sample, we find that 13 percent of villages use 
this method of water allocation.  
In contrast, the efficiency criteria are adopted in other villages.  According to these criteria, 
village water managers irrigate as water flows into the canal.  When the nearest fields are irrigated 
first, it is physically the most efficient way to allocate water.  Interestingly, despite the emphasis of 
IDs on equity, a much greater number of villages (70%) claim they use the efficiency method of 
water allocation. 
Finally, some villages use other methods.  According to the first come/first served method, 
villages are supposed to provide water to those that ask for it first. We find no villages operate this 
way.  However, there are small number of villages that provide water on a first pay/first served 
basis.  This happens, according to our survey, in only 2 percent of the villages.  In the rest of the 
villages, there are no established rules. 
 
 
AGRICULTURAL WATER PRICING 
 
Despite continuously increasing water prices over the past several decades, China' s agricultural 
water is believed to be much under-priced (Liu 1997; Wang 1997).  In 1997, the national O&M cost 
recovery rate of agricultural water was only 28 percent, while the number for industry water and 
urban  domestic  water  was  over  100  percent  (Ministry  of Water  Resources  2002).
21   Although 
increases in water prices must certainly reflect the rising scarcity of water over time, the current 
level of prices in most agricultural areas cover only a part of the cost of the O&M of China’s 
irrigation systems (Ministry of Water Resources 2002).  There is also reason to believe that the 
price of water is far below its shadow price, or actual value (Ministry of Water Resources 2002).  
Across regions, water prices vary substantially.  For example, in 1997, agricultural water price was 
0.015 yuan/m
3 only in Zhejiang province, one of the richest provinces in water resource, while it 
reached 0.075 yuan/m
3 in the most water-scarce province – Hebei (Ministry of Water Resources 
2002).  
                                                 
21 The O&M cost recovery rate is the ratio of water price (yuan/m
3) over the water supply cost (yuan/m
3).   143 
These  variations  in  water  prices  across  space  arise  for  a  variety  of  reasons.    Unlike 
agricultural commodity prices that are increasingly determined by integrated national markets, the 
price  of  water,  which  is  almost  always  too  costly  to  transport  outside  the  immediate  locality, 
frequently  depends  on  local supply  and  demand  conditions.   Moreover, instead  of  establishing 
water prices for each province, the central government provides general guidelines for the local 
price bureaus and water authorities, the two agencies that are most frequently authorized to set the 
price of surface water.   
Water prices also vary considerably among sectors.  In the same location, the difference in 
water prices for agriculture and industry could be several-fold.  In general, reflecting the high value 
of water in non-agriculture and the reluctance of the government to raise prices in the agricultural 
sector that has a population that is by far poorer than those in the cities, China’s water prices 
generally  increase  as  water  moves  from  agriculture  to  industry  and  from  rural  to  urban.    For 
example, in 1997, the average price of water in industry was 4.7 times that in agriculture and 3.8 
times that in domestic use.  In this way, government policy can be seen to be subsidizing the 
agricultural population, which by itself can be thought of as a pro-poor policy. 
Although the above facts are not new, beyond this little is known about how prices are 
determined locally and what their impact may be on the poor.  Hence, in the rest of this section, we 
discuss agricultural water pricing in our study areas.  Given the complex nature of water pricing in 
China, changes in water price policies in our study area may reflect some common trends in the rest 
of China, but it should be noted that such generalizations should be made with caution since China 
is a relatively decentralized place.  
 
WATER PRICING STRUCTURE IN NINGXIA AND HENAN PROVINCES 
 
Measuring water use is a universal problem in all countries.  More difficulty is encountered when 
the users are millions of small farmers.  Early in the 1980s, in order to improve the water use 
efficiency, China’s Government had begun to encourage local governments to adopt the volumetric 
water pricing approaches (Ministry of Water Resources 2002).  However, due to high transaction 
costs and rigorous requirement of the measurement facilities, this policy has not been implemented 
in most provinces, especially at the farm-gate.   
With the inherent difficulties involved with pricing water volumetrically, a number of ways 
have emerged in the Yellow River Basin to price agricultural water.  At the farm level, water is 
most frequently priced on the basis of total area irrigated.  In our sample, 79 percent of the villages 
have their farmers pay for their surface water on this basis.  Although there is no distinction made 
between the type of crop grown on the plot at the farm level, since the water fee is calculated by the 
mix of the volumetric water fee and fixed water fee in the Ningxia Province; the per land unit water 
fee of the villages in Ningxia Province is higher for water-using crops, such as rice, due to higher 
volumetric water fee for rice than for dry crops (table 9.3).  In a few villages a number of other   144 
price rules are used, such as a water fee based on the number people in the household (13% of the 
villages), the amount of time it took to irrigate (12% of the villages).
22  
 
Table 9.3.  Water prices in gravity irrigation systems in Ningxia Province, 1981 to 2000. 
 
In current prices     In real prices (2000 prices)  
Volumetric price (yuan/m




quota   Over 30% quota  
Basic fee 
(yuan/ha)    Within 




1981  0.0005  \  15    0.002  \  56.4 
1983  0.001  na  15    0.004  na  54.2 
1989  0.002  na  21    0.004  na  41.7 
















Note: na = not available. 
Data source: Ningxia Water Resources Bureau (2000). 
 
The policy has had more effect at the point where water is transferred from the ID to the 
village.  For example, since 1983, in both the Ningxia IDs, officials implemented a volumetric 
water-pricing policy and set up a two-tier water pricing system.  The first part is volumetric water 
price measured at outlets of the main or branch canals and is set at a level that is supposed to cover 
the variable costs associated with the supply of water.  The second part, the basic water fee, is set at 
a level that is equal to the value of the labor required for canal maintenance.  The first part of water 
fee is mainly used to cover the salaries of the ID staff and for other expenses associated with the 
operation and maintenance of the main and branch canals; the second part is mainly used to pay the 
wages of those hired to maintain the canals. 
When setting water fees before 2000, Ningxia provincial level officials did not include a 
part to cover the maintenance of the system’s tertiary canals.  At that time tertiary canal O&M 
expenditure mainly came from the budgetary allocations of local governments and from the water 
fees collected by the leaders of the collectives directly from the farmers.  However, this part of the 
maintenance fees depended on the financial strength of local governments.  In the case of many 
poor areas that were chronically in deficit, such work was often delayed or completely ignored.  As 
a result, the maintenance of canals has not always performed well. 
In 2000, however, the structure of water pricing was changed to address the problem of 
China’s deteriorating infrastructure, especially in tertiary canals.  To do so, officials allowed local 
government officials to raise the basic water fee to include an additional part.  However, limits were 
placed on the magnitude of the fee increase.  Water maintenance and management fees could not 
exceed 90 yuan per hectare.  The County Water Resources Bureaus got to keep 40 percent of the 
new  fee;  the  Township  Water  Management  Stations  got  to  keep  the  other  60  percent.    The 
                                                 
22 Mainly for  pump irrigation.   145 
collection of the additional fees was designed not only to improve the O&M of the tertiary canals 
(from that part collected by the township water management station), but also was supposed to be 
used to promote water management reforms that were scheduled to be implemented in 2001. 
Based on table 9.1, we calculated the average water quota for rice and dry crops in Ningxia, 
as 29,000 m
3 and 10,250 m
3 per hectare, respectively.  Assuming that each year’s water quota is 
same, we transferred the volumetric price into the per hectare water fee.  Based on this calculation, 
we found that the share of rice volumetric water fee over the total water fee increased from 49 
percent in 1981 to 70 percent in 2000, the number for the dry crops was from 25 percent to 45 
percent  in  the  same  year.    The  increasing  share  of  the  volumetric  water  pricing  implies  that 
volumetric water pricing has become a more and more important economic instrument in adjusting 
water use behaviors.  Applying water pricing incentive mechanism to realize the water saving 
objective has been an important water policy in the Ningxia Province, especially after 2000. 
In  order  to  reduce  waste  of  water  resources,  Ningxia  provincial  officials  have  also 
gradually adopted a progressively priced water pricing structure since 1983.  Under this system, 
when water is used in excess of a certain amount for a certain type of crop or in a certain area, a 
higher price in charged for the water used in excess of the standard.  Initially, however, the use of 
progressive pricing was scattered and not implemented regularly.  In 1994, however, a series of 
policy measures clarified the policy and the government began to encourage its use.  Regulations 
stipulated that if water use exceeded the quota by more than 30 percent, the volumetric water price 
would increase by 67 percent, from 0.006 yuan/m
3 to 0.01 yuan/m
3.  Encouraged by the results, in 
2000, the gap between the quota and above-quota price increased from 0.004 to 0.005 (although 
since both the quota and above quota prices were raised to 0.012 yuan/m
3 and 0.017 yuan/m
3, the 
relative price of the above-quota prices fell to 42% (table 9.4).  
 
 
Table 9.4.  Water fees measured on a per land unit basis (yuan/ha) in the Liuyuankou 
Irrigation District, Henan Province, 1983 to 2000. 
 
In current prices      In real prices (2000 prices) 
Year 
Paddy   Dry crop       Paddy   Dry crop  
 
1983  75  30    271  108 
1987  120  75    334  209 
1990  135  90    257  171 












Data source: Management Agency of the Liuyuankou Irrigation District (2000).  
 
In contrast with the relatively complex water pricing structure in the Ningxia province, 
water  prices in  Henan are  set  on the  basis  of  a relatively  simple  formula.    In  the  LID-H,  for 
example, the price is only based on the cropped cultivated area.  Part of the reason for relying on   146 
such  a  simple  pricing  structure  may  be  related  to  the  lack  of  means  to  measure  water 
volumetrically.  Moreover, the sandy soil that is common in the ID compounds the difficulties in 
making accurate measurements.  Another reason may be that since the Henan Province is located in 
the downstream part of the YRB, the government is putting less pressure on them to save water to 
be freed up for the provinces in the lower reaches.   
The division of the water fees in Henan by the agencies that use the funds for funding the 
various water-related services is just as complicated as in Ningxia.  Since one of the Henan IDs, 
LID-H, is directly managed by the county water resources bureau, the water fees are divided among 
the township government, county water resources bureau, and upper level government.  In 2000, 
after being collected by the village and remitted to the township, 30 percent of the water fees was 
retained by the township government to be used for supporting the maintenance of facilities and 
staff salaries.  The other 70 percent is submitted by the township to the county water resources 
bureau.  Of the amount sent to the county, 4 percent is used for providing bonuses to township 
irrigation staff if they meet irrigation fee collection; 50 percent is paid to the YRB commission as a 
Yellow  River  water  resources  fee;  15  percent  is  used  for  the  provincial  and  municipal  price 
differences (since the water fee in the LID-H is lower than that at the provincial and municipal 
levels); and 31 percent is used for the O&M of the system.  Although the share of fees that is used 
for maintenance of the tertiary canals, (which belong to the township government), is much the 
same as in Ningxia prior to 2000.  Local governments facing chronic budget shortfalls tend to shirk 
on their maintenance work.  When shrinking government investment is combined with relatively 
low prices and lack of progressive pricing, the system produces a low O&M cost recovery rate 
(19%).                                           
 
OVER TIME AND CROSS VARIATION OF WATER PRICE IN NINGXIA AND 
LID-H 
 
As  policies  towards  prices  vary  both  over  time  and  across  provinces,  water  charges  also  vary 
considerably across time and space (table 9.5).  Prices in both Ningxia and Henan have risen over 
time.  Most notably, the upward trend in prices has accelerated since the 1990s, a reflection of the 
fact that policies have encouraged higher water prices during the 1990s.  Clearly, as leaders have 
begun to understand better markets and farmer response to price signals, their willingness to raise 
prices to encourage the more efficient use of water has risen.  
Water  prices  also  vary  across  IDs  for  a  number  of  reasons,  the  greatest  being  due  to 
variation in cropping patterns (table 9.2).  For example, water fees differ between the upper and 
lower reaches of IDs within provinces and among provinces.  In particular, water fees are higher in 
the upper reaches than those in the lower reaches.  Most likely these fee differences are due to 
cropping pattern differences.  Among our 4 IDs, our data shows that the share of rice area is higher 
in the upper reach than in the lower reach.  Since the price of water for rice is higher than that of the 
dry crops, it is not hard to understand why water fees are higher in the upstream areas.     147 
 
Table 9.5.  Water fees (yuan/ha) in the four sample irrigation districts, Ningxia and Henan 
Provinces, 1990 to 2001. 
 
  Irrigation district  
    WID-N  QID-N  PID-H  LID-H 
 
In current prices          
1990  240   202   212   135  
1995  428   300   253   164  
2001  556   489   279   212  
 
In real 2001 prices          
1990  460  386  405  259 












Data source: Authors’ survey. 
 
WATER FEE COLLECTION 
 
One  of  the  major  problems  facing  water  management  in  China’s  villages  is  the  difficulty  of 
collecting water fees.  Based on our field survey, for most collectives, nearly 20 percent of water 
fees  cannot  be  collected.    Especially  as  tax  and  fee  collection  regulations  have  become  more 
common and stricter (in essence, limiting the amount and way that village leaders collect fees from 
farmers), collecting water fee has become an increasing burden on village leaders, especially when 
they manage water collectively.  Although we do not have data to show this, conversations with 
farmers and leaders show that the problem is complicated.  From the farmers’ point of view, their 
unwillingness to pay stems from the poor services that they believe they have received.  From the 
village  leader’s  point  of  view  since  they  face  few  incentives  and  since  farmers  are  frequently 
reluctant to pay for water (at least without a great amount of effort on their part), they feel that 
farmers do not deserve any special service.  
Moreover,  the  lack  of  ability  to  collect  fees  on  time  sometimes  becomes  a  long-term 
problem that creates problems in subsequent periods and further complicates water management.  
When farmers do not pay, in order to meet the village’s obligation to the ID (which is required if the 
village wants to get water deliveries in the next period), some villages draw on their general funds, 
borrow from local enterprises or individuals or have to take a loan from the bank or local rural 
credit cooperative.  To service the interest on the loan, however, leaders frequently must add the 
interest payments onto the farmer’s water charge, an action that invariably leads to higher water 
fees and more complaints by farmers.  In some cases, in which the villages have not paid the ID in a   148 
timely manner, the ID cuts water deliveries or at least gives the village less water or less timely 
service.  
Given the pervasiveness and magnitude of the problem, water management reform is often 
triggered  by  the  fee  collection  difficulties.    It  is  thought  that  compared  with  collective  water 
management, the contracting and the Water Users Association (WUA) institutions facilitate the 
problem of fee collection.  However our field data indicate that the WUA only collects a slightly 
higher percentage than the collective.  Contracting water managers, in contrast, collect all but six 
percent.  
Although  our  research  team  needs  to  do  more  rigorous  research  before  anything 
definitively  can  be  proved,  we  believe  that  alternative  water  organizations  facilitate  water  fee 
collection for two reasons.  First, as part of the new water management package, water fees are 
frequently reduced, which almost certainly contributes to easier fee collection.  Likewise, to the 
extent that water management is improved, fees will also be easier to collect.  Most poignantly, 
however, one of the most important reasons for better fee collection is that when private individuals 
have their compensation based on fee collection, there is more effort that is put into this task.  
Moreover, when private individuals deliver services, the entitlement to access to service weakens.  
In other words, farmers may believe that village leaders in their role as collective heads, would 
never cut delivery of a critical service, such as water for the crops.  In our field survey only 5 
percent of villages adopted such an approach to deal with this issue.  Private water managers, 
however, have less of an incentive to keep delivering water, should a farmer not pay.  Our field 
survey  indicates  that  14  percent  of WUAs  and  9  percent  of  contractors  would  like  to  cut  the 
farmers’ water delivery if farmers cannot pay the water fee.  Therefore, evidence show that the 





Water rights, allocation and pricing issues are major concerns of this chapter.  In China,  water 
ownership belongs to the State and  water rights are not associated with land rights.  In response to 
increasing water use conflicts among upstream and downstream IDs and other users, China has 
been trying various means to deal with the problems that have been created by its open-access 
water resources in the YRB.  Faced with increasing water scarcity, policy makers intend to adopt 
measures combining both direct administrative intervention (cuts in water in the upstream regions) 
and market measures (by increasing water prices in upstream areas).   
The issues surrounding water allocation among the provinces are similar to those among 
the main and branch canals within an ID.  The basic water allocation rule is to allocate water by 
comprehensively  considering  water  volume,  canal  capacity,  water  quota  and  water  delivery 
efficiency while abiding with the allocation principles.  Although the quota-based water allocation 
rules have been designed so that all areas should be able to irrigate their crops with the volume of 
water specified by the quota, some areas exceed their quotas.  At the tertiary canal level, local water 
managers are responsible for water allocation.  Our field survey found various allocation rules that   149 
managers used in the course of their water allocation duties. During our survey, we identified four 
kinds of water allocation approaches: equity, efficiency, payment capacity, and no-rule allocations. 
Despite  continuously  increasing  water  prices  over  the  past  several  decades,  China' s 
agricultural water is believed to be much under-priced.  Water prices vary considerably among 
sectors and over time.  With the inherent difficulties involved in pricing water volumetrically, a 
number of ways have emerged in the Yellow River Basin to price agricultural water.  Given the 
pervasiveness and magnitude of the problem, water management reform is often triggered by the 




 Water Management Reforms: Implications for the Poor 
 
In this chapter, we have three purposes.
23  First, we track the evolution of water management 
reforms and seek to identify the incentive mechanisms that encourage water managers to more 
efficiently use water.  Second, we identify the impact of water management reforms on crop water 
use, the primary motivation of the policy.  Finally, the paper explores how changes in China’s 
water management institutions also affect agricultural production, farmer income and poverty.   
 
 
REFORM AND THE EVOLUTION OF WATER MANAGEMENT 
 
Based on our field surveys, after upper-level officials began implementing the reforms, surface 
water is managed in three ways.  If the village leadership through the village committee directly 
takes  responsibility  for  water  allocation,  canal  operation  and  maintenance  (O&M)  and  fee 
collection, the village’s irrigation system is said to be run by ‘collective management’, the system 
that essentially has allocated water in most of China’s villages during the People’s Republic period.  
A WUA is theoretically a farmer-based, participatory organization that is set up to manage the 
village’s irrigation water.  In WUAs a member-elected board is supposed to be assigned the control 
rights over the village’s water.  ‘Contracting’ is a system in which the village leadership establishes 
a contract with an individual to manage the village’s water.   
According  to  our  data,  since  the  early  1990s  and  especially  after  1995,  reform  has 
successively established WUAs and contracting in the place of collective management (table 10.1).  
The share of collective management declined from 91 percent in 1990 to 64 percent in 2001 (table 
10.1, column 5).  Across our sample, contracting has developed more rapidly than WUAs.  By 
2001, 22 percent of villages managed their water under contracting and 14 percent through WUAs.  
Assuming that the results from our sample reflect the more general trends across north China, the 
somewhat more rapid emergence of contracting may be due to the ease of setting the system up and 
the similarities of the reforms to the other reforms that have unfolded in rural China (Nyberg and 
Rozelle 1999).
24   
 
                                                 
23 Data applied in this chapter are from 51 villages instead of 56 villages; since there is no surface water irrigation in the 
other 5 villages we dropped them.  Finally, data from 51 villages, 189 households and 378 plots have been used in this 
section’s analysis. 
24 During China’s economic reforms, many government services have been contracted out to private individuals, 
including grain procurement, extension and health services.   151 
 
Table 10.1. Surface water management in the sample villages of the four selected irrigation districts, 
Ningxia and Henan Provinces, 1990 – 2001. 
Ningxia    Henan   
 
WID-N  QID-N    PID-H  LID-H   
Total 
1990        (percent)       
Collective  100  81    100  100    91 
WUA  0  5    0  0    3 
Contracting  0  14    0  0    6 
               
1995               
Collective  100  72    100  100    87 
WUA  0  10    0  0    6 
Contracting  0  18    0  0    7 
               
2001               
Collective  27  51    92  100    64 
WUA  50  14    0  0    14 
Contracting  23  35    8  0    22 
 
Data source: Authors’ survey. 
 
 
While there has been a shift from collective management to WUAs and contracting during 
the past 5 years, water management reform still varies across the four sample IDs.  WUAs and 
contracting have developed more rapidly in Ningxia than in Henan (table 10.1).  For example, in 
1995, the collective ran 100 percent of the water management institutions in one of  Ningxia IDs 
(WID-N) (table 10.1, column 1).  By 2001, however, the collective managed water in only 27 
percent of the sample villages.  WUAs managed water for about 23 percent of the villages and 
contracting managed water in approximately 50 percent.  In Ningxia’s other sample ID (QID-N), 
the share of villages under WUAs and contracting approached 49 percent, almost the same as those 
under collective management (table 10.1, column 2).  In contrast, significantly less reform occurred 
in Henan.  Only eight percent of the villages in one of the sample IDs (PID-H) and none in the 
other (LID-H) have moved to either contracting or WUAs (table 10.1, columns 3 and 4).   
Based on our field survey, although some of the differences in water management among 
the IDs may be due to the characteristics of local villages and local water management initiatives, 
the  dramatic  differences  between  Ningxia  and  Henan  Provinces  suggest  that  upper-level 
government  policy  may  be  playing  an  important  role.    In  2000,  in  order  to  promote  water 
management reform, Ningxia provincial water officials issued several documents that encouraged 
localities to proceed with water management reform (Wang 2002).  Regional water officials exerted 
considerable effort to promote water management reform in a number of experimental areas.  The 
sharp  shift  away  from  collective  management  is  consistent  with  the  interpretation  that  these   152 
measures were effective in pushing (or at least relaxed the constraints that were holding back) 
reform.   
The differences among the villages in Ningxia and variations in the way that different 
regions implemented the reforms (i.e., some moved to contracting while others shifted to WUAs), 
however, show that the reforms are far from universal.  In fact, this is what would be expected in 
China,  a  nation  that  often  allows  local  governments  considerable  room  in  making  their  own 
decisions on the exact form and timing of institutional changes (Jin, Qian and Weingast 2000).  In 
contrast, neither the Henan provincial government nor any of the prefectural governments have 
issued directives mandating reforms.   
 
 
VARIATION IN GOVERNANCE OF VARIOUS WATER MANAGEMENT FORMS  
 
While the shift in China’s water management institutions demonstrate that the nation’s communities 
are following policy directives that are being developed and issued from upper-level governments, 
when local leaders set up their organizational frameworks in their villages, practice often varies 
from theory.  For example, in practice, at least in the early stages of the development of WUAs (the 
only stage of the organizations that we are observing since this type of management is so new), the 
organization of most WUAs varies sharply from theory.  In most cases (70% of the WUAs), the 
governing board of the WUA was the village leadership itself.  In a minority share of the cases 
(30% of the WUAs), village leaders appointed a chair or manager to carry out the day-to-day duties 
of the WUAs.  In many of these WUAs that had village-appointed leaders, however, the manager 
actually had close ties with the village leadership, more than half being a leader in an earlier time 
period.  In other words, at least in terms of the composition of the management team, most WUAs 
differ little from collective management.   
An  examination  of  the  way  managers  are  compensated  perhaps  shows  the  greatest 
difference between theory and practice.  To show this, however, we need to understand the way 
farmers pay fees, managers are compensated and how IDs are paid.  In fact, water management 
reform has created a complicated system of fees, payments and charges that embody the primary 
incentives for the managers to save water.  Water fees collected from farmers include two parts: 
basic water fees associated with the fixed quantity of land in the village and volumetric water fees 
associated with the volume of water use.  Set by water bureau officials, the farmer is required to 
pay the basic water fee (which is based on his land holdings) and part of the basic water fee belongs 
to the water manager after it is collected.  This part of the manager’s compensation is paid to him as 
a fixed payment and provides little or no direct incentives to save water.
25     
Upper-level officials, however, can use the other part of the water fee to provide managers 
with more direct incentives.  Prior to the farming year, ID officials determine (on the basis of 
historic use patterns and other criteria) a targeted amount of water that a village should use (called 
the target quantity).  Based on a per cubic meter charge, the total value of the expected water use 
                                                 
25 Once the manager collects that total fee from the farmer, he turns the basic fee part to the village accountant who in turn 
sends it to the township that is supposed to use the funds to maintain the township’s canal infrastructure.   153 
for the village is then divided by the village’s total quantity of land and this volumetric water fee is 
added to the basic water fee to create the farmer’s total water fee.  As can be seen, the volumetric 
water fee also provides the farmer no incentives to save water since he pays a fixed fee for each 
hectare of land.  The water manager in some communities, in contrast, does have an incentive.  In 
implementing water management reform ID officials agree that the water manager only has to pay 
the per cubic meter charge for the water that is actually used (actual quantity).  If the actual quantity 
of water delivered to the village (at the request of the water manager) is less than the targeted 
quantity, the difference between the volumetric fee that is collected from the farmers and that which 
he pays for the water is his excess profit.  The excess profit is an amount that is earned by the 
manager beyond the fixed payment.  
According  to  our  data,  there  are  sharp  differences  in  the  way  that  villages  have 
implemented the incentives part of the reform packages, regardless of whether they are WUAs or 
contracting (table 10.2).  For example, in 2001, on an average, leaders in only 41 percent of villages 
offered WUA and contracting (or non-collective) managers with incentives that could be expected 
to induce managers to exert efforts to save water in order to earn an excess profit (table 10.2, row 
1).  In the rest of the villages, although there was a nominal shift in the institution type (that is 
leaders claimed that they were implementing WUAs or contracting), in fact, from an incentives 
point of view, the WUA and contracting managers faced no incentives (table 10.2, row 1).  In these 
villages, water managers are like village leaders in a collectively managed system, in that, they do 
not have a financial incentive to save water.  The incentives offered to the managers also differed 
across IDs (table 10.2, rows 2 to 6).  Hence, to the extent that the incentives are the most important 
part of the reform, the differences across time and space mean that it would not be surprising if in 
some villages WUAs and contracting were more effective at saving water than in other villages.   
Table 10.2.  Incentives mechanism of WUAs and contracting in the sample irrigation districts, 
2001. 
Percentage of samples (%) 
 
With incentives  Without incentives  Total 
Whole samples       
WUA and Contracting  41  59  100 
       
Ningxia Province       
WID-N       
WUA  25  75  100 
     Contracting  0  100  100 
       
QID-N       
WUA  25  75  100 
    Contracting  76  24  100 
       
Henan Province       
PID-H       
Contracting  0  100  100 
 
Data source: Authors’ survey. 
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WATER MANAGEMENT AND CROP WATER USE 
Statistic Description 
 
Although the major objective of water management reform is to save water, descriptive statistics 
using our data show that water use in some areas that have established WUAs and contracting is 
lower than those areas still under collective management, and higher in others (table 10.3).  For 
example, in the QID-N in Ningxia (ID2), the water use per hectare in areas that have reformed 
(WUAs and contracting) is lower than those areas in which the collective still manages the water 
(table 10.3, rows 5 and 6 versus row 4). However, in Ningxia’s other ID (WID-N) and in Henan, 
water use per hectare is higher in those villages that have shifted to WUAs or contracting (table 




While the effectiveness of changing from collective to non-collective management in terms 
of water saving is not clear, our data shows the importance of policy implemention.  In particular, 
the importance of incentives in making the reforms work is shown when comparing water use in 
 
Table 10.3.  Relationship between surface water management and crop water use in the four sample 
irrigation districts, Ningxia and Henan Provinces, 2001. 






   Collective  21,924 
WUA  23,460 
    Contracting  30,969 
QID-N   
   Collective  16,549 
WUA  15,483 





Collective  13,052 
 Contracting  17,113 
LID-H   
Collective  8,450 
 
Data source: Authors’ survey.   155 
those villages that provide their water managers with incentives as against those that do not (table 
10.4).  After reform, when managers face incentives to earn profits by saving water, water use per 
hectare  fell  by  nearly  10  percent  when  compared  to  collectively  managed  systems  across  our 
Ningxia sample (table 10.4, row 1, columns 1 and 3).  In contrast, when leaders implement water 
management reform without providing incentives, water use rises (table 10.4, column 2).  When 
examining the individual IDs in Ningxia, we also find that in both cases water use falls more (or 
does not rise as much) when incentives are provided during reform than when they are not.  In 
QID-N, for example, water use falls in both non-collective systems with and without incentives, but 
it falls further for those with incentives (table 10.4, row 3).  In WID-N, although water use in both 
the non-collective systems rises, it rises less for those with incentives (table 10.4, row 2).  We also 
find that the same patterns occur when examining individual crops (table 10.4, rows 4 to 6).   
 
Table 10.4.  Relationship between incentive mechanism and crop water use in the sample irrigation 
districts of Ningxia Province, 2001. 
 
Crop water use (m
3/ha) 




incentives  Collective 
Ningxia Province       
Whole samples  12,729  20,598  14,003 
       
WID-N   25,055  26,583  21,924 
QID-N   11,188  14,711  16,549 
       
Wheat  5,619  7,416  7,489 
Maize  7,004  7,704  7,266 
Paddy  31,307  31,688  36,949 
       
   
Data source: Author' s survey. 
 
 
While our descriptive analysis shows that there is a positive correlation between incentives 
and water savings, in fact, there can be many other factors that are correlated with incentives that 
are creating the tendency of incentives and water savings to move together.  In particular, it can be 
that cropping structure, the nature of the canal system’s investment and the scarcity of water may 
affect the managerial type, the way that reforms are implemented and water use.  As a result, 
multivariate analysis is required to analyze the relationship between water management reform and 
water use and other outcomes.     156 
 
MULTIVARIATE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
 
Based on the above discussion, the link between water use per hectare and its determinants can be 
represented by the following equation: 
    jk w  =  jk jk jk k D Z M e g b a + + + +                 (equation 10.1) 
where wjk represents average water use per hectare for household j in village k.  The rest of the 
variables are those that explain water use: Mk, our variable of interest, measures either the type of 
the water management institution or the nature of the incentives faced by the water manager; Zjk, a 
matrix of control variables, represents other village and household factors that affect water use.  
Specifically,  we  include  a  number  of  variables  to  hold  constant  the  nature  of  the  village’s 
production environment and its cropping structure.  We include variables such as the source of 
water (either surface or ground), the degree of water scarcity and the level of irrigation investment 
per  hectare  to  measure  the  production  environment.    Cropping  structure  is  measured  as  the 
proportion of the village’s sown area that is in rice.  Household characteristics include age and 
education of the household head and land endowment. Finally, our model also includes Djk, a 
dummy  variable  representing  the  ID  that  serves  the  household.  The  symbols  ￿,  ￿,  and  ￿  are 
parameters to be estimated and ￿jk  is the error term that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
other explanatory variables in our initial equations, an assumption that we subsequently relax. 
Our empirical estimation performs well for our water use model (table 10.5).  The goodness 
of  fit  measure,  the  adjusted  R
2,  around  0.45,  is  sufficiently  high  for  analyses  that  use  cross- 
sectional household data.  Many coefficients on our control variables have the expected signs and 
are  statistically  significant.    For  example,  we  find  that  after  holding  constant  other  factors, 
households that are in villages with more rice area use more water per hectare than other crops.  We 
also find that those villages that face more severe water shortages use less water per hectare.   157 
 
Table 10.5.  Determinants of crop water use at the household level. 
 
Water use per hectare 
 
OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS  OLS 
-1,311.036  -1,919.847        Share of WUA 
(0.70)  (1.00)       
-703.677  -2,468.590        Share of contracting  (0.49)  (1.34)       
    -2,843.730  -6,355.798    Share of non-collective with 
incentives      (1.72)*  (1.99)**   
    275.206  1,107.587    Share of non-collective without 
incentives      (0.18)  (0.43)   
        -1,437.970  Share of WUA with incentives          (0.36) 
        -1,183.625  Share of WUA without incentives          (0.62) 
        -3,136.275  Share of contracting with 
incentives          (1.74)* 
        1,996.519  Share of contracting without 
incentives          (1.06) 
2,390.651  2,560.447  2,141.794  2,494.746  1,661.746  Share of surface water irrigation 
in the village  (0.99)  (1.08)  (0.90)  (1.06)  (0.69) 
-3,574.071  -3,463.464  -3,811.787  -3,533.920  -3,872.363  Dummy of village water scarcity  (3.13)***  (3.03)***  (3.34)***  (3.13)***  (3.38)*** 
-0.107  -0.114  -0.055  0.032  -0.104  Irrigation investment per hectare 
in the village  (1.01)  (1.11)  (0.52)  (0.23)  (0.66) 
10,592.172  10,655.043  10,430.425  10,437.281  10,017.102  Share of village paddy area in 
1995  (4.18)***  (4.23)***  (4.17)***  (4.18)***  (3.92)*** 
519.380  551.829  447.423  517.174  424.895  Age of household head  (1.17)  (1.25)  (1.02)  (1.18)  (0.96) 
-6.282  -6.705  -5.610  -6.296  -5.230  Squared age of household head  (1.28)  (1.37)  (1.15)  (1.29)  (1.07) 
-81.947  -79.195  -78.691  -58.589  -62.044  Education of household head  (0.50)  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.36)  (0.38) 
-10,486.693  -8,964.478  -7,920.360  -6,326.932  -7,574.179  Arable land per hectare of 
household  (2.23)**  (1.89)*  (1.64)  (1.26)  (1.56) 
-9,888.333  -9,968.427  -8,921.639  -8,512.471  -8,886.488  QID-N  (6.50)***  (6.69)***  (5.97)***  (4.90)***  (5.66)*** 
-11,151.005  -11,587.766  -10,468.396  -10,214.118  -10,914.394  PID-H  (4.94)***  (5.12)***  (4.81)***  (4.19)***  (4.87)*** 
-15,752.440  -16,105.004  -15,126.321  -14,819.640  -15,523.975  LID-H  (5.68)***  (5.82)***  (5.60)***  (5.12)***  (5.64)*** 
14,261.399  13,821.536  15,130.403  12,514.529  15,861.024  Constant  (1.43)  (1.39)  (1.53)  (1.27)  (1.59) 
Observations  189  189  189  189  189 
Adjusted R-squared  0.44  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
 
After  holding  constant  other  factors,  our  results  show  that  the  mere  fact  of  shifting 
management from the collective to either a WUA system or contracting by itself does not lead to 
water  savings  (table  10.5,  column  1).    In  fact,  the signs  on  the  coefficients of  the  WUA  and 
contracting variables are negative, suggesting that water use is lower in villages that have moved to 
non-collective management (table 10.5, rows 1 and 2).  However, the standard errors are all large 
relative to the magnitude of the coefficients, which implies that nominal institutional reform has no 
significant impact on saving water.    158 
When officials provide water managers with incentives, regardless of whether they shifted 
to WUA or contract management, managers appear to reduce water deliveries in the village (table 
10.5, column 2).  Econometric results show that the coefficient on the incentive indicator variable is 
negative  and  significant  (although  only  at  the  10%  level),  when  compared  to  the  collective 
management, the omitted institutional type (table 10.5, row 3).  In other words, without regard to 
the form of the water management institution, if managers face positive incentives, water use per 
hectare can be reduced by nearly 3,000 cubic meters, about 20 percent of their typical water use.  
Significant incentive can also be found when examining water management type separately (table 
10.5, column 5) 
Although interesting, it is possible that the estimated parameter is biased since water use 
per hectare and water management may be determined simultaneously with water use or that the 
estimated coefficient is affected by unobserved heterogeneity.  For example, it is possible that in 
areas that are facing rising demand for water from cities, farmers naturally reduce water use in 
anticipation of future water restrictions.  At the same time, village leaders in the areas may also be 
trying to forestall the shortages by adopting new institutional arrangements to show that they are 
concerned  about  the  pending  water  crisis.    In  such  a  situation,  the  coefficient  on  the  water 
management institution (or incentive) variable could be negative, even if the institution itself has no 
effect.   
In order to control the potential endogeneity of water management types and incentives in 
the water use equation, we adopt an instrumental variable approach.  To do so, prior to estimating 
equation (10.1), we can regress a set of variables on the water management institution variable, Mk: 
    k M =  k k k Z IV e g b a + + +                               (equation 10.2) 
where the predicted value of Mk from equation (10.2),  k M ˆ , would replace Wk in equation 
(10.1).  Equation (10.2) includes Zk, which are measures other village-level control variables (which 
are the same as those in equation 1 – e.g., measures of the village’s production environment and 
cropping structure).     
This IV procedure, however is only valid if the variables in the IV matrix in equation (10.2) 
meet the definition of instruments.  The key IV in equation (10.2) that we use to address the 
endogeneity  problem  is  a  variable  (Pk)  that  measures  the  effect  of  the  decision  of  regional 
policymakers to push water management reform in village k.  Such a measure should function well 
as an instrument, especially in our setting, since the officials that were responsible for promoting 
water management reform believed that at least in the short run they were choosing villages on a 
fairly random basis.  An official in one ID told us that initially he went to villages in which he 
personally knew the local officials.  If the spectrum of the aquaintances of the typical water system 
officials are independent of the amount of water used in the village, our policy variable should meet 
the criteria of an instrumental variable: it is correlated with the decision of a village to participate in 
water management reform but does not have an effect on water use (or income or crop production)   159 
except through the influence of the reform.  We also include the age and education of the village 
leader as IVs.
26    
Examining the results of equation (10.2) by itself, the model performs well (table 10.6).  
The adjusted R-squares range from 0.23 to 0.94.  Importantly, the results show that water policy 
intervention variable, Pk, is positive and statistically significant; the variable meets the first criteria 
of an IV.  Although the coefficient on the variables measuring village leader characteristics are 
insignificant, the Hausman test of exclusion restrictions that are designed to test the validity of the 
instruments show that our instruments are statistically valid and meet the second criteria of IVs.
27   
When putting the predicted value of the water management variable into the water use 
model in equation (10.1), our results change a little and largely support the findings from the OLS 
model (table 10.5, columns 3 and 4).  Compared with the OLS estimation, the statistic of the 
estimated coefficient on the incentive variable actually rises (table 10.5, row 3).  The magnitude of 
the coefficient also suggests that the savings from providing incentives are large, and in fact even 
greater.  Holding other variables constant, in the villages in which leaders offer managers positive 
incentives, water use declines more than 6,000 cubic meter per hectare, about 40 percent of average 
water use (table 10.5, row 3, column 4).   
                                                 
26 We include village leader characteristics as IVs, following Brandt et al. (2003) and Li (1998).  In these papers, the 
authors claim that village leader characteristics may affect reform in the village, but their characteristics would not have 
an independent effect on production decisions (in our case, water use).   
27 To test if the set of identifying instruments are exogenous, a Lagrange multiplier test can be used (Hausman).  The chi-
square-distributed test statistic with three degree of freedom, is N*R
2, where N is the number of observations, and R
2 is 
the measure of goodness-of-fit of the regression of the residues from the institutional equation (4.2) on the variables 
which are exogenous to the system.  The test statistics are 0.00 for WUAs, 0.05 for contracting, 1.36 for non-collective 
with incentives and 2.27 for non-collective without incentives.  The test results indicate the null hypothesis that there is no 
correlation between the exogenous instruments and the disturbance term from institutional equation (2) cannot be 
rejected.   160 
 
Table 10.6.  Determinants of water management institution at the village level. 







0.864  0.670  0.212  0.424  Dummy of government 
intervention  (22.43)***  (7.72)***  (2.10)**  (4.53)*** 
0.000  -0.017  -0.013  -0.003  Age of village leader  (0.21)  (3.32)***  (1.80)*  (0.47) 
0.002  -0.005  -0.029  0.021  Education of village leader  (0.45)  (0.37)  (1.43)  (1.13) 
0.004  0.182  -0.078  0.263  Share of surface water 
irrigation in the village  (0.08)  (1.23)  (0.38)  (1.39) 
-0.001  0.086  0.015  0.060  Dummy of village water 
scarcity  (0.06)  (1.16)  (0.15)  (0.63) 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  Irrigation investment per 
hectare in the village  (10.43)***  (0.54)  (2.40)**  (0.28) 
0.016  -0.051  -0.055  0.043  Share of village paddy area in 
1995  (0.27)  (0.32)  (0.25)  (0.21) 
-0.038  -0.162  0.208  -0.464  QID-N  (1.01)  (1.53)  (1.45)  (3.49)*** 
-0.032  0.092  0.042  -0.095  PID-H  (0.60)  (0.64)  (0.20)  (0.48) 
-0.037  -0.002  0.038  -0.176  LID-H  (0.57)  (0.01)  (0.15)  (0.74) 
-0.067  0.716  0.770  -0.001  Constant  (0.53)  (2.00)*  (1.53)  (0.00) 
Observations  51  51  51  51 
Adjusted R-squared  0.94  0.65  0.23  0.42 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
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WATER MANAGEMENT, PRODUCTION, INCOME AND POVERTY 
Statistic Description 
 
Water management reform, at least when implemented as designed, leads to water saving and meets 
the primary goal of water sector officials.  However, it is possible that the success from such a 
policy can only come at a cost, either in terms of falling production or income or increased poverty.  
In this section, we examine how water management reform affects agricultural production.  We 
then examine its impact on income and the incidence of poverty.  
Descriptive  statistics  from  our  data  show  that  water  management  reform  negatively 
influences  agricultural  production  (table  10.7,  rows  1  to  3).    Compared  with  collective 
management, in the villages that provide incentives to managers to save water, wheat yields decline 
by nearly 10 percent.  Maize and rice yields also decline by 9 and 12 percent, respectively.  The 
negative effect of incentives on production is even clearer when comparing the yields between 
villages that nominally implement reforms but do not provide incentives to water managers, with 
those that do provide incentives (table 10.7, rows 1 to 3, column 1 versus 2).  In the case of wheat 
and maize yields, while production in villages with managers that have positive incentives, those in 
villages that have moved to WUAs and contracting but have not provided incentives actually rise 
marginally.  In the case of rice, yields fall for villages that only reform nominally, but not as far as 
for villages that provide incentives to their managers.  Since the pattern in production is consistent, 
though  in  the  opposite  direction,  the  correlations  between  water  management  and  water  use, 
suggest that water savings through management reform may only be able to come at a cost of lower 
yields.  Similar evidence can be found when examining the yield under various water management 
type (table 10.8).   
Table 10.7.  Incentives, production, income and poverty in the sample irrigation districts, Ningxia 
and Henan Provinces, 2001. 
    Non-collective with  
incentives 
Non-collective without 
incentives  Collective 
Wheat yield (kg/ha)  4,340  4,827  4,800 
Maize yield (kg/ha)  5,328  6,031  5,801 
Rice yield (kg/ha)  6,288  6,499  7,155 
Income (yuan)  2,334  1,966  1,646 
Cropping income (yuan)  1,073  784  726 
Poverty incidence (%)  11.1  6.5  7.5 
Data source: Authors'  survey. 
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Table 10.8.  Relationship between water management and crop yield in the sampled irrigation 
districts, Ningxia and Henan Provinces, 2001. 
 
Crop yield (kg/ha) 
   
Wheat  Maize  Paddy 
Ningxia Province       
WID-N       
Collective   4,723  5,750  6,750 
WUA  4,677  5,644  6,764 
Contracting  4,653  4,700  8,182 
       
QID-N       
Collective   4,671  5,415  7,748 
WUA  4,738  6,667  8,125 
Contracting  4,220  5,697  6,324 
Henan Province       
PID-H       
Collective  5,453  7,295  6,298 
    Contracting  4,757  5,625  5,381 
Data sources: Authors'  survey. 
 
In contrast, the negative influence of water management reform on production does not 
appear in the descriptive statistics when examining farmer income (table 10.7).  Evidence from our 
survey  reveals  that  in  villages  in  which  leaders  reformed  their  water  management  system  and 
provided  incentives  to  managers,  farmers  actually  earn  higher  income  (table  10.7,  row  4).  
Surprisingly, crop income is also higher in villages that have provided managers with incentives 
(table 10.7, row 5).  Part of the explanation for the difference between yields and income may be 
due to the fact that water fees also fall in villages that have reformed.  It may also be that farmers 
are also shifting their production decisions and allocating labor to other enterprises in villages that 
provide water managers with incentives.  Econometric analysis is needed to isolate the effect of 
reform on income.  Econometric analysis also appears to be needed to distinguish between income 
and poverty effects; in contrast to the case of income, our descriptive data shows that poverty is 
worse in those villages that provide managers with incentives (table 10.7, row 6).  Similar evidence 
can also be found when either examining the incentive separately by water management type or 
directly by examining the relationship between income, poverty and water management type (tables 
10.9 and 10.10).   163 
Table 10.9.  Relationship between incentives mechanism, income and poverty in the sample irrigation 
districts, Ningxia Province, 2001. 





 (%)  
   (yuan)   (yuan)  Poor I  Poor II  Poor I  Poor II 
Whole samples              
  Non-collective with incentives  1,646  1,073  11.1   13.9   4.0   63.1  
  Non-collective without incentives  1,966  784  6.5   10.9   22.6   44.4  
  Collective  1,646  726  7.5   15.0   13.3   43.6  
Ningxia Province             
WID-N              
     WUA             
  With incentives  2,821   1,290   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0  
  Without incentives  2,137   665   8.3   8.3   18.2   39.3  
Contracting  Without incentives  1,833   792   0.0   20.0   0.0   24.2  
             
Collective  1,628   636   12.5   12.5   39.0   70.6  
             
QID-N             
WUA             
  With incentives  4,517   1,021   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0  
  Without incentives  2,103   737   9.1   9.1   19.4   42.4  
Contracting             
  With incentives  1,952   1,049   14.3   17.9   39.0   81.1  
  Without incentives  2,249   1,036   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0  
Collective  2,063   723   4.7   7.0   8.5   25.8  
     
Data sources: Authors’ survey.   
 
 
Table 10.10.  Relationship between water management, income and poverty in the sample irrigation 
districts, Ningxia and Henan Provinces, 2001. 
Income  Cropping 
income  Poverty incidence (%)  Poverty gap (%) 
  (yuan)   (yuan)  Poor I  Poor II  Poor I  Poor II 
Ningxia Province             
WID-N             
     Collective  1,628  636  12.5  12.5  39.0  70.6 
  WUA  2,308  821  6.25  6.25  13.6  29.5 
     Contracting  1,833  792  0  20  0.0  24.2 
QID-N             
     Collective  2,063  723  4.7  7.0  8.5  25.8 
  WUA  2,747  812  6.7  6.7  14.2  31.1 
    Contracting  2,025  1046  10.8  13.5  29.5  61.4 
Henan Province             
PID-H             
    Collective  1,387  732  10.0  13.3  22.3  52.3 
   Contracting  767  690  25.0  25.0  152.4  215.6 
Data sources: Authors’ survey.   
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MULTIVARIATE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
 
In addition to water management reform, other socio-economic factors also influence agricultural 
production, income and poverty.  In order to answer the question of whether water management 
reform affects outcomes, it is necessary to account for these other factors.  
To do so, we specify the link between agricultural production and its determinants as  
ijk Q  =  ijk ijk ijk ijk ijk D Z X W e d g b a + + + + +          (equation 10.3) 
where Qijk represents the yields of wheat, maize or rice from the ith plot of household j in village k.  
In equation (10.3), yields are explained by the variable of interest, Wijk, which measures water use 
per hectare, Xijk, which measures other inputs to the production process, Zijk which holds other 
factors constant, including characteristics of the production environment of the village, household 
and plot, and the irrigation district dummy, Dk. Agricultural production inputs include measures of 
per  hectare  use  of  labor  (measured  in  man-days),  fertilizer  (measured  in  aggregated  physical 
units
28)  and  expenditure  on  other  inputs,  such  as  fees  paid  for  custom  services.    The  control 
variables for village and household characteristics are the same as for equation (10.1) except that 
we do not use the village level cropping structure.  We also add five plot characteristics, including 
measures of soil types; plot location (distance from the plot to the farmer’s house); whether the crop 
on the plot is planted in rotation with another crop or not (single season equals one, or not); and 
production  shocks  (measured  as  yield  reduction  on  a  plot  due  to  floods,  droughts  or  other 
“disasters”).   
The impact of water management reform is measured through the water use variable.  If 
production responds positively to water use, then we can deduce that water management reform 
will have an effect in the opposite direction, because of its water reducing effect that we found in 
table 10.5.  However, because table 10.5 combined all crops together at the household level and in 
our production analysis we examined wheat, maize and rice separately at the plot level, we need to 
have separate measures of the effect of water management reform on water use by crop.  The 
results of these alternative water use equations are included in tables 10.11 to 10.14 and show that 
in the case of all crops, the coefficient on the variable measuring the presence of incentives in local 
water management institutions is negative (and is significantly so for wheat and rice).
29  Predictions 
from table 10.14 are used in the estimation of equation (10.3). 
 
                                                 
28 To measure fertilizer, we decomposed each type of fertilizer by nutrients, N, P and K, and then summed across nutrients 
and fertilizer types.  We also aggregated fertilizer by value and our main results of interest do not change.  
29 The analysis uses plot-level data for estimating the equation in tables 10.11 to 10.14.  We also use predicted values of 
water management reform for the estimation of the equations in tables 10.11 to 10.14 because of our concerns of 
endogeneity.   165 
 
Table 10.11.  Determinants of crop water use. 
  Water use per hectare (OLS) 
  Wheat  Maize  Paddy 
Share of WUA  2,255.986  3,395.103  -3,075.444 
  (2.79)***  (3.01)***  (0.49) 
Share of contracting  -2,205.524  -1,320.208  -11,914.241 
  (3.87)***  (1.54)  (2.21)** 
Share of surface water irrigation in the village  86.764  -1,744.847  7,958.702 
  (0.09)  (0.76)  (0.72) 
Dummy of village water scarcity  -1,787.228  -3,271.617  -12,168.564 
  (3.79)***  (4.35)***  (2.94)*** 
Irrigation investment per hectare in the village  -0.039  -0.067  -2.720 
  (0.80)  (1.02)  (2.57)** 
Share of village paddy area in 1995  -3,843.133  -1,817.755  10,722.165 
  (3.41)***  (0.91)  (0.92) 
Age of household head  -158.844  -476.665  2,066.124 
  (0.90)  (1.66)*  (1.26) 
Squared age of household head  1.296  4.915  -25.898 
  (0.67)  (1.56)  (1.43) 
Education of household head  -220.928  -140.816  -685.201 
  (3.38)***  (1.34)  (1.17) 
Arable land per hectare of household  -2,288.728  -6,788.718  16,390.889 
  (1.19)  (2.45)**  (1.12) 
Dummy of loam soil  -112.444  -765.201  -130.032 
  (0.22)  (0.93)  (0.03) 
Dummy of clay soil  -67.363  -372.336  211.629 
  (0.13)  (0.46)  (0.05) 
Distance to home  -127.374  945.883  -256.863 
  (0.37)  (1.40)  (0.13) 
Dummy of single season  673.435  1,399.946  -1,979.556 
  (0.86)  (1.29)  (0.15) 
QID-N  -3,104.925  -2,372.109  -8,834.134 
  (4.69)***  (2.60)**  (1.57) 
PID-H  -3,940.947  -4,615.587  -20,701.239 
  (4.39)***  (2.90)***  (1.27) 
LID-H  -5,829.946  -6,980.665  -33,627.756 
  (5.37)***  (2.77)***  (2.10)** 
Constant  16,687.821  24,459.819  8,110.669 
  (4.14)***  (3.60)***  (0.21) 
Observations  234  163  114 
Adjusted R-squared  0.46  0.37  0.28 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1%   166 
 
Table 10.12.  Determinants of crop water use. 
 
  Water use per hectare (OLS) 
  Wheat  Maize  Paddy 
Share of non-collective with incentives  -1,722.905  -149.290  -5,855.974 
  (2.38)**  (0.15)  (1.08) 
Share of non-collective without incentives  -646.837  66.540  -14,936.392 
  (1.01)  (0.07)  (2.37)** 
Share of surface water irrigation in the village  -120.083  -1,816.533  12,699.424 
  (0.12)  (0.75)  (1.06) 
Dummy of village water scarcity  -1,902.652  -3,559.408  -9,766.863 
  (3.79)***  (4.48)***  (2.23)** 
Irrigation investment per hectare in the village  0.072  0.030  -3.048 
  (1.41)  (0.43)  (2.72)*** 
Share of village paddy area in 1995  -3,267.589  -1,040.433  14,989.560 
  (2.77)***  (0.50)  (1.27) 
Age of household head  -22.885  -244.316  2,512.957 
  (0.12)  (0.81)  (1.52) 
Squared age of household head  -0.035  2.630  -29.986 
  (0.02)  (0.80)  (1.64) 
Education of household head  -223.285  -156.614  -723.308 
  (3.22)***  (1.41)  (1.24) 
Arable land per hectare of household  -1,658.672  -6,800.339  8,818.276 
  (0.80)  (2.26)**  (0.59) 
Dummy of loam soil  267.724  -250.803  2,749.737 
  (0.50)  (0.29)  (0.65) 
Dummy of clay soil  399.216  92.347  1,702.526 
  (0.76)  (0.11)  (0.41) 
Distance to home  -50.080  1,041.071  -529.377 
  (0.14)  (1.46)  (0.26) 
Dummy of single season  830.038  1,521.156  -3,069.680 
  (1.00)  (1.33)  (0.23) 
QID-N  -4,193.431  -3,574.588  -16,851.772 
  (6.17)***  (3.76)***  (2.78)*** 
PID-H  -5,438.175  -6,156.671  -27,861.832 
  (6.01)***  (3.73)***  (1.75)* 
LID-H  -7,231.488  -8,003.792  -39,427.152 
  (6.46)***  (3.03)***  (2.55)** 
Constant  14,008.835  19,544.812  229.366 
  (3.30)***  (2.76)***  (0.01) 
Observations  234  163  114 
Adjusted R-squared  0.39  0.30  0.28 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1%   167 
 
Table 10.13.  Determinants of crop water use. 
  Water use per hectare (2SLS) 
  Wheat  Maize  Paddy 
Share of WUA  1,527.027  3,060.689  -7,883.709 
  (1.86)*  (2.70)***  (1.23) 
Share of contracting  -3,535.795  -1,401.277  -20,337.877 
  (4.69)***  (1.28)  (3.04)*** 
Share of surface water irrigation in the village  -17.148  -1,751.480  5,921.161 
  (0.02)  (0.75)  (0.58) 
Dummy of village water scarcity  -1,654.577  -3,168.910  -9,057.027 
  (3.53)***  (4.15)***  (2.12)** 
Irrigation investment per hectare in the village  -0.026  -0.047  -2.642 
  (0.55)  (0.73)  (2.57)** 
Share of village paddy area in 1995  -3,853.002  -1,893.904  9,734.531 
  (3.46)***  (0.95)  (0.85) 
Age of household head  -132.378  -451.026  2,577.742 
  (0.76)  (1.55)  (1.58) 
Squared age of household head  1.046  4.707  -31.792 
  (0.54)  (1.47)  (1.77)* 
Education of household head  -203.618  -133.710  -744.190 
  (3.13)***  (1.25)  (1.30) 
Arable land per hectare of household  -1,249.648  -6,820.605  21,716.580 
  (0.64)  (2.39)**  (1.49) 
Dummy of loam soil  -66.753  -703.324  527.892 
  (0.13)  (0.85)  (0.12) 
Dummy of clay soil  0.020  -362.936  1,232.452 
  (0.00)  (0.44)  (0.30) 
Distance to home  -74.864  1,018.589  -311.140 
  (0.22)  (1.49)  (0.16) 
Dummy of single season  775.484  1,401.578  -1,688.249 
  (1.00)  (1.27)  (0.13) 
QID-N  -3,309.064  -2,528.298  -11,432.373 
  (5.13)***  (2.78)***  (2.09)** 
PID-H  -4,636.372  -4,957.582  -27,406.790 
  (5.20)***  (3.08)***  (1.71)* 
LID-H  -6,374.350  -7,106.642  -39,381.044 
  (5.91)***  (2.80)***  (2.52)** 
Constant  16,223.262  23,743.035  2,473.249 
  (4.04)***  (3.45)***  (0.07) 
Observations  234  163  114 
Adjusted R-squared  0.46  0.36  0.31 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1%   168 
 
Table 10.14.  Determinants of crop water use. 
  Water use per hectare (2SLS) 
  Wheat  Maize  Paddy 
Share of non-collective with incentives  -3,802.375  -2,107.654  -23,149.103 
  (2.83)***  (1.09)  (2.24)** 
Share of non-collective without incentives  -1,054.236  992.491  -5,943.309 
  (0.96)  (0.63)  (0.64) 
Share of surface water irrigation in the village  61.923  -1,555.108  1,018.291 
  (0.06)  (0.64)  (0.10) 
Dummy of village water scarcity  -1,911.910  -3,510.065  -11,202.815 
  (3.90)***  (4.45)***  (2.75)*** 
Irrigation investment per hectare in the village  0.110  0.090  -1.948 
  (1.79)*  (1.02)  (1.83)* 
Share of village paddy area in 1995  -3,210.399  -1,106.899  11,146.211 
  (2.79)***  (0.54)  (0.96) 
Age of household head  29.091  -251.383  2,779.020 
  (0.16)  (0.84)  (1.68)* 
Squared age of household head  -0.560  2.725  -32.915 
  (0.28)  (0.82)  (1.80)* 
Education of household head  -198.481  -144.878  -687.514 
  (2.91)***  (1.31)  (1.18) 
Arable land per hectare of household  -218.531  -5,470.061  25,745.862 
  (0.10)  (1.76)*  (1.61) 
Dummy of loam soil  347.962  -309.517  1,619.001 
  (0.66)  (0.36)  (0.38) 
Dummy of clay soil  358.484  -44.854  1,204.337 
  (0.68)  (0.05)  (0.29) 
Distance to home  -51.871  1,119.131  190.460 
  (0.15)  (1.57)  (0.10) 
Dummy of single season  841.530  1,429.926  -2,000.727 
  (1.04)  (1.25)  (0.15) 
QID-N  -4,141.450  -3,090.040  -10,489.498 
  (5.35)***  (2.86)***  (1.64) 
PID-H  -5,666.515  -5,686.672  -29,838.197 
  (5.59)***  (3.21)***  (1.81)* 
LID-H  -7,374.123  -7,398.282  -44,115.553 
  (6.16)***  (2.70)***  (2.77)*** 
Constant  12,469.815  18,713.794  -3,738.899 
  (3.00)***  (2.64)***  (0.10) 
Observations  234  163  114 
R-squared  0.41  0.31  0.30 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
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We also establish the following equation to examine the relationship between income and 
other factors: 
jk y  =  jk jk jk jk D Z M e g b a + + + +                        (equation 10.4) 
where yjk  represents either total or cropping income per capita or total income per capita for 
household j, and the other variables, including Mjk, our interested variable (a measure of incentives) 
are  the  same  as  in  equation  (10.1).    In  examining  the  effect  of  water  management  reform  on 
poverty, we proceed in largely the same way.  Because we are measuring poverty in terms of 
income,  one  would  use  largely  the  same  specifications  and  expect  similar  results,  albeit  with 
opposite signs.    
Almost  all  the  models  specified  on  production,  income  and  poverty  perform  well  and 
produce robust results that largely confirm our priority expectations (tables 10.15 to 10.22).  The 
goodness of fit measure for production and income models, the adjusted R
2, arrange from 0.16 to 
0.40.    Many  coefficients  of  our  control  variables  in  these  models  were  of  expected  sign  and 
statistically  significant.    For  example,  the  production  shock  not  only  negatively  influences 
agricultural  production,  but  also  reduces  farmer  income  and  adversely  affects  the  household’s 
poverty status.  Higher levels of land holdings also positively affect incomes.
30     
Our  results  show that reforming  water  management  reduces  wheat  yield  which  has  no 
significant impact on the yields of maize and rice.  From the wheat water use model, when villages 
provide water managers with incentives, managers reduce water use per hectare about 3,800 cubic 
meter,  a  decline  of  about  50  percent  (table  10.14,  column  1,  row  1).    At  the  same  time,  the 
coefficient  on  the  predicted  water  use  variable  in  the  wheat  yield  equation  is  positive  and 
statistically significant (table 10.16, column 1, row 1).  The estimated water use elasticity for wheat 
yield is 0.226.  Overall, our estimates of the size of the decline in water use and the responsiveness 
of wheat yields to water use imply that water management reform reduces wheat yields by about 11 
percent.  In contrast, although we find that incentives have a negative association on water use, the 
estimated water use elasticities for maize and rice are indistinguishable from zero (table 10.16, 






Table 10.15.  Determinants of crop yield. 
  Log of crop yield (OLS) 
  Wheat  Maize  Rice 
                                                 
30 Although the coefficients on the fertilizer variable in the maize and rice yield equations are positive, significant and 
similar to results found elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Putterman and Ciacu 1995), as found in much of the literature on 
cross- section production analysis at the household level, our other coefficients are insignificant due to measurement 
problems (e.g., we observe labor days, not effort), multicollinearity (e.g., when farmers use high levels of one input, they 
often use high levels of all other inputs), and endogeneity (management ability and weather shocks are not measured 
completely).   170 
Log of water use per hectare  0.122  0.118  0.032 
  (3.68)***  (2.42)**  (0.67) 
Log of label use per hectare  -0.025  0.069  0.004 
  (0.70)  (1.05)  (0.09) 
Log of fertilizer use per hectare  0.031  0.087  0.188 
  (0.67)  (1.40)  (2.61)** 
Log of other production fee per hectare  0.004  -0.004  0.015 
  (0.38)  (0.49)  (1.31) 
Share of surface water irrigation in the village  0.240  -0.003  0.066 
  (3.02)***  (0.02)  (0.41) 
Dummy of village water scarcity  0.022  0.077  0.074 
  (0.51)  (1.01)  (1.06) 
Irrigation investment per hectare in the village  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.80)  (1.16)  (2.01)** 
Age of household head  -0.023  -0.011  -0.020 
  (1.48)  (0.43)  (0.76) 
Squared age of household head  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (1.87)*  (0.56)  (0.46) 
Education of household head  0.015  0.008  -0.019 
  (2.35)**  (0.78)  (1.86)* 
Dummy of loam soil  0.098  0.134  0.083 
  (2.17)**  (1.81)*  (1.24) 
Dummy of clay soil  0.107  0.146  0.039 
  (2.33)**  (2.01)**  (0.60) 
Distance to home  -0.005  0.017  -0.013 
  (0.15)  (0.28)  (0.40) 
Dummy of single season  0.074  -0.001  -0.042 
  (1.01)  (0.01)  (0.18) 
Yield reduction due to production shock  -1.323  -0.991  -1.465 
  (9.68)***  (4.89)***  (7.32)*** 
QID-N  -0.019  0.033  -0.048 
  (0.36)  (0.43)  (0.66) 
PID-H  0.319  0.242  -0.013 
  (4.21)***  (1.72)*  (0.05) 
LID-H  0.309  0.095  0.338 
  (3.15)***  (0.40)  (1.18) 
Constant  7.243  6.716  7.775 
  (12.48)***  (8.12)***  (8.14)*** 
Observations  234  158  113 
Adjusted R-squared  0.41  0.19  0.36 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. 






Table 10.16.   Determinants of crop yield. 
  Log of crop yield (2SLS) 
  Wheat  Maize  Paddy 
Log of water use per hectare  0.226  0.043  0.148 
  (3.15)***  (0.32)  (1.05) 
Log of label use per hectare  -0.009  0.099  -0.003 
  (0.26)  (1.51)  (0.07) 
Log of fertilizer use per hectare  0.020  0.110  0.182   171 
  (0.44)  (1.75)*  (2.53)** 
Log of other production fee per hectare  -0.001  -0.002  0.018 
  (0.09)  (0.21)  (1.49) 
Share of surface water irrigation in the village  0.197  -0.027  0.103 
  (2.39)**  (0.13)  (0.62) 
Dummy of village water scarcity  0.086  0.029  0.133 
  (1.63)  (0.23)  (1.38) 
Irrigation investment per hectare in the village  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.51)  (1.18)  (2.21)** 
Age of household head  -0.028  -0.020  -0.029 
  (1.74)*  (0.76)  (1.04) 
Squared age of household head  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (2.13)**  (0.85)  (0.77) 
Education of household head  0.023  0.006  -0.016 
  (3.04)***  (0.55)  (1.45) 
Dummy of loam soil  0.081  0.137  0.077 
  (1.75)*  (1.80)*  (1.16) 
Dummy of clay soil  0.095  0.154  0.039 
  (2.04)**  (2.08)**  (0.60) 
Distance to home  -0.008  0.016  -0.016 
  (0.24)  (0.25)  (0.49) 
Dummy of single season  0.061  -0.010  -0.029 
  (0.82)  (0.09)  (0.13) 
Yield reduction due to production shock  -1.411  -1.026  -1.469 
  (10.37)***  (4.94)***  (7.45)*** 
QID-N  0.063  0.015  -0.030 
  (0.94)  (0.14)  (0.41) 
PID-H  0.392  0.215  0.099 
  (4.68)***  (1.18)  (0.33) 
LID-H  0.392  0.016  0.615 
  (3.48)***  (0.05)  (1.44) 
Constant  6.365  7.310  6.698 
  (7.96)***  (4.73)***  (4.27)*** 
Observations  234  158  113 
Adjusted R-squared  0.40  0.16  0.37 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10.17.  Determinants of farmer income. 
Total income  Cropping income   
OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS 
103.073  236.087  -191.709  -130.485  Share of WUA 
(0.29)  (0.65)  (1.37)  (0.91) 
-16.683  163.743  -79.765  -36.535  Share of contracting  (0.06)  (0.46)  (0.74)  (0.26) 
333.054  302.994  -102.181  -120.987  Share of surface water irrigation in the 
village  (0.72)  (0.66)  (0.57)  (0.67) 
137.652  136.974  -9.863  -6.801  Dummy of village water scarcity  (0.62)  (0.62)  (0.11)  (0.08) 
0.070  0.070  0.013  0.012  Irrigation investment per hectare in the 
village  (3.45)***  (3.49)***  (1.68)*  (1.56) 
186.339  168.896  -38.340  -48.109  Share of village paddy area in 1995  (0.38)  (0.35)  (0.20)  (0.26) 
175.109  170.340  55.381  54.189  Age of household head  (2.04)**  (1.98)**  (1.66)*  (1.61) 
-1.680  -1.623  -0.642  -0.629  Squared age of household head  (1.77)*  (1.70)*  (1.73)*  (1.69)* 
21.680  21.766  -7.830  -7.928  Education of household head  (0.69)  (0.69)  (0.64)  (0.65) 
3,391.259  3,262.361  3,244.717  3,219.093  Arable land per hectare of household  (3.09)***  (2.95)***  (7.47)***  (7.34)*** 
0.112  0.112      Production asset per capita  (3.51)***  (3.50)***     
    0.085  0.080  Agricultural production asset per capita 
    (1.86)*  (1.76)* 
-118.612  -120.898  -4.704  -5.461  Number of plots per household  (3.63)***  (3.70)***  (0.37)  (0.43) 
-231.967  -225.979  -183.512  -182.815  Dummy of production shock  (1.24)  (1.21)  (2.53)**  (2.51)** 
-209.746  -178.612  -206.507  -180.654  QID-N  (0.71)  (0.61)  (1.79)*  (1.59) 
-968.544  -912.979  -99.217  -76.784  PID-H  (2.17)**  (2.04)**  (0.57)  (0.44) 
-857.204  -804.823  -94.152  -69.873  LID-H  (1.59)  (1.50)  (0.45)  (0.33) 
-2,590.195  -2,520.228  -557.297  -540.841  Constant  (1.35)  (1.32)  (0.75)  (0.72) 
Observations  189  189  189  189 
Adjusted R-squared  0.24  0.24  0.36  0.35 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10.18.  Determinants of farmer income. 
Total income per capita  Cropping income per capita   
OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS 
175.109  688.980  -136.262  69.719  Share of non-collective with 
incentives  (0.53)  (1.08)  (1.06)  (0.28) 
-18.277  -108.274  -61.382  -95.177  Share of non-collective without 
incentives  (0.06)  (0.21)  (0.54)  (0.47) 
337.665  301.020  -112.871  -125.975  Share of surface water  irrigation 
in the village  (0.73)  (0.66)  (0.62)  (0.70) 
157.467  144.952  -15.764  -3.154 
Dummy of village water scarcity 
(0.70)  (0.66)  (0.18)  (0.04) 
0.069  0.056  0.012  0.007  Irrigation investment per hectare 
in the village  (3.37)***  (2.08)**  (1.54)  (0.65) 
198.901  198.012  -56.991  -59.428  Share of village paddy area in 
1995  (0.41)  (0.41)  (0.30)  (0.32) 
183.491  178.580  49.640  51.933 
Age of household head 
(2.13)**  (2.07)**  (1.48)  (1.53) 
-1.759  -1.710  -0.587  -0.609 
Squared age of household head 
(1.84)*  (1.79)*  (1.57)  (1.62) 
21.984  19.876  -7.920  -8.093 
Education of household head 
(0.70)  (0.63)  (0.65)  (0.66) 
3,291.145  3,034.111  3,270.769  3,167.299  Arable land per hectare of 
household  (2.99)***  (2.71)***  (7.48)***  (7.07)*** 
0.111  0.110     
Production asset per capita 
(3.49)***  (3.45)***     
-124.052  -127.845  -3.112  -7.441 
Number of plots per household 
(3.68)***  (3.79)***  (0.24)  (0.56) 
-229.269  -219.720  -183.171  -180.501 
Dummy of production shock 
(1.23)  (1.18)  (2.52)**  (2.47)** 
-285.847  -353.283  -144.761  -181.364 
QID-N 
(0.96)  (1.01)  (1.24)  (1.31) 
-1,044.013  -1,086.376  -36.442  -73.217 
PID-H 
(2.37)**  (2.17)**  (0.21)  (0.37) 
-924.558  -967.621  -35.554  -64.471 
LID-H 
(1.74)*  (1.68)*  (0.17)  (0.28) 
    0.081  0.080  Agricultural production asset per 
capita      (1.76)*  (1.74)* 
-2,707.916  -2,458.543  -472.618  -459.997 
Constant 
(1.41)  (1.29)  (0.63)  (0.61) 
Observations  189  189  189  189 
Adjusted R-squared  0.24  0.25  0.35  0.35 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10.19.  Determinants of poverty incidence. 
  Dummy of poverty incidence (OLS)  Dummy of poverty incidence (2SLS) 
  Poor I  Poor II  Poor I  Poor II 
Share of WUA  0.058  0.026  0.025  -0.018 
  (0.75)  (0.27)  (0.32)  (0.18) 
Share of contracting  0.067  0.151  0.045  0.118 
  (1.12)  (2.07)**  (0.59)  (1.25) 
-0.186  -0.365  -0.174  -0.340  Share of surface water  irrigation 
in the village  (1.86)*  (2.99)***  (1.74)*  (2.79)*** 
-0.005  -0.045  -0.009  -0.054 
Dummy of village water scarcity 
(0.10)  (0.77)  (0.18)  (0.92) 
-0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  Irrigation investment per hectare 
in the village  (0.83)  (0.49)  (0.73)  (0.44) 
0.007  0.138  0.013  0.148  Share of village paddy area in 
1995  (0.06)  (1.07)  (0.12)  (1.14) 
Age of household head  0.006  0.004  0.007  0.005 
  (0.32)  (0.19)  (0.36)  (0.23) 
-0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
Squared age of household head 
(0.46)  (0.40)  (0.50)  (0.44) 
Education of household head  -0.009  -0.009  -0.009  -0.010 
  (1.38)  (1.14)  (1.39)  (1.17) 
-0.289  -0.526  -0.270  -0.496  Arable land per hectare of 
household  (1.22)  (1.81)*  (1.12)  (1.68)* 
Production asset per capita  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.76)  (0.90)  (0.72)  (0.86) 
0.013  0.013  0.014  0.014 
Number of plots per household 
(1.89)*  (1.56)  (1.95)*  (1.65) 
Dummy of production shock  0.095  0.100  0.096  0.102 
  (2.35)**  (2.03)**  (2.35)**  (2.06)** 
QID-N  0.035  0.012  0.022  -0.003 
  (0.54)  (0.15)  (0.35)  (0.04) 
PID-H  0.046  -0.078  0.038  -0.079 
  (0.47)  (0.66)  (0.39)  (0.67) 
LID-H  -0.043  -0.008  -0.054  -0.017 
  (0.37)  (0.06)  (0.46)  (0.12) 
Constant  0.099  0.415  0.089  0.401 
  (0.24)  (0.82)  (0.21)  (0.79) 
Observations  189  189  189  189 
Adjusted R-squared  0.01  0.10  0.01  0.08 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10.20.  Determinants of poverty incidence. 
  Dummy of poverty incidence (OLS)  Dummy of poverty incidence (2SLS) 
  Poor I  Poor II  Poor I  Poor II 
Share of non-collective with incentives  0.086  0.136  0.057  -0.022 
  (1.21)  (1.56)  (0.41)  (0.13) 
0.032  0.073  -0.040  0.053  Share of non-collective without incentives  (0.52)  (0.95)  (0.36)  (0.39) 
-0.175  -0.344  -0.167  -0.328  Share of surface water irrigation in the 
village  (1.75)*  (2.80)***  (1.68)*  (2.68)*** 
Dummy of village water scarcity  0.001  -0.034  -0.008  -0.046 
  (0.03)  (0.57)  (0.16)  (0.78) 
-0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  Irrigation investment per hectare in the 
village  (1.07)  (1.12)  (0.85)  (0.36) 
Share of village paddy area in 1995  0.012  0.137  0.018  0.141 
  (0.12)  (1.07)  (0.17)  (1.09) 
Age of household head  0.007  0.002  0.009  0.002 
  (0.40)  (0.10)  (0.45)  (0.08) 
Squared age of household head  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.53)  (0.34)  (0.60)  (0.32) 
Education of household head  -0.009  -0.010  -0.010  -0.010 
  (1.39)  (1.16)  (1.40)  (1.14) 
Arable land per hectare of household  -0.297  -0.520  -0.261  -0.427 
  (1.24)  (1.78)*  (1.07)  (1.42) 
Production asset per capita  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.76)  (0.87)  (0.72)  (0.77) 
Number of plots per household  0.012  0.013  0.013  0.016 
  (1.70)*  (1.43)  (1.83)*  (1.78)* 
Dummy of production shock  0.095  0.101  0.095  0.099 
  (2.36)**  (2.04)**  (2.33)**  (1.98)** 
QID-N  0.017  0.020  -0.004  0.030 
  (0.26)  (0.25)  (0.05)  (0.32) 
PID-H  0.032  -0.056  0.004  -0.048 
  (0.33)  (0.48)  (0.03)  (0.36) 
LID-H  -0.055  0.015  -0.086  0.017 
  (0.48)  (0.11)  (0.68)  (0.11) 
Constant  0.083  0.455  0.087  0.439 
  (0.20)  (0.89)  (0.21)  (0.86) 
Observations  189  189  189  189 
Adjusted R-squared  0.01  0.09  0.01  0.07 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10.21.  Determinants of poverty gap. 
  Poverty gap (OLS)  Poverty gap (2SLS) 
  Poor I  Poor II  Poor I  Poor II 
Share of WUA  17.338  26.036  6.006  4.907 
  (0.78)  (0.65)  (0.26)  (0.12) 
Share of contracting  35.489  62.402  25.021  44.733 
  (2.05)**  (2.00)**  (1.11)  (1.10) 
-24.589  -93.682  -18.456  -82.965  Share of surface water irrigation in the 
village  (0.85)  (1.79)*  (0.64)  (1.59) 
-8.516  -15.893  -10.463  -19.470 
Dummy of village water scarcity 
(0.61)  (0.64)  (0.75)  (0.77) 
-0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  Irrigation investment per hectare in the 
village  (0.52)  (0.58)  (0.45)  (0.51) 
-3.644  24.919  -1.158  29.470 
Share of village paddy area in 1995 
(0.12)  (0.45)  (0.04)  (0.53) 
Age of household head  0.718  1.629  0.900  2.023 
  (0.13)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.21) 
-0.014  -0.035  -0.017  -0.041 
Squared age of household head 
(0.24)  (0.33)  (0.28)  (0.38) 
-3.528  -6.123  -3.598  -6.253 
Education of household head 
(1.79)*  (1.72)*  (1.81)*  (1.75)* 
-109.819  -219.884  -100.923  -204.486 
Arable land per hectare of household 
(1.60)  (1.77)*  (1.44)  (1.62) 
Production asset per capita  -0.001  -0.003  -0.001  -0.003 
  (0.73)  (0.88)  (0.68)  (0.83) 
3.925  7.403  4.163  7.817 
Number of plots per household 
(1.92)*  (2.00)**  (2.01)**  (2.10)** 
31.953  54.843  32.302  55.477 
Dummy of production shock 
(2.73)***  (2.60)**  (2.73)***  (2.60)** 
QID-N  8.981  17.713  4.786  10.051 
  (0.48)  (0.53)  (0.26)  (0.30) 
PID-H  40.045  37.121  38.785  34.572 
  (1.43)  (0.74)  (1.37)  (0.68) 
LID-H  -2.224  -5.397  -5.044  -10.712 
  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.15)  (0.17) 
Constant  18.800  93.659  16.326  87.970 
  (0.16)  (0.43)  (0.13)  (0.40) 
Observations  189  189  189  189 
R-squared  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.03 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10.22.  Determinants of poverty gap. 
  Poverty gap (OLS)  Poverty gap (2SLS) 
  Poor I  Poor II  Poor I  Poor II 
32.856  60.794  30.298  32.138 
Share of non-collective with incentives 
(1.59)  (1.63)  (0.75)  (0.44) 
21.979  33.829  -11.054  -10.078  Share of non-collective without 
incentives  (1.22)  (1.04)  (0.34)  (0.17) 
-20.680  -85.551  -15.730  -77.746  Share of surface water irrigation in the 
village  (0.71)  (1.63)  (0.54)  (1.49) 
Dummy of village water scarcity  -6.657  -11.760  -9.101  -16.946 
  (0.47)  (0.46)  (0.65)  (0.67) 
-0.001  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  Irrigation investment per hectare in the 
village  (0.91)  (1.06)  (0.90)  (0.77) 
Share of village paddy area in 1995  -2.834  26.202  -0.084  30.216 
  (0.09)  (0.48)  (0.00)  (0.55) 
Age of household head  0.440  1.286  1.191  2.092 
  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.22)  (0.21) 
Squared age of household head  -0.012  -0.034  -0.021  -0.044 
  (0.21)  (0.31)  (0.35)  (0.40) 
Education of household head  -3.587  -6.220  -3.661  -6.301 
  (1.82)*  (1.75)*  (1.84)*  (1.75)* 
-108.348  -218.730  -98.948  -191.879 
Arable land per hectare of household 
(1.56)  (1.75)*  (1.39)  (1.49) 
Production asset per capita  -0.001  -0.003  -0.001  -0.003 
  (0.71)  (0.86)  (0.66)  (0.79) 
Number of plots per household  3.840  7.086  4.012  7.862 
  (1.81)*  (1.85)*  (1.87)*  (2.03)** 
Dummy of production shock  31.969  55.014  31.974  54.615 
  (2.72)***  (2.60)**  (2.70)***  (2.56)** 
QID-N  8.909  16.442  -2.824  4.023 
  (0.48)  (0.49)  (0.13)  (0.10) 
PID-H  42.563  40.835  29.073  25.135 
  (1.53)  (0.82)  (0.91)  (0.44) 
LID-H  0.634  -0.901  -13.708  -18.614 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.37)  (0.28) 
Constant  25.006  102.947  23.221  99.627 
  (0.21)  (0.47)  (0.19)  (0.46) 
Observations  189  189  189  189 
R-squared  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.02 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
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If our plot-level analysis of water management and production are correct, then this would 
mean that in our sample areas the main trade-off between the water savings from management 
reform and production occurs for wheat and is less severe or absent for maize and rice.  The 
conclusion is plausible and, although its validity may only be valid for our sample region, it is 
consistent with many of the observations we made in the field.  Wheat is the crop that depends, 
more than any other, on irrigation because its growth period is almost entirely during the dry 
season.  Water cutbacks should be expected to reduce yields.  Maize, in contrast, is grown during 
the wet season and water managers who have an incentive to save water may be able to time their 
use of irrigation water with the rains while those who have no interest in saving water might adhere 
to  a  predetermined  water delivery  schedule,  no  matter  what the  weather.    In  the  case of  rice, 
although the crop is dependent on large volumes of irrigation water, experiments by domestic and 
international water scientists have shown that there are many new ways of managing rice irrigation 
(e.g., alternative wetting and drying – see Barker et.al 2002) that can lead to water savings but do 
not have significant yield effects in many cases.  New water management technologies, however, 
require efforts to learn and implement.  Our results, then, may demonstrate that it is managers with 
incentives who have been able and are willing to use these new technologies that have brought 
water savings without large-yield declines.  
Our research results also demonstrate that water management reform has no impact on 
farmer income status (tables 10.17  and 10.18).  When we use either OLS or 2SLS approaches, the 
incentive variable in both the total and cropping income  models is not statistically significant.  
Consistent with the descriptive statistics (which find no obvious fall in income in those villages that 
give water managers incentives), our results may suggest that whatever negative income effect 
there is from falling wheat production, it is being offset partially by reductions in water fees (water 
fees on an average drop by around 9% ).  It could also be that the average reduction in income due 
to lower wheat yields are small enough, 89 yuan (11% of average wheat yield, 4,740 kg per hectare, 
that they cannot be detected statistically.  Moreover, since the fall in household income is less than 
1.2 percent, the losses in cropping are likely to be offset by other actions taken by households (e.g., 
because water management is better, they can focus more on other economic activities).   
Similar results can also be found in the poverty model (tables 10.19 to 10.22).  Since we 
measure poverty status as “under the poverty line or not,” our results say that there is no effect of a 
village’s decision to provide water managers with incentives on a household poverty status.  If 
universally true, such a finding would be important, since critics of water management reforms 
often point out that one possible adverse consequence of using incentives to induce water reform is 
that managers may cut back on water deliveries to marginal users, who may also be those on the 
poorest land.  Our results here, however, should be interpreted with caution.  First, we have not 
identified what may be behind this result.  In many villages, leaders have specified strict rules in 
their agreements with water managers that they cannot exclude households from water allocation 
schedules.  Second, as seen by examining the estimated equations in table 10.20, only a few of the 
coefficients are significant, a sign that our sample may be too small to identify poverty effects.  In 
short,  though  interesting,  we  believe  our  current  results  may  be  more  important  as  raising   179 
awareness of possible associations rather than as definitive.  Future research should try to pinpoint 







In this chapter, we have sought to understand the evolution of China’s surface water management 
systems and their effect on water use, output, income and poverty.  Research results show that since 
1990, especially after 1995, collective management has been replaced by non-collective, WUAs or 
contracting.    In  some  regions,  non-collective  management  forms  have  become  the  dominated 
pattern.  Innovation of water management has reflected many stakeholders’ interests, such as upper 
and local governments, village leaders and farmers; in particular, policy makers’ intervention in the 
reform seems to play an important role that made the spatial variation of the reform.   
Designing the reform is one issue, implementing it is another issue.  Despite the fact that 
the reform has been considered by governments as being designed well, effectively implementing 
the reform seems to be out of policy makers’ control and should be highly emphasized.  The major 
difference between non-collective and collective is the incentives faced by managers.  Proving the 
importance  of  incentives  mechanism  for  water  management  is  one  of  our  important  results.  
Research shows that if managers are provided with positive incentives to earn money by saving 
water, they will try to improve water management, water delivered to farmers will be significantly 
reduced.  More importantly, our analysis found that even water management with incentives will 
reduce  water  use, it  will not  produce  negative  impacts  on farmers’  output  (except for  wheat), 
income and poverty.  Although this result needs to be further explored in the long term, at least in 
the short term, the concern on potential negative impact of water management seems to be un-
necessary.  
Overall, we propose that the government should continue to support the water management 
reform.  However, contrary to the beginning stage, more emphasis should be put on the effective 
implementation of the reform.  Although the negative impact on farmers have not been found in the 
short term, in the long term, government still needs to focus on this issue and take some measures 
to promote the healthy development of water reform.  Since reform will lead to water saving under 
the directives of policy makers’ design, how a large scope of water should be saved and how to 
efficiently reallocate the saved water to some water-short regions that can maximize social benefits, 
are  the  other  two  important  issues  that  need  to  be  further  explored  by  researchers  and  policy 
makers. 




Summary and Conclusions 
 
Based on the field survey in the four sample IDs of the Ningxia and the Henan Provinces along the 
YRB,  we  systematically  examined  the  relationship  between  irrigation,  water  management  and 
poverty.  We also compared the various pro-poor implications under irrigation and non-irrigation 
conditions applying the data collected from six provinces.  Through both statistical description and 
multivariate analysis, our research provides many interesting and important results, which have 
significant policy implications in guiding future pro-poor strategy by reforming water management.  
We summarize our conclusions in the following several points: 
1. Reforming water management with well-implemented incentives can increase water use 
efficiency with no adverse impact on poverty.  Research results show that since 1990 especially 
after 1995, collective management has been replaced by non-collective management, WUAs or 
contracting.  The major difference between non-collective and collective is the incentives faced by 
managers.  Research shows that if managers are provided with positive incentives to earn money by 
saving water, they will try to improve water management, and water delivered to farmers will be 
significantly reduced.  More importantly, our analysis found that even water management with 
incentives will reduce water use; it will not produce negative impacts on farmers’ output (except for 
wheat), income and poverty.  Although this result needs to be further explored in the long term, at 
least in the short term, the concern regarding potential negative impact of water management seems 
to be un-necessary.  
2.  There  is  scope  for  improving  performance  of  irrigation  systems  under  existing 
conditions, with effective and improved institutional arrangements.  Government should continue to 
support  the  water  management  reform  while,  more  emphasis  should  be  put  on  the  effective 
implementation of the reform.  Although the negative impact on farmers have not being found in 
the short term,  in  the  long  term,  government  still needs  to  focus  on  this  issue  and  take  some 
measures to promote the healthy development of water reform.  Since reform will lead to water 
saving under the directives of the policy makers’ design, how large scope of water should be saved 
and how to efficiently reallocate the saved water to some water-short regions that can maximize 
social benefits are the other two important issues that need to be further explored by researchers and 
policy makers. 
3. Faced with increasing water scarcity, pro-poor strategies combining market measures 
water right innovation, water allocation improvement and increasing water pricing also should be 
emphasized by the policy markers.  Our results show that water ownership belongs to the State and 
reforming water rights system is necessary but needs to consider its potential influence on the poor.  
Although policy markers consider the equity aspects of water allocation, practices show that the 
effective implementation of equal allocation seems to be hard.  Despite continuously increasing 
water prices over the past several decades, China' s agricultural water is believed to be much under-  181 
priced and should be increased.  Due to time and financial limit, our research has not in detail 
identified the impacts of reforming water rights, allocation and pricing on the pro-poor, however, 
these important issues will be focused in future related research.  
4. Our results show that command areas of specific canal reaches receiving less irrigation 
water per hectare will not necessarily have lower productivity and a higher incidence of poverty.  
IDs in the upper reach have been allocated more water than those in the lower reach, the difference 
is  more  obvious  across  provinces.    However,  distribution  of  output  exhibits  relatively  equal 
characteristics  that  greatly  differ  from  other  Southeast  Asian  countries.    As  a  result,  water 
productivity in the lower IDs is obviously higher than that in the upper IDs.  In addition, poverty 
distribution along the IDs has not presented consistent patterns regarding their access to water.  
While  it  could  be  that  access  to  water  and  irrigated  land  accounts  for  some  of  the  income 
differences of households, a number of other factors appear to be correlated with income levels of 
our sample households in the IDs.  
5. Our results demonstrate that under existing conditions, small, marginal and poor farmers 
will not necessarily receive less benefit from irrigation than large and non-poor farmers.  Our 
research shows that small and large farmers have relatively equal access to water.  It is worthy to 
note that the equal water accessibility among farmers (or even in favorable of the poor) is not only 
achieved through water related institutions and water policies.  It may be that there are several 
policies that are working together to achieve this result (a finding that could have lessons for other 
developing countries).  These policies include equal distribution of land, rapid expansion of off-
farm employment, and the allocation and distribution of irrigation water based on the size of a 
farm’s cultivated land. By controlling the influence of other factors, the large-size farmers earn 
more  income  than  smaller  farmers.    Access  to  water  and  water  reliability  have  a  significant 
relationship  with  the  pro-poor  in  our  sample  IDs.    Even  we  have  not  found  that  irrigation 
investment can significantly improve the poverty situation, econometric results demonstrate the 
significant relationship between irrigation investment and farmer income.   
6. By comparing the differences between irrigation and non-irrigation conditions, our study 
provides evidence of irrigation’s strong impact on yield and cropping revenue, both descriptively 
and in the multivariate analysis.  Unlike some of the literature that used aggregate data, we find that 
irrigation increases yields and cropping revenue when we look at either different crops or examine 
grain or crops as whole.  Moreover, we find that although the marginal impact of irrigation on 
revenue appears to be higher in richer areas, since the poor relies more on cropping revenue, our 
findings suggest that farmers in poor areas increase their incomes relatively more than farmers in 
richer areas.  
If irrigation has such a great effect on agricultural performance it is no wonder why so 
much of the budget of many countries has gone towards irrigation in the past.  Moreover, although 
the costs of the project must be considered, the disinterest that seems to be beginning to pervade the 
international  community  in  irrigation,  needs  to  be  questioned.    Our  findings  of  the  effect  of 
irrigation on the income of those in poor areas mean that poverty alleviation programs, in particular, 





Key Interventions and Actions: The Way Forward 
 
 
According to our major results, we propose the following pro-poor interventions and action plans to 
improve the performance of irrigation systems while simultaneously benefiting the poor farmers in 
the IDs:   183 
Table 12.1. Major issues, pro-poor intervention and action plan. 
Issues  Pro-poor intervention  Action plan 
Unbalanced development of water 
management reform  
Promote water management 
reform based on local conditions 
1)  Analyzing system performance gaps, understanding what changes are required and feasibility of water 
management reform; 
2)  Conducting extensive discussion with upper and local governments, farmers and other stakeholders, 
mobilizing extensive political and legal support; 
3)  Visiting the reformed regions, learning the experience and lessons 
4)  Based on full discussions and analyses, drafting and issuing policy documents on the reform; 
5)  5) Facilitating teams to work on the process and evaluation. 
Poor incentive mechanism to 
managers 
Establish and perfect incentive 
mechanism to managers 
1)  Setting objectives of the reform:  Objectives generally include increasing water use efficiency, improving 
irrigation infrastructure conditions, timely supply of water, increasing agricultural productivity and farmer 
income, pulling farmers out of poverty status; 
2)  Putting the objectives of the reform into a formal contract, based on the agreed performance standards and 
actual performance, decide how much profit or welfare  managers can get, i.e., connecting the welfare of 
managers with their performance. 
3)  Monitoring and evaluating the performance of management by governments, farmers and other stakeholders. 
If the performance is far lower than the standard, contracting with managers should be stopped. 
No or not enough farmer 
participation 
Encourage farmer participation in 
water management 
1)  Conducting extensive discussions with farmers on the feasibility of the reform, benefiting from an open 
exchange of ideas; 
2)  Building consensus among stakeholders on the choice of management type and possible institutional change; 
3)  Selecting representatives of farmers and stakeholders to elect the management board of the new management 
organization; 
4)  Under the guidance and assistance of upper-level government, the management board and representative of 
farmers should be involved in drafting the management rules of the organization; 
5)  Organizing regular meetings to discuss some management issues to make sure that organizations keep up with 
the changing needs and demands in the external environment. 
6)  Farmers or their representatives should actively participate in the evaluation and monitoring of the 
performance of the management.   184 
Weak legal support and poor 
definition of water right 
Strengthen the establishment of 
legal system for supporting water 
management reform 
1) Issuing regulations to formally adopt the water management policies; 
2) Providing legal status to water management organizations; 
3) Legally identifying the rights and responsibilities of water management organizations; 
4) Legally defining the resolution procedure for water conflict; 
5) Legally defining water rights;  
6) Granting clear water rights to water management organizations and then to the users 
7) Promoting and encouraging the development of water markets while fully considering the potential negative 
influence on the poor farmers 
Absence of capacity building on 
water management 
Provide training on the technical 




   
Government should provide the following training for water managers:  
1)  Water measurement 
2)  Canal operation and maintenance 
3)  O&M audits 
4)  Rehabilitation and modernization 
Water saving technologies 
Low water charges  Increase water charge and reform 
water fee structure 
1) Gradually increasing water charge level to promote water savings while providing certain subsidies to poor 
farmers; 
2)  Reforming the structure of water fee, adopting the combination of basic and  volumetric water fee structure.  
Fragmentation of water 
management 
Promote integrated river basin 
management 
1)  Strengthening the integrated river basin water management through empowering the river basin commission; 
2)  Efficiently allocating water among regions and sectors while fully considering the equity issues through 
applying some policy measures; 
3)  Assessing the potential of real water saving in the river basin and assessing the overall welfare of water 
management reform. 
Poor physical condition  Improve physical condition by 
increasing investment and 
subsidies 
Government should continue to provide investment and subsides for periodic rehabilitation of the irrigation 
system to stimulate, not discourage, investment in maintenance by the water users. 
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Appendix A: Calculation of crop water use. 
   At first, we checked the variable of water use per irrigation by crops estimated by canal 
managers and village leaders, then we averaged their information to get an average water use per 
irrigation by crops in the village.  According to our survey, near 80 percent of village leaders and 
canal managers can give a relative accurate estimation on this number, which are generally 
consistent with local officials’ estimation or their experimental results.  If existing some heretical 
data, we will adjust them by the secondary source data and other villages’ estimation those having 
similar physical and water conditions.  For the rest of the villages that are hard to estimate water 
use by crops, they can provide the information on irrigation hours per mu and water depth in the 
field by crops.  Since these information are also provided by those villages that have water use 
estimation, we will compare these information and then get an estimation of water use per 
irrigation by crops if these villages have similar physical and water conditions.  Finally, each 
village will get one estimation on average water use per irrigation by crops.  We apply this 
information to each sample household and mutiply it by irrigation times of crops per year in 
certain land plot answered by farmers and then get annually total water use in the sample land 
plots of farm households.  Household average water use of certain crop is the average water uses 
of all the plots that planting this crop.   189 
 
Appendix B:  Statistic Description of Major Variables. 
  Mean  Standard 
deviation  Minimum   Maximum 
Dummy of WUA management  0.14  0.34  0  1 
Dummy of Contracting   0.22  0.39  0  1 
Dummy of non-collective with incentives  0.16  0.36  0  1 
Dummy of non-collective without incentives  0.20  0.39  0  1 
Dummy of governmental intervention for WUA  0.14  0.35  0  1 
Dummy of government intervention for Contracting  0.30  0.46  0  1 
Age of village leader (year)  43  7  29  55 
Education of Village leader (year)  9  3  0  15 
Dummy of village surface water irrigation  0.73  0.41  0  1 
Dummy of village water scarcity  0.27  0.45  0  1 
Village irrigation investment (yuan/ha)  2,824  4,881  0  33,943 
Share of village rice area in 1995 (%) 
  0.19  0.21  0  0.80 
Household crop water use per hectare (m
3/ha  15,365  8,739  627  44,580 
Wheat water use per hectare (m
3/ha) 
  5,937  3,909  300  21,000 
Maize water use per hectare (m
3/ha) 
  6,936  4,802  360  27,750 
Rice water use per hectare (m
3/ha) 
  28,882  18,572  1,381  89,072 
Household total income (yuan)  1,855  1,426  -42  11,087 
Household cropping income (yuan)  806  604  -135  4,285 
Dummy of poverty  0.08  0.27  0  1 
Age of household head (year)  44  9  24  66 
Education of household head (year)  6  3  0  15 
Arable land per hectare of household (ha)  0.17  0.12  0.03  1.03 
Production asset per capita (yuan)  1,434  2,972  2  32,533 
Agricultural production asset per capita (yuan)  906  857  1  4,800 
Number of plots per household (number)  7  4  1  23 
Dummy of production shock  0.52  0.50  2  1 
Wheat yield (kg/ha)  4,740  1,253  375  8,625 
Maize yield (kg/ha)  5,760  1,770  600  10,125 
Rice yield (kg/ha)  6,900  1,740  1,125  12,855 
Data source: Authors’ survey.   190 
Appendix C:  Number of Plots by Irrigation Type. 
1  2  3  4  5 
   
Total Plots 
(2)+(5)  Irrigated Plots 






Major Grains -Aggregate           
  Rice    1,813  1,688  1,609  42  125 
  Wheat    1,097  721  379  315  376 
  Maize  1,218  552  257  274  666 
Major Grains – by Season            
  Single Season Rice   1,169  1,053  1,000  33  116 
  Early Season Rice   197  194  192  1  3 
  Late Season Rice   197  194  192  1  3 
  Single Season Wheat  149  18  9  9  131 
  Wheat-Rice Rotation   239+239  237+237  215+215  6+6  2+2 
  Wheat-Maize Rotation   495+495  339+339  118+118  210+210  155+155 
 
Wheat-Other Crop 
Rotation  224  136  46  89  88 
  Single Season Maize   486  87  34  48  399 
 
Maize-Other Crop 
Rotation  237  126  105  16  111 
 
Coarse Grains 
b   348  134  47  84  214 
 
Tubers 
c  612  255  230  16  357 
Cash Crops            
  Cotton   152  133  19  114  19 
  Peanut  126  81  12  68  45 
Data Source: Authors’ survey. 
a Number of irrigated plots include plots irrigated by surface water, by groundwater and by both (conjunctively). Number of 
plots irrigated conjunctively is not reported here because it is less than 2% of total number of plots. Thus column (3) and 
column (4) does not sum up to column (2). 
b Coarse grains includes sorghum, millet, pearl millet, buckwheat and others. 
c Tubers includes white potatoes and sweet potatoes.   191 
Appendix D: The Impact of Irrigation on Crop Yield with Village fixed effect. 
    Dependent Variables: Crop Yield 
b 
  Wheat  Maize  Cotton  Coarse Grain  Tuber 
    Equation1  Equation2  Equation1  Equation2  Equation1  Equation2  Equation1  Equation2  Equation1  Equation2  Equation3     
Irrigation Status                          
 
Irrigated (by 
Surface Water  
0.115    0.149    -0.08    0.145 
 
-0.26    0.019   
  or Groundwater)  (2.97)***    (4.24)***    -0.56    -1.05    (2.50)**    -0.17   
 
Irrigated by Surface 












      (2.08)**    (2.77)***    -0.54    (2.33)**    (2.31)**    -0.4 
 
Irrigated by 












      -1.11    (3.55)***    -0.28    -0.99    -0.79    -0.5 
Land Characteristics                         
  Good Soil Quality   0.138  0.14  0.125  0.123  0.56  0.561  -0.13  -0.113  0.171  0.171  0.172  0.173 
    (4.88)***  (4.93)***  (3.91)***  (3.85)***  (4.59)***  (4.54)***  -1.31  -1.12  -1.61  -1.61  (1.69)*  (1.70)* 
  Topography-Plain   0.062  0.06  0.089  0.094    0.271  0.483  0.598  0.026  0.019  0.107  0.115 
           -0.77  -0.74  -0.94  -1    -0.92  -1.13  -1.39  -0.08  -0.06  -0.36  -0.38 
  Topography-Hill  0.035  0.031  0.114  0.114      0.593  0.684  -0.021  -0.015  0.056  0.064 




0.022  0.019  -0.024  -0.021  0.193  0.193  0.003  -0.024  -0.019  -0.019  -0.02  -0.021 
    -1.57  -1.37  -1.11  -0.98  (2.71)***  (2.70)***  -0.05  -0.35  -0.33  -0.32  -0.37  -0.37 
Shock: Severity of 
Disaster 
c  
-0.008  -0.008  -0.012  -0.012  -0.003  -0.003  -0.013  -0.013  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 
  (10.43)***  (10.32)***  (17.23)***  (16.91)***  -1.54  -1.52  (5.89)***  (5.76)***  -0.9  -0.91  -0.98  -1 
Crop growing length 
d   
0.093  0.091  -0.091  -0.086  0.062  0.062  -0.067  -0.075  0.216  0.221  0.288  0.288 
  (1.71)*  (1.67)*  (2.12)**  (1.98)**  -0.54  -0.53  -0.47  -0.54  (1.85)*  (1.88)*  (2.55)**  (2.55)** 
South Non-irrigated 
Potato                     
1.243  1.261 
                      (6.24)***  (6.32)*** 
Number of Plots   1027  1027  1112  1112  141  141  277  277  509  509  509  509 
Number of Villages  43    47  47  10  10  38  38  50  50  50  50 
R-square   0.15  0.14  0.28  0.28  0.26  0.26  0.17  0.19  0.03  0.03  0.11  0.11 
a Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
b Dependent variable in log form. Estimate using fixed effect model at household level.
 
c Severity of Disaster means percentage reduction of production.
 
d A dummy variable that is 1 if the crop is not grown in conjunction with other crops during the year and is 0 if it is cultivated in rotation with other crops.
 
 